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Abstract 
 
Payments for Environmental services (PES) has been considered a cost-effective instrument 
to deal with negative externalities such as CO2 emissions and loss of biodiversity, in addition 
to providing co-benefits such as poverty reduction. Costa Rica has been considered a success 
among developing countries for regaining forest cover after high deforestation trends in the 
1960s and 1970s and the PSA (‘Pagos Por Servicios Ambientales’) program implemented in 
1996, has been partly credited for this. However, the program, like many PES schemes, have 
also being criticized for low environmental effectiveness due to lack of additionality (i.e. the 
forest would have been preserved anyway; without payments), high transaction- and 
compliance costs, and the obstacles to participate that smallholders face.  
 
This thesis evaluates PES schemes in the canton of Hojancha in Costa Rica with respect to 
environmental effectiveness, economic effectiveness and equity. Evaluating two contract 
types, forest protection and reforestation (timber plantations), the results seem to support the 
general critic of the country’s PSA program. Reforestation seems to provide most of the 
additionality (additional forest cover/environmental effectiveness). However, high 
participation costs appear to be an issue lowering cost-effectiveness, especially compliance 
costs for reforestation participants, and impeding participation for many potential participants.  
Also, the PSA applicants are characterized by having large properties, which supports the 
notion of smallholders being less likely to participate in the PSA program.  There are, 
however, also other issues that need to be considered when evaluating the success of this PES 
scheme; including the Forest Law which prohibits forest clearing, leading to low 
additionality; and the question of whether timber plantations provide actual environmental 
services. 
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Sammendrag 
 
Betaling for økosystemtjenester (PES) har vært sett på som et kostnadseffektivt virkemiddel 
for å håndtere negative eksternaliteter som CO2-utslipp og tap av biodiversitet, i tillegg til å 
bidra til andre fordeler, som fattigdomsreduksjon. Costa Rica har vært sett på som en suksess 
blant utviklingsland for å gjenvinne skogdekke etter å ha hatt høy avskogingsrate i 1960 og 
70-årene, og PSA (Pagos Por Servicios Ambientales) programmet som ble innført i 1996 har 
delvis fått æren for dette. Programmet er likevel, slik som mange PES programmer blitt 
kritisert for lav miljøeffektivitet som en følge av mangel på addisjonalitet (dvs. at skogen ville 
blitt bevart i alle fall, uten betaling), høye transaksjons- og gjennomføringskostnader, og for 
hindringer for å delta som små landeiere møter på. 
 
Denne oppgaven evaluerer PES programmet i kommunen Hojancha i Costa Rica med hensyn 
på miljøeffektivitet, økonomisk effektivitet og likhet. Etter å ha evaluert to kontrakttyper, 
skogbevaring og gjenskoging (tømmerplantasjer), ser resultatene ut til å vise at de støtter den 
generelle kritikken av landets PSA program. Gjenskoging ser ut til å sørge for det meste som 
er av addisjonalitet (tillegg i skogdekket/miljøeffektivitet). Uansett ser høye 
deltakelseskostnader ut til å være noe som reduserer kostnadseffektiviteten, spesielt 
gjennomføringskostnader for deltakerne i gjenskoging, og hindrer deltakelse for mange 
potensielle deltakere. I tillegg er et kjennetegn ved PSA-søkerne at de ser ut til å ha større 
eiendommer, noe som støtter antakelsen om at det er mindre sannsynlighet for at små 
landeiere deltar i PSA programmet. Det er likevel andre ting som må tas med i betraktning 
ved en evaluering av graden av suksess for dette PES programmet, som inkluderer skogloven 
fra 1996 som forbyr hogst av skog, noe som fører til lav addisjonalitet; i tillegg til spørsmålet 
om tømmerplantasjer fører til faktiske miljø/økosystemtjenester. 
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Summary 
 
The negative environmental effects caused by deforestation, have the last decades received 
increased attention, and various policies have been developed in order to deal with the 
challenges and negative externalities in terms of CO2 emissions and loss of biodiversity. 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is an instrument believed to be cost-effective 
compared to traditional command-and-control measures. Costa Rica implemented their PES 
program ‘Pagos Por Servicios Ambientales’ (PSA) in 1996 and has been considered a pioneer 
and success as a developing country dealing with its deforestation problems in the 1960s and 
70s. Four contract modalities exist today, including two of them on forest protection and 
reforestation (timber plantations). The program has been criticized for low environmental 
effectiveness, hence low opportunity cost of land among especially protection participants, 
leading to low additionality, especially; high transaction- and compliance costs for 
participants leading to lower cost-effectiveness, and that participants often are larger 
landowners, better educated etc. 
 
I have performed a case study in the canton of Hojancha and surrounding areas in Costa Rica, 
evaluating environmental effectiveness, economic effectiveness and equity. Concerning 
environmental effectiveness (in terms of forest cover), I have looked at opportunity cost 
factors of land for participants vs. non-participants and for protectection participants vs. 
reforestation participants. Regarding environmental effectiveness, I have calculated 
transaction- and compliance costs to find out how large part of the payments they represent in 
addition to looking at factors concerning landowners not participating in PSA. I have also 
looked at the opportunity costs of land for contract applicants vs. recipients concerning cost-
effectiveness. As to equity, I have studied factors affecting participation in PES.  
 
Hojancha is one of the first places in the country where incentives for reforestation were 
introduced, and where the recovery of the landscape has been significant the past decades. 
Today, a large part of all contracts signed in this area are reforestation contracts, as compared 
to the rest of the country, where it represents only a small percentage. 
 
The theory the study is based on is primarily the ‘Public Private Benefits framework’ by 
Pannel, D.J. (2008), stating that negative incentives (protection contracts) should be used in 
	  
ix	  
cases with positive private net benefits, negative public net benefits and public net costs 
outweighing the private net benefits. In order for the incentives to work efficiently, the 
payments should thus not be provided unless there would be undertaken changes to land use 
in the absence of them. The opposite applies to positive incentives (reforestation), which 
should only be used in cases with negative private net benefits and private net costs should 
not outweigh public net benefits. When it comes to transaction- and compliance costs, or 
“learning costs”, these are important as there in the presence of such costs may be need for 
increasing payments to make it privately profitable for landowners to enjoy the program. 
Landholders that in the end might have resulted with positive private net benefits may be 
prevented from entering the program.  
 
I performed a household survey, interviewing 207 farmers, inkluding 31 protection 
participants, 32 in reforestation, and 135 non-participants who had never had a PSA contract. 
For opportunity cost factors and differences between participants/non-participants and 
protection/reforestation contracts, I performed a logistic regression for binary response. As to 
transaction- and compliance costs, appliance costs and establishment- (plantation), 
maintenance- and other similar costs were calculated and the percentage was compared to the 
payment levels of the respective contract type. I also had data on self-reported alternative 
land-uses in case of not receiving payments, main uses of payments, reasons for not 
participating among the non-participants, and main issues that should be improved to the 
program according to participants. 
 
Regarding the results; as to the environmental effectiveness, there was found little evidence of 
less opportunity costs of land for participants than for non-participants. As to differences 
between protection and reforestation contract land, there was found a few significant 
variables. However, the results were supported by the self-reported land-use alternatives in 
the absence of payments stated by the landholders, in addition to the main uses of the 
payments. This indicated higher opportunity costs of land for reforestation participants than 
protection participants, thus higher additionality, and in addition that reforestation payments 
seem to appear as a subsidy for timber production. There are however, critics concerning what 
kind of environmental services the reforestation contract actually provide, due to the issue that 
for example some tree species are very nutrient demanding in addition to the trees being 
permitted to harvest after 15 years. 
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When it comes to the cost-effectiveness issue, transaction- and compliance costs, the 
transaction costs (appliance costs) do not appear to be very high among participants, but 
compliance costs, especially for reforestation participants, appear to be substantial relative to 
the payment level. There is however high variation in the data. In addition, there are most 
likely costs that are not included in the calculation. Regarding non-participants, transaction- 
and compliance costs of PSA and low payment level appear to be a key factor that many 
landholders do not apply. These costs thus appear to be high and prevent several landholders 
from participation and hence also likely to prevent cost-effectiveness. Regarding the 
opportunity cost and cost-effectiveness related to applicants and recipients, there did not seem 
to be much difference. There does hence not seem to be any specific selection when it comes 
to landowners with lower opportunity costs.  
 
As to the equity perspective, several variables turned out to be significant, even though not all 
with the expected sign. However, it gives some indications that there are certain 
characteristics typical to participants also in the case study area, but it may be that the 
presence of intermediary plays a role to some extent. Data on reasons that non-participants 
give for not applying and opinions from participants on what should be improved support the 
hypotheses of high transaction costs and low payments being a major obstacle. 
 
The results from Hojancha and the surrounding areas seem to support many of the general 
critics of PES, such as lack of environmental and economic effectiveness. The canton is as 
mentioned a particular place, and there has been a considerable development and 
improvement in forest cover and these things need to be taken into consideration for 
designing such a program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
xi	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
xii	  
Table	  of	  contents	  	  
Preface	  ...................................................................................................................................	  iv	  
Abstract	  .................................................................................................................................	  vi	  
Sammendrag	  ......................................................................................................................	  vii	  
Summary	  ............................................................................................................................	  viii	  
Table	  of	  contents	  ................................................................................................................	  xi	  
Lists	  of	  tables	  and	  	  figures	  ............................................................................................	  xiii	  
Abbreviations	  ...................................................................................................................	  xvi	  	  
1	   Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................	  1	  
1.1	   Background	  ........................................................................................................................................	  1	  
1.2	   Problem statement and hypotheses	  ...............................................................................................	  4	  
1.3	   Outline of the thesis	  ..........................................................................................................................	  7	  
2	   Case	  study	  site	  and	  Costa	  Rica’s	  PSA	  program	  ....................................................	  8	  
2.1	   Costa Rica	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  8	  
2.2	   Guanacaste	  ......................................................................................................................................	  10	  
2.3	   Hojancha	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  11	  
2.4	   Costa Rica’s PSA program	  ...........................................................................................................	  14	  
2.4.1	   ‘Pagos Por Servicios Ambientales’, PSA	  .........................................................................................	  14	  
2.4.2	   The contract modalities	  ..........................................................................................................................	  15	  
2.4.3	   Administration, FONAFIFO and previous incentive programs	  ................................................	  19	  
3	   Literature	  review	  .......................................................................................................	  21	  
3.1	   Additionality	  .....................................................................................................................................	  21	  
3.2	   Cost-effectiveness and transaction costs	  ....................................................................................	  23	  
3.3	   Poverty and equity/fairness perspective	  .....................................................................................	  25	  
4	   Theoretical	  framework	  ...........................................................................................	  28	  
4.1	   Definition of PES	  .............................................................................................................................	  28	  
4.2	   Necessary conditions for PES	  .......................................................................................................	  29	  
4.3	   Pagiola’s framework	  .......................................................................................................................	  31	  
4.4	   Pannell’s ‘Public Private Benefits’ framework	  ........................................................................	  33	  
5	   Methodology	  and	  data	  collection	  .........................................................................	  39	  
5.1	   Data	  ....................................................................................................................................................	  39	  
5.1.1	   Data sources used in the study	  .............................................................................................................	  39	  
5.1.2	   Household survey – data collection and sampling	  ........................................................................	  39	  
5.1.3	   Semi-structured interviews/qualitative part	  .....................................................................................	  42	  
5.1.4	   The questionnaire	  .....................................................................................................................................	  42	  
5.2	   Transaction- and compliance costs	  .............................................................................................	  43	  
5.2.1	   Definition of transaction- and compliance costs	  ............................................................................	  43	  
5.2.2	   Transaction- and compliance costs to landholder	  ..........................................................................	  44	  
5.2.3	   Interpretations of compliance costs for the reforestation contract	  ...........................................	  48	  
5.3	   Econometric and statistical methods	  ..........................................................................................	  49	  
5.3.1	   The multiple regression model	  .............................................................................................................	  49	  
5.3.2	   Probability models – binary response models	  ................................................................................	  50	  
5.4	   Validity considerations	  ..................................................................................................................	  52	  
	  
xiii	  
	  	  
6	   Results	  and	  discussion	  .............................................................................................	  53	  
6.1	   Environmental effectiveness and opportunity cost of land	  ....................................................	  54	  
6.1.1	   Forest protection – opportunity cost of land	  ....................................................................................	  55	  
6.1.2	   Reforestation – opportunity cost of land	  ...........................................................................................	  59	  
6.1.3	   Opportunity cost of land – type of contract	  .....................................................................................	  65	  
6.1.4	   More on additionality and opportunity cost of land	  ......................................................................	  71	  
6.2	   Cost-effectiveness	  ............................................................................................................................	  73	  
6.2.1	   Transaction- and compliance costs	  .....................................................................................................	  73	  
6.2.2	   Cost-effectiveness and opportunity cost of land	  ............................................................................	  79	  
6.3	   Equity	  .................................................................................................................................................	  81	  
6.3.1	   Factors affecting participation	  ..............................................................................................................	  81	  
6.3.2	   Transaction costs and factors affecting these and participation	  ................................................	  86	  
6.3.3	   More on participation	  ..............................................................................................................................	  86	  
6.4	   Discussion section	  ............................................................................................................................	  90	  
6.4.1	   Negative and positive incentives and opportunity cost of land	  .................................................	  90	  
6.4.2	   Transaction- and compliance costs	  .....................................................................................................	  91	  
6.4.3	   Opportunity cost and smallholders	  .....................................................................................................	  92	  
6.4.4	   Change in deforestation trends	  .............................................................................................................	  93	  
7	   Conclusions	  ..................................................................................................................	  95	  
8	   Recommendations	  .....................................................................................................	  98	  
8.1	   Improvements in methodology	  .....................................................................................................	  98	  
8.2	   Policy recommendations	  ................................................................................................................	  98	  
9	   References	  ....................................................................................................................	  99	  
9.1	   Online resources	  ..............................................................................................................................	  99	  
9.2	   Articles and books	  ........................................................................................................................	  100	  	  
Appendix	  A	  	  Development	  of	  the	  Forestry	  Law	  and	  effect	  in	  Hojancha	  ...	  	  	  	  	  123	  
Appendix	  B	  Priority	  Areas	  ......................................................................................	  	  	  	  	  104	  
Appendix	  C	  Correlation	  matrixes	  .........................................................................	  	  	  	  	  106	  
Appendix	  D	  OLS	  regressions	  ..................................................................................	  	  	  	  	  107	  
Appendix	  E	  The	  questionnaire	  for	  the	  survey	  ..................................................	  	  	  	  	  108	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
xiv	  
List of tables and figures 
 
List of tables Table	  6.1	  Explication	  and	  description	  of	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  regressions	  in	  the	  chapter	  ........................................................................................................................................................................	  53	  Table	  6.2	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  forest	  protection	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  
ever_applied	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  55	  Table	  6.3	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  forest	  protection	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  
received_contract	  ....................................................................................................................................	  56	  Table	  6.4	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  
ever_applied	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  59	  Table	  6.5	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  
received_contract	  ....................................................................................................................................	  60	  Table	  6.6	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  with	  both	  contract	  types	  with	  dependent	  variable	  
ever_applied	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  63	  Table	  6.7	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  with	  both	  contract	  types	  with	  dependent	  variable	  
received_contract	  ....................................................................................................................................	  63	  Table	  6.8	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  of	  land,	  summary	  table	  of	  tables	  1-­‐4.	  ..................................	  64	  Table	  6.9	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  related	  to	  the	  type	  of	  contract,	  regressions	  1-­‐7	  ..............	  65	  Table	  6.10	  The	  percentages	  of	  the	  self-­‐reported	  area	  in	  PSA	  contract	  that	  would	  be	  used	  
for	  the	  different	  purposes	  if	  not	  participating	  in	  PSA	  protection	  .........................................	  68	  Table	  6.11	  The	  percentages	  of	  the	  self-­‐reported	  area	  in	  PSA	  contract	  that	  would	  be	  used	  
for	  the	  different	  purposes	  if	  not	  participating	  in	  PSA	  reforestation	  ....................................	  70	  Table	  6.12	  Main	  uses	  of	  PSA	  payments	  for	  forest	  protection	  participants	  .................................	  71	  Table	  6.13	  Main	  uses	  of	  PSA	  payments	  for	  reforestation	  participants	  ........................................	  71	  Table	  6.14	  Transaction-­‐	  and	  compliance	  costs	  for	  forest	  protection	  contract	  .........................	  74	  Table	  6.15	  Application	  costs,	  establishment	  costs	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  separated	  for	  
reforestation	  contract	  ...........................................................................................................................	  74	  Table	  6.16	  Establishment	  costs	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  combined	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  ........................................................................................................................................................................	  75	  Table	  6.17	  Transaction-­‐	  and	  compliance	  costs	  combined	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  ...........	  75	  Table	  6.18	  Total	  transaction-­‐	  and	  compliance	  costs	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  .....................	  76	  Table	  6.19	  Establishment	  costs	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  first	  payment	  for	  reforestation	  .......	  78	  Table	  6.20	  Factors	  affecting	  participation	  with	  dependent	  variable	  ever_applied,	  
regressions	  1-­‐8	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  81	  Table	  6.21	  Factors	  affecting	  participation,	  summary	  table	  for	  tables	  19a	  and	  19b,	  
participatory	  factors	  ..............................................................................................................................	  85	  Table	  6.22	  Reasons	  farmers	  gave	  for	  not	  wanting	  a	  contract	  or	  not	  wanting	  to	  apply	  again	  
among	  landholders	  .................................................................................................................................	  87	  Table	  6.23	  Percentages	  of	  whether	  the	  protection	  participants	  received	  the	  payments	  in	  
time	  agreed	  upon	  .....................................................................................................................................	  88	  Table	  6.24	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  farmers	  in	  protection	  contract	  of	  what	  should	  be	  improved	  
or	  changed	  in	  the	  program	  ..................................................................................................................	  88	  Table	  6.25	  Percentages	  of	  whether	  the	  reforestation	  participants	  received	  the	  payments	  in	  
time	  agreed	  upon	  .....................................................................................................................................	  89	  Table	  6.26	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  farmers	  in	  reforestation	  contract	  of	  what	  should	  be	  
improved	  or	  changed	  in	  the	  program	  ..............................................................................................	  89	  
	  
xv	  
 
List of figures 
 Figure	  2.1	  Map	  of	  Costa	  Rica	  and	  its	  provinces.	  The	  province	  of	  Guanacaste	  and	  the	  canton	  of	  Hojancha	  are	  outlined.	  http://www.mapasdecostarica.info/atlascantonal/atlas_cantonal.htm	  .........................	  9	  Figure	  2.2	  Map	  over	  the	  province	  of	  Guanacaste	  and	  its	  cantons.	  Hojancha	  is	  canton	  number	  11.	  http://www.mapasdecostarica.info/atlascantonal/guan.htm11.	  ...........	  10	  Figure	  2.3	  Satelite	  images	  of	  	  changes	  in	  forest	  cover	  of	  one	  of	  the	  properties	  in	  Hojancha	  participating	  in	  reforestation	  (performed	  at	  Norwegian	  Institute	  for	  Nature	  Research	  (NINA),	  2012)	  ......................................................................................................................	  11	  Figure	  4.1.	  Framework	  for	  how	  to	  analyze	  effectiveness	  of	  PES	  	  (Pagiola,	  2005)	  ...............	  31	  Figure	  4.2.The	  sample	  space	  for	  potential	  projects,	  involving	  specific	  changes	  in	  land	  management	  in	  specific	  locations,	  depending	  on	  private	  and	  public	  net	  benefits.	  (Pannell,	  2008)	  ........................................................................................................................................	  34	  Figure	  4.3.Suggested	  classes	  of	  policy	  tools	  for	  different	  levels	  of	  public	  and	  private	  benefits.	  (Pannell,	  2008)	  .....................................................................................................................	  35	  Figure	  4.4.Efficient	  policy	  mechanisms	  for	  encouraging	  land	  use	  on	  private	  land,	  refined	  to	  account	  for	  lags	  to	  adoption	  and	  learning	  costs,	  and	  assuming	  that	  managers	  require	  benefit-­‐cost-­‐ratio	  ≥	  2.0.	  (Pannell,	  2008)	  ......................................................................	  38	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
xvi	  
 
Abbreviations 
 
CAF – Forest Credit Certificate 
CAFA – Forest Credit Certificate in Advance 
CPB – Forest Protection Certificate 
ES – Environmental Service 
FONAFIFO – The National Forest Financing Fund  
GEF – Global Environmental Facility 
GIS – Geographical Information System 
MAG – Ministry of Agriculture 
MINAET – Ministry of Environment and Energy  
PES – Payments for Environmental Services 
PSA – Pagos Por Servicios Ambientales 
SAF – Sistemas Agro Forestales (The agroforesty modality) 
SINAC – National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de 
Conservación) 
TC – Transaction Costs 
WTA – Willingness to Accept 
WTP – Willingess to Pay
	  
i	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
1	  
 
1 Introduction 
    
1.1 Background 
 
During the last decades, the attention toward greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and 
other negative effects on the environment as a result of deforestation, has been increasing. 
Deforestation and forest degradation is said to account for 20% of the total CO2 emissions 
globally (e.g. Angelsen 2008, Burgess et al, 2011). 
 
There has been developed various policies aiming to deal with the problems of deforestation 
and the negative externalities they impose on society. The international society has spent, and 
continues to spend, millions of dollars to try to deal with these problems. In this regard, 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is considered, depending on land-use and 
conservation values, to be a more cost-effective environmental policy instrument to correct 
for negative externalities (such as loss of biodiversity and CO2 emissions), than traditional 
command-and-control instruments, such as land-use restrictions, that have been the 
dominating conservation approach (e.g. Ferraro and Kiss. 2002, Engel et al. 2009). 
 
PES is considered to become effective, cost-efficient and equitable instruments for the 
implementation of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) 
on the national and local level (Wunder, 2009). REDD+ is a mechanism that intends to create 
a financial value for the carbon that is stored in forests, and is supposed to offer incentives to 
developing countries “to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths 
to sustainable development” (UN-REDD, 2012). The program now also includes 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks” 
(ibid.). 
 
Thus, PES in general is related to REDD+ as it is a market-based approach, working as a 
direct way of recognising the values and positive externalities that ecosystem services 
represent. It creates a voluntary system in which landowners receive payments as an 
economic incentive for providing environmental services. Environmental/ecosystem services 
can be defined as: 
	  
2	  
 
“the beneficial outcomes, for the natural environment or people resulting from ecosystem 
functions. Ecosystem functions are the physical, chemical and biological processes or 
attributes that occur within ecosystems such as wetlands, forests or estuaries. These contribute 
to the self-maintenance of an ecosystem”  
(Zandersen et al 2009, p.23).  
 
PES differs from targeted subsidies in that it implies conditionality, meaning that the service 
delivery must be secured, which depends on a well functioning monitoring and sanctioning 
system.  
 
Latin America is a region that has experienced high deforestation rates the last few decades, 
and Costa Rica is one of the countries experiencing high deforestation rates, especially in the 
1960s and 70s. It holds a very high level of biodiversity, high density of species (e.g. 
Sanchez-Azofeifa, 2001). However, Costa Rica has been considered a pioneer and a success 
story among development countries when it comes to handling its deforestation problems. In 
1996/1997, the country implemented its PSA (‘Pagos por Servicios Ambientales’) program, a 
government-led PES program paying private landowners for providing environmental 
services, and the program has partly been credited for the low deforestation rates that the 
Costa Rica experiences today.  
 
However, there have been several critics of the country’s PSA program when it comes to lack 
of efficiency/effectiveness especially, which include: 
  
i) Lack of additionality or lack of environmental effectiveness, implies that there is 
none or little increase in environmental services (or in this case forest cover), 
compared to a predefined baseline, or in the absence of payments. The 
additionality of PSA in Costa Rica has been questionable, and it is claimed that the 
country’s success is based on the previously implemented measures, such as 
reforestation incentives (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Pagiola. 2008). Many 
landowners participating in the program are claimed to have low or negative 
opportunity cost of their land, and combined with the ban of forest clearing in 
Costa Rica, the Forest Law from 1996, the landowners seem in many cases to 
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have protected their forests in any case (Pagiola. 2008, Wünscher et al. 2006).  
Reforestation therefore appears as the primary cause of ‘real’ land-use change in 
Costa Rica. The country does not have additionality as an explicit target for the 
PSA program. Its focus is rather to compensate landowners for the environmental 
services their forests or plantations provide (hence, instead of providing payments 
to the farmers to increase environmental services (i.e. through forest protection) 
relative to a baseline, the farmers receive payments for the value of the 
environmental services their forests etc. already provide). This can be seen in 
connection with the Forest Law from 1996. 
 
ii) The second problem is related to cost-effectiveness – high transaction and contract 
implementation costs in addition to low opportunity costs. These include costs 
related to the application process for a contract and the costs involved with 
fulfilling the contract requirements. The transaction- and compliance costs will 
from the farmers’ perspective affect whether they will decide to apply for a PSA 
contract, (assuming they will participate as long as they find it privately profitable) 
or not. The level of transaction costs in the PSA program have been criticized for 
being high, and a result of a complicated application procedure, and in that way 
also being a significant impediment for poorer landholders to participate (Pagiola 
2005, 2008).   
 
When it comes to the equity question, poverty reduction is not an explicit target in Costa 
Rica’s PSA program, but with the right design, such programs are considered instruments that 
may contribute to this in addition to environmental services (Pagiola, 2005). Larger 
landholders are for example found to be more likely to have a contract than smaller ones and 
off-farm income in addition to have higher education (Zbinden and Lee, 2005).  
 
The case study area selected for this study is the canton of Hojancha and surrounding areas, 
located in the province of Guanacaste, northwest at the Pacific coast of Costa Rica. This is an 
area that experienced high levels of deforestation, but which has recovered substantially the 
forest cover over the years, and was one of the places in the country where forest incentives 
were first implemented and remain highly prevalent. It is also an area where reforestation is a 
widespread activity and there are many PSA participants in both forest protection and in 
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reforestation contracts compared to elsewhere in the country, making it an interesting area to 
explore the mentioned challenges to PES programs and to look at how cost-effectiveness 
issues can be addressed. 
 
1.2 Problem statement and hypotheses 
 
 
Main problem statement: 
To evaluate Costs Rica’s PSA program in Hojancha not working appropriately with respect 
to: 
 
i) Environmental effectiveness (opportunity cost of land) 
ii) Economic effectiveness (cost-effectiveness) 
iii) Equity perspective 
 
Environmental effectiveness (additionality) 
As mentioned, additionality implies to increase the level of environmental services (conserved 
forest or planted trees in this case), and this will often depend on the farmers’ opportunity cost 
of land. In order to be able to say something about this, I will be looking at opportunity cost 
factors of land, such as biophysical characteristics of the farm area, whether there has been 
offer to sell the farm, farm size, number of cattle, and compare participants and non-
participants. As reforestation participants are assumed to have higher opportunity cost of land 
than protection participants, this issue is also addressed. The number of cattle is included as a 
factor since this traditionally has been the main economic activity in the case study area and 
often considered the most relevant land-use. 
 
1. Do PSA participants have lower opportunity costs of land than non-participants (do 
the incentives cause positive public net benefits)? 
 
H. 1:  a. Forest protection participants have less cattle/livestock than non-participants. 
b. Reforestation participants have less cattle/livestock than non-participants. 
H. 2: a. Forest protection participants are more likely to have less favourable biophysical 
conditions (poor soils and steep slope) than non-participants. 
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H. 3: a. Forest protection participants are less likely to have been offered to sell their property 
than non-participants. 
H. 4: a. Forest protection participants are more likely to have larger properties and/or several 
parcels than non-participants 
b. Reforestation participants are more likely to have larger properties and/or several 
farms/parcels than non-participants 
H. 5: a. Forest protection participants are more likely to have off-farm income and/or a second 
occupation than non-participants. 
b. Reforestation participants are more likely to have off-farm income and/or a second 
occupation than non-participants. 
H. 6: a. Forest protection participants are more likely to have more difficult access to their 
farm than non-participants. 
 
 
2. Do reforestation participants have higher opportunity cost of land than forest 
protection participants (do the positive incentives create higher public net benefits than 
the negative incentives)? 
 
H. 7: Reforestation participants have higher opportunity cost of land than protection 
participants (same opportunity cost factors as in H.1-H.6.). 
H. 8: Forest protection participants would express they would have kept the forest in any case 
(would not have cleared the forest even if they did not receive payment). 
H. 9: Reforestation participants would express that they would have reforested the area in any 
case (even if they did not receive payment). 
 
Cost-effectiveness.  
Cost-effectiveness with respect to PES implies low participation costs per unit environmental 
service. Hence, low total opportunity cost and transaction cost per hectare conserved or 
hectare reforested. In a program with a restricted budget and many applicants, there is a need 
for targeting concerning who the receivers of the contracts are. It is therefore a point to look at 
who receive contracts vs. who are those applying, whether there are differences in opportunity 
costs of land between these. 
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As to the transaction- and compliance costs, these are as mentioned, an important issue when 
it comes to whether a PES contract is attractive or not, also which type of policy that should 
be used in order for a program to be as cost-effective as possible. If the transaction costs 
represent too large a part of the payments, this obviously keep many landowners from 
applying for a PES contract, as well as creating too large costs overall. The ‘establishment 
costs’ are considered separately since they are of high importance to whether a farmer will 
consider a reforestation contract, and there are not given any payments in advance. These 
costs are hence compared to the first payment of the reforestation contract. 
 
3. Are transaction- and compliance costs too high compared to payment level in order to 
make landowners decide to undertake the desired land-use change, and are opportunity 
cost of land lower among recipients than applicants? 
 
H. 10: The transaction costs and compliance costs combined represent more than 30% 
(Rodriguez, 2008) of the PES payment received.  
H. 11: The plantation establishment costs are less than the first payment in the contract for 
reforestation (50% of the total). 
H. 12: The transaction- and compliance costs related to the reforestation contract are higher 
than those costs related to the forest protection contract, (relative to the PES-payment 
received). 
H. 13: There are not lower opportunity costs among the contract receivers than the contract 
applicants (there is a lack of targeting when it comes to opportunity cost of land). 
 
Equity perspective 
In order to be able to say something about whether there are certain farmer characteristics 
dominating among PSA participants in the case study area, I have looked at factors that are 
assumed to be positively related to PSA participation (farm size, previous participation in 
forest incentive programs, distance to public offices, education level, off-farm income, second 
occupation, whether they live at the farm or not). 
 
 
4. Are there specific characteristics of PSA participants, and which factors affect 
participation in the canton of Hojancha (and surrounding areas)? 
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H. 14: Landowners with larger properties are more likely to participate than smaller. 
 
H. 15: Landowners that have participated in similar incentive programs (before 1997) are 
more likely to apply/participate in PSA than others 
H. 16: Landowners living closer to public offices (MAG, FONAFIFO) are more likely to 
apply/participate  
H. 17: Higher educated landowners are more likely to apply/participate than others 
H. 18: Landowners with off-farm income or second occupation are more likely to 
apply/participate than farmers without.  
H. 19: Landowners living at the farm in question are less likely to be participants than farmers 
living elsewhere. 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis  
 
In the second chapter, I will look at the case study site, and give a brief introduction to the 
country Costa Rica and then insight into the specific area of Hojancha, in which the case 
study took place. In the second part of the chapter, i will introduce the Costa Rican PSA 
program and the structures it was built on.  
 
In chapter 3, I will give a literature review of the topics involved in the thesis; additionality, 
transaction costs and the equity perspective. 
 
In the forth chapter, there will be presented the theory behind PES, with the factors necessary 
for the system to work, and I will look at two frameworks that are useful for analysing cost-
effectiveness/efficiency of PES programs. 
 
In chapter 5, the methodology used for the thesis will be presented, with description of the 
data collection, calculation of transaction costs and econometric and statistical methods. 
 
Chapter 6 consists of the results found and discussion, and finally chapter 7 will present the 
conclusions. Chapter 8 will give recommendations based on my findings, and in chapter 9 
there will contain the list of references. Finally there will be appendixes, including the 
questionnaire used for the household survey. 
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2 Case study site and Costa Rica’s PSA program 
In this chapter, I will first introduce briefly Costa Rica and the province of Guanacaste, and 
then I will introduce the canton of Hojancha, which was the place the case study was 
conducted. In the second part of the chapter, I will present Costa Rica’s PSA program and the 
different contract modalities that exist and the requirements for being able to receive a PSA 
contract. Finally, I will give a background on the financing of the program and the previous 
program structures that the current program is based on. 
 
2.1 Costa Rica  
Costa Rica is a quite small country in Central America with coastline to both the Pacific 
Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. It has a population of approximately 4,5 million (2010) and 
covers an area of 51,100km2, and the national capital is San José (Britannica, 2012). 
 
It is a stable country compared to its neighbouring countries and the national army was 
abolished in 1948. Costa Rica has a developing economy with one of the highest GNP per 
capita in Central America (Britannica 2012) and is at the top of the ‘Happy Planet Index’, 
which involves human well being and environmental impact, taking environmental 
sustainability into account (Nef, 2009).  
 
Costa Rica has with time received a reputation for being a “green country” with much concern 
for the environment, and intends to become carbon neutral by 2021 (UNEP, 2012). It has 
developed an extended national park system and a well-established tourism industry, which 
has attracted foreign investment, and made the country’s economy shift from being 
agriculture-based to being dominated by services and technology by the late 20th century 
(Britannica, 2012).  	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Figure	  2.1	  Map	  of	  Costa	  Rica	  and	  its	  provinces.	  The	  province	  of	  Guanacaste	  and	  the	  canton	  of	  Hojancha	  are	  
outlined.	  http://www.mapasdecostarica.info/atlascantonal/atlas_cantonal.htm	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Figure	  2.2	  Map	  over	  the	  province	  of	  Guanacaste	  and	  its	  cantons.	  Hojancha	  is	  canton	  number	  11.	  
http://www.mapasdecostarica.info/atlascantonal/guan.htm11.	   	  	  
2.2 Guanacaste 
The province of Guanacaste, in which the case study took place, was previously dominated by 
the agricultural sector. Today, there is still much livestock production, but the province has 
developed as one of the most attractive provinces of the country when it comes to the 
country’s tourism sector, in addition to a great urban development. Still, it remains among the 
provinces with highest poverty and unemployment rates. The economic crisis hit tourism and 
real estate activities hard, and when the construction industry crashed in 2009, Guanacaste 
experienced the highest impact (Britannica. 2012, Costa Rica Guides. 2012).  	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Picture	  from	  1998	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Picture	  from	  2005	  (infrared),	  with	  increased	  forest	  cover	  
Figure	  2.3	  Satelite	  images	  of	  	  changes	  in	  forest	  cover	  of	  one	  of	  the	  properties	  in	  Hojancha	  participating	  in	  
reforestation	  (performed	  at	  Norwegian	  Institute	  for	  Nature	  Research	  (NINA),	  2012)	  	  
2.3 Hojancha 
 
The main area for the case study was the canton of Hojancha. As the fieldwork went on, it 
turned out to be a need to expand the case study area to parts of the neighbouring cantons 
Nandayure and Nicoya. Since Hojancha and its experiences were the main objectives and 
most of the farmers interviewed for the study are located close to the border, I will keep 
focusing on the canton of Hojancha in the description of the area.  
 
Hojancha is a little canton located in the province of Guanacaste, at the western coast, at the 
North Pacific of Costa Rica and makes up part of the ‘Tempisque Conservation Area’. It is 
located at the mountainous foothills of the Nicoya peninsula, the altitude ranging from 0 to 
830 meters above sea level, and limits to the east and south with the canton of Nandayure and 
to the Pacific Ocean and to the west and the north with the canton of Nicoya. Hojancha 
consists of 26,140 hectares and is made up of 4 districts: Hojancha, Monte Romo, Huacas and 
Puerto Carrillo. Matambú, which is the only indigenous reserve in the Guanacaste province, is 
also located in Hojancha (Isaza et al., 2007). 
 
Hojancha and the surrounding areas went through a great transformation of landscape in the 
1960s and 1970s, as the majority of the forest cover was deforested. It was a result of clearing 
forest for pastures for livestock production, which continues to be the main economic income 
source in the area today. With intensified livestock production, the soil was degraded, and 
together with a meat crisis in the 1970s in which meat prices decreased substantially, labour 
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sources decreased and 57% of the population migrated. The product capacity was limited 
further by the climate conditions at the time with little precipitation and high temperatures in 
addition to decreasing water supplies. Together, these conditions led to the need to 
undertaking measures for the environmental and social problems in the region (Isaza et al. 
2007, Morales. 2012).   
 
Hojancha is a canton that has been highly influenced by measures introduced to deal with the 
deforestation challenges during the last decades. It was actually the first place in the country 
to implement CAFA (Forest Credit Certificate in Advance), which were incentives for 
encouraging reforestation and facilitated participation of small farmers through organizations. 
Today, a significant amount of the area is involved in the PSA program. On the country level, 
mostly forest protection participants comprise the PSA program. In Hojancha and the 
neighbouring areas, however, the long history with reforestation incentives and initially with 
large deforestated areas, degradation and abandonment after the livestock crisis, the 
reforestation modality continues to be important and comprises a large part of all PSA 
contracts in the area today.  
 
Today, the main production activities are livestock production, agriculture and timber 
production. 80% of the economically active population work in the primary sector (livestock 
production, reforestation, agriculture, beekeeping, plant production), 5% work in the 
secondary sector (sawmills, coffee mills, furniture shops etc.) and 10% work in the tertiary 
sector (cafeterias, shops, stores etc.), and the remaining working populations work within 
professional activities (lawyers, teachers, engineers etc.) (Isaza et al. 2007).   
 
When it comes to land tenancy, in 1994, 76% of the land was in private hands, 9% under lease 
and 15% had mixed tenancy. The properties are in general medium and small size. 84% of the 
farms are up to 50 hectares in size and the rest (16%) are larger than 50 hectares (ICES 2001 
in Isaza et al. 2007).  
 
In 2002, forestry represented the main productive activity, generating 30% of the canton’s 
income (the number based on the sale from the sawmill that processes and commercializes 
90% of the timber in the canton). The forestry sector in Hojancha began in the 1980s, with the 
establishment of forest plantations, and more general planting of trees at the properties, for 
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‘living fences’ (‘cercas vivas’). This turned out to be the main alternative for recovery of 
degraded areas and generation of income to the community, which continues today. An 
important factor that has facilitated forestry activity in the canton, is the development of 
activities related to production and use of forest resources such as recollection and sale of 
seeds, ‘viveros’, technical assistance, industrialization and commercialization (Isaza et al. 
2007)  
 
According to Isaza et al. (2007), there are several conditions that have led to the successful 
recovery of the landscape in Hojancha. Political aspects, such as forest legislation and the 
space given for the commercialization of seeds etc., which have generated an added value to 
the forest is one of the points. Another is the mentioned compensation mechanisms for 
conservation, such as like the previous forest incentives and later the PSA program. Access to 
credit is also mentioned as an important factor. Larger and better control of forest fires in 
addition to the emerging ecotourism sector is also stressed as an important reason for the 
recovery in the period 1986-2000 (Morales, 2012).  
 
One of the institutions that appear to have substantial importance in Hojancha related to 
facilitate participation in the various programs throughout the years, is the Agricultural Center 
of Hojancha (‘Centro Agrícola Cantonal de Hojancha’), CACH (the neighbouring cantons 
also have similar offices). These centres exist in various parts of the country, and Hojancha is 
one of the places where it has long experience of serving farmers and landowners by for 
example facilitating applications and providing information. The Agricultural Centres are 
farmer organizations, private, non-profit, legal entities with certain characteristics: 
a) Consist of individual persons or enterprises 
b) Their objectives are to promote participation of farmers/producers and to improve 
farming, agroforestry, fisheries, and conservation of natural resources by the local 
population. In addition they should promote appropriate training, credit, technology 
transfer and other benefits that contribute to the improvement of productive activities 
c) They should ensure members free membership, voluntary retirement and other basic 
rights 
(MAG, 1999)  
 
See Appendix A for development of the forestry law and effects in Hojancha. 
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2.4 Costa Rica’s PSA program 
2.4.1 ‘Pagos Por Servicios Ambientales’, PSA 
 
The Costa Rican PSA program ’Pagos por Servicios Ambientales’ is a government-led PES 
program that pays private landowners for providing environmental services. The current 
design uses forest cover as a proxy for ecosystem or environmental services (Daniels et al. 
2010). The program is established to compensate forest landowners for the value the forest, 
either natural forest or planted, on their land provide, and aims to integrate lands outside the 
already protected areas.  
 
Costa Rica experienced in the 1960s and 1970s one of the highest deforestation rates in the 
world, reducing the country’s forest cover radically, mainly as a result of agricultural 
expansion. Costa Rica was the first developing country to implement a large-scale PES 
program, and this has been given part of the credit for the positive trend over the last decades, 
related to low deforestation rates. In the early 2000s, the country achieved negative net 
deforestation (Daniels et al, 2010) and Costa Rica has been considered a showcase for other 
countries in the region (Pagiola, 2008). The Peninsula of Nicoya, which is the region of the 
case study area, is one of the areas that has had the most positive development regarding 
regaining forest cover (Morales, 2012). 
 
The program was established in its current form in 1996 (Pagiola, 2008, Sanchez-Azofeifa et 
al. 2007) and came short time after the Forest Law No. 7575 from 1996 was implemented. 
This law recognized four kinds of environmental services that forest ecosystems provide: 1) 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, 2) hydrological services (including provision of 
water for human consumption, irrigation and energy production), 3) provision of scenic 
beauty for recreation and ecotourism, and 4) biodiversity conservation. Furthermore, four 
types of contracts or land use modalities are available: ’forest protection’ (protection of 
existing forest), ’reforestation’ (through timber plantations), ’natural forest regeneration’, and 
’agroforestry systems’ (Pagiola, 2008). 
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2.4.2 The contract modalities 
 
Forest protection modality 
The forest protection/conservation contract has on the country level been the far most popular 
contract since the implementation of the program. In 2008, more than 89% of the area 
contracted for PSA were forest protection contracts (Daniels et al. 2010), and 95% of the 
contracted areas at the end of 2005, were forest protection contracts (Pagiola 2008). The 
forest protection contract is also referred to as the ‘forest conservation contract’ and implies 
that no forest clearing is allowed at all (even though it with the current legislation, which 
prohibits forest clearing, is still allowed to harvest up to 40% of standing timber above a 
certain diameter (Pagiola, 2008). Being a forest protection participant implies that one has to 
make sure to prevent forest fires and prevent livestock to enter the forest, prevent hunting etc. 
Often the landowners will need to fence in the forest (FONAFIFO, 2009). 
 
The contract is given for minimum 2ha of forest (max 300ha) over a period of 5 years, where 
the payment is distributed equally over the 5-year period. It can be renewed after the 5 years, 
but this is not guaranteed. The PES-related restriction becomes written into the land title, thus 
if the owner decides to sell the property, the restriction transfers to the new owner (this also 
goes for the other contract types). Private landowners living inside nationally protected areas, 
but who have not been compensated for their lands are eligible for the forest protection 
contract as well (ibid.).  
 
Reforestation modality 
When it comes to the reforestation contract, this represents 5% of the total area contracted in 
the country (4% at the end of 2005) (Pagiola, 2008), and was initially intended to promote 
production of commercial timber plantations. Now, it is supposed to pay the landowners for 
the environmental services provided by the plantations. Still, many areas, including the case 
study area, timber production is an important income source driving the interest for 
reforestation. Not all areas are eligible for forest plantations, for example areas in where the 
terrain consists of steep slopes and riparian zones (Pagiola, 2008). A reforestation contracts 
requires a minimum of 1 ha planted (max 300ha) (FONAFIFO, 2009). The reforestation 
contract also implies a payment distributed over a 5-year period, but with the difference that 
50% of the total is paid the first year (in order to provide funds for the establishment phase), 
20% in the second, 15% in the third, 10% in the fourth, and 5% in the fifth year. In the 
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reforestation contract, they commit themselves to preserve the plantation for 15 years and are 
then permitted to harvest the wood (ibid.). 
 
Agroforestry modality 
The agroforestry contract was implemented in 2003, and pays the farmers per tree planted 
(mostly native species and often used for “living fences” (‘cercas vivas’)), with a minimum of 
350 trees. This contract does also last for 5 years, but the payments are paid over three years; 
65% the first year, 20% the second year, and the last 15% the third year (FONAFIFO 2011a). 
The participation rate in this contract type is expanding, in 2010 there was in total contracted 
over 530000 trees (see table 2.1). 
 
Natural regeneration modality 
The natural regeneration contract came in 2006, when it became separated from the 
reforestation contract (FONAFIFO, 2011b), and it aims to recover pasture areas etc. that were 
deforested before 31.12.1989 (MINAET, 2011). It has the same payment structure as the 
conservation contract. The forest regeneration contract creates an incentive for letting forest 
grow, and aims for being qualified for a forest protection contract in the future. But once 
letting the forest regenerate, one is not permitted to clear it later on, hence creating competing 
incentives. The possibility of getting a renewal of the contract is also an important factor for 
the decision of applying for this program. 
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Table	  2.1	  Number	  of	  hectares	  (or	  trees	  in	  the	  case	  of	  agroforestry)	  in	  the	  different	  PSA	  modalities	  and	  total	  
number	  of	  contracts	  in	  PSA	  Costa	  Rica	  from	  1998	  to	  2010	  (FONAFIFO	  2011b)	  
	   Forest	  
Protection	  
Reforestation	   Natural	  
Regeneration	  
Agroforestry	  	   Number	  of	  
contracts	  
1998	   47,804	   4,173	   	   	   597	  
1999	   55,776	   3,156	   	   	   622	  
2000	   26,583	   2,457	   	   	   271	  
2001	   20,629	   3,281	   	   	   287	  
2002	   21,819	   1086	   	   	   279	  
2003	   65,405	   3155	   	   97,381	   672	  
2004	   71,081	   1557	   	   412,558	   760	  
2005	   53,493	   3602	   	   513,684	   755	  
2006	   19,972	   4586,70	   279,30	   380,398	   619	  
2007	   60,567	   5070,90	   755,10	   541,531	   1180	  
2008	   66,474	   4083,30	   1660	   656,295	   1103	  
2009	   52,017	   4017,50	   1500,20	   370,187	   796	  
2010	   59,644	   4185,40	   1274,60	   536,839	   1111	  	  
Table	  2.2	  Number	  of	  contracts	  (valid),	  hectares	  and	  trees	  in	  different	  contract	  modalities	  in	  the	  canton	  of	  
Hojancha	  in	  2012	  (FONAFIFO,	  2012)	  
	   Number	  of	  contracts	   Number	  of	  
hectares	  
Number	  of	  trees	  
Reforestation	   78	   1665,30	   	  
Forest	  protection	   31	   1094,30	   	  
Agroforestry	   8	   	   8350	  
Other	  version	  of	  
the	  contracts	  
22	   440,50	   	  	  	  
Application requirements 
In order to apply for PSA, there are certain basic requirements that need to be fulfilled, but to 
some landowners it appears troublesome and too time-consuming to comply with. Figure 2.4 
shows the initial requirements. 	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Requirements:	  
Pre-­‐application	  (to	  one	  of	  the	  regional	  offices	  of	  FONAFIFO):	  	  
	  
Individual	  landholders:	  
• Copy	  of	  id-­‐card	  (‘cédula’)	  
• Copy	  of	  cadastral	  map	  (‘plano	  catastrado’)	  
• Copy	  of	  the	  legal	  document	  of	  the	  farm	  (‘escritura’)	  
	  
	  Enterprises:	  
• Copy	  of	  legal	  certification	  of	  the	  enterprise	  (‘personería	  jurídica’).	  
• Copy	  of	  the	  document	  of	  identification	  of	  the	  enterprise	  (‘cédula	  jurídica’)	  
• Copy	  of	  identification	  of	  the	  legal	  representative	  (‘cédula’)	  
	  
There	  must	  be	  a	  separate	  application	  for	  each	  modality	  if	  applying	  for	  more	  than	  one.	  
	  
When	  pre-­‐application	  approved	  by	  FONAFIFO	  for	  farms	  in	  the	  public	  register	  (the	  following	  often	  performed	  
assisted	  by	  an	  intermediary):	  
• Contract	  with	  a	  Forest	  Official	  (‘regente	  forestal’)	  
• Sustainable	  forest	  management	  plan	  (prepared	  by	  a	  licensed	  Forest	  Official,	  including	  
information	  on	  e.g.	  topography,	  soils,	  climate,	  drainage,	  current	  land-­‐use,	  plans	  for	  preventing	  
forest	  fires,	  illegal	  hunting	  and	  harvesting	  etc.	  if	  forest	  protection	  contract	  (or	  plan	  for	  
reforestation/plantations	  or	  agroforestry	  if	  that	  is	  the	  contract).	  
	  
For	  farms	  in	  ‘possession’	  (under	  these	  conditions	  only	  forest	  protection	  can	  be	  applied	  for):	  
• Legal	  declaration	  about	  the	  right	  of	  possession	  for	  more	  than	  15	  years.	  Or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  being	  
within	  a	  protected	  wildlife	  area,	  prove	  the	  right	  of	  possession	  10	  years	  before	  the	  creation.	  
• Authentic	  selling	  card	  (‘carta	  de	  venta’)	  by	  an	  attorney	  
• Determination	  of	  the	  farm	  area	  through	  one	  of	  the	  following	  option:	  
o Cadastral	  map	  
o Topography	  	  
	  
Figure	  2.4	  Requirements	  for	  what	  landowners	  need	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  for	  PSA	  (FONAFIFO,	  2009)	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2.4.3 Administration, FONAFIFO and previous incentive programs 
In the beginning of the program, it was the national conservation area system (Sistema 
Nacional de areas de Conservación, SINAC), and NGOs, such as FUNDECOR, which 
administered these contracts. From 2003, the task was handed over to FONAFIFO, and eight 
regional offices were established in order to handle applications, sign contracts and perform 
monitoring (Pagiola, 2008).  
 
The National Fund for Forest Financing (’Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal’), 
FONAFIFO, was established together with the Forestry Law from 1996. FONAFIFO is a 
semi-autonomous agency with independent legal status and administers today the PSA 
program. FONAFIFO’s governing board consists of representatives from Ministry of 
Environment and Energy (MINAE), Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) and the National 
Banking system, in addition to representatives from the private forest sector. FONAFIFO is 
thus quite autonomous when it comes to decisions and managing of funds, but it still has to 
deal with certain governmental restrictions, making the work more difficult, for example that 
the budget must be approved by the Ministry of Finance. Payment levels are also set by 
executive degree (Pagiola, 2008).  
 
Prior to the establishment of the PSA program and the Forest Law, there were several 
initiatives, which the PSA program was based on. It started in the 1970s with a concern over 
less timber supply, and it was initiated incentives for planting of timber plantations. In the 
beginning, this was performed through income tax credits. In 1986, the Forest Credit 
Certificate (‘Certificado de Abono Forestal’), CAF, was created. This facilitated participation 
and thus led to increased participation. Several variants of this credit were introduced over the 
coming years. A very significant one was the Forest Protection Certificate (‘Certificado para 
la protección del Bosque’), CPB, which was introduced in 1995, giving support for forest 
conservation, and led to a broader focus, which had so far been to promote reforestation 
(Daniels et al. 2010, Pagiola, 2008). 
 
Thus, there was already a system and institutions in place when the PSA program was 
implemented. The Forest Law was based on these existing structures, but compared to the 
previous system, two major changes appeared. The first involved justification for 
‘reforestation payments’, implying that what as previously viewed as support for timber 
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production, was now to be understood as support for providing environmental services. The 
second change involved the financing source. It was previously financed from the government 
budget, but from now on the financing came from an earmarked tax and payments from 
beneficiaries (ibid.). Today, most of the financing for PSA comes from a fossil fuel sales tax, 
and FONAFIFO is allocated 3,5%, which represents about US$10 million a year. The rest of 
the funds come from different grants, for example from the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) through the so-called Ecomarkets Project (e.g. Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). 
 
When it comes to the monitoring and enforcement of the contracts and the participating farms, 
these are first and foremost carried out by the agencies responsible for the contracts with the 
landowners, such as the Agricultural Centers and the forest officials (‘regentes’). There are 
made visits to the farms at least once a year. FONAFIFO performs a sampling of 
approximately 10% of all projects annually, SINAC 5%, and the rest is carried out by the 
forest officials, often in connection with the intermediaries (e.g. Centro Agrícola) if they are 
not hired directly by the farmer (Sánchez, 2012). In addition, FONAFIFO has established a 
monitoring system with GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and databases in order to 
verify that the requirements of the contract are fulfilled. It if turns out that the participants do 
not comply, they will not receive further payments, and the forest officials may lose their 
license if they report compliance if it turns out that it is not the case (Pagiola, 2008). Leakage, 
in this case the issue of moving deforestation from the area under contract to another 
parcel/farm, does not seem to be a major concern in Costa Rica. There is no specific contract 
condition addressing this issue, but they would equally be affected by the ban on forest 
clearing, hence this is not considered a serious risk (ibid.).   
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3 Literature review 
In this section, I will go through the major literature related to the topic. First I will go into the 
topic of additionality, then cost-effectiveness and transaction costs, and finally literature 
related to PES the equity question. 
 
3.1 Additionality 	  
Even though additionality (environmental effectiveness) is not an explicit aim for the Costa 
Rican PSA, it has emerged as an external requirement as a result of the increased amounts of 
money spent globally on these issues and this leading to an increased focus on how these 
funds are spent and what positive environmental effect they in reality have (Daniels et al. 
2010). Costa Rica’s PSA program has been criticized for lack of targeting and the use of 
undifferentiated payments. However, the program has taken many of these issues into account 
over the years, and there has been made several improvements to it, such as creating a list of 
priority areas (see appendix B).  
 
Studies investigating the impact of the forest protection PSA contract, have in general found 
that there is higher forest cover among PSA participants than non-participants, even though 
the effect appears limited (Zbinden and Lee. 2005, Sierra and Russmann. 2006). Other 
researchers have not found much difference in land-use change between participants and non-
participants in forest protection (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Pfaff et al. 2008, Robalino et 
al. 2008).  
 
The farmers’ opportunity cost of land is highly related to additionality. For example Wunder 
(2005, 2006), stresses the importance of seeking landholders with the higher opportunity costs 
who might be a more credible threat to conservation. Farmers that have mostly forests on their 
land and unfavourable conditions for crop cultivation and livestock production/agriculture 
(previously the major cause of deforestation (Daniels et al, 2010), are for example less likely 
to change land-use on their properties. Livestock production has traditionally been the main 
opportunity cost of land in this area, and if the farm has little favourable conditions for this 
kind of land use, the actual threat to forest, hence the chance that the forest might be cleared. 
 
 Sierra and Russmann (2006) have conducted a study at the Osa Peninsula in Costa Rica, 
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which give indications that “agricultural land is abandoned by landholders who use the 
payments as capital to engage in other (often urban) productive activities and forest cover is 
maintained or let increase” (ibid. p.139). They state that “because the existing forest area 
would not have changed without the payments, any additional gain would be from the new 
forest growing in previous agricultural and charral areas” (ibid. p.139), hence pointing to the 
relevance of the natural regeneration contract modality, which may have more potential to 
create addtionality. Sierra and Russmann (2006) also claim that including more landholders 
that are already involved in non-forest land use will make it possible to increase PES 
additionality as it will limit agricultural expansion in addition to providing a diversification of 
farm income, by producing land rent from the provision of ecosystem services and not only 
agriculture. Two of the conditions important for the level of efficiency of PES are “whether 
forest cover would be lower without the payments” and “whether any additional gain in forest 
cover is temporary or permanent” (ibid. p. 139). 
 
Arriagada et al (2009) find that one of the main reasons for participating in PES according to 
farmers in a study in the Sarapiqui region in Costa Rica is “lack of more profitable land use 
alternatives (e.g. poor soil quality, high slope)” (ibid. p. 355). Other important reasons appear 
to be the restrictions on forest management (Forestry Law 7575 prohibiting forest clearing), 
and that cattle farming/livestock production is less profitable, influencing the decisions to 
rather plant trees instead. This indicates a low opportunity cost of land to many farmers. In 
general they found that those with high opportunity cost of participation and significant off-
farm income were less likely to participate. 
 
Concerning land characteristics, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al (2007) find that the variable ‘slope’ 
(the amount of the land area that has steep slope) is negatively associated with deforestation. 
Zbinden and Lee (2005) find that landowners with a higher level of marginal lands at their 
farms are “more likely to participate in reforestation given the lower opportunity cost of land” 
(ibid. p.262). Hence, variables such as the extent to which the farmer perceives land 
degradation and steepness at their farm, are assumed to be positively related to participation in 
reforestation. They also claim that “an owner of steep forestland is more likely to participate 
in forest protection rather than forest management, since harvesting timber on steep slopes 
presumably increases the costs of timber harvesting” (ibid. p.262).  
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The Costa Rican PSA program has been very popular among landowners, and there are much 
more applicants than available contracts and financing. There are many applicants on waiting 
lists, willing to accept a contract at the current prices, which indicates that to many applicants 
and current participants, the opportunity cost of land is not very high (the lands may not be 
very productive or relevant for agriculture or such activities), and that larger area could be 
included in the program for the same budget (Pagiola, 2008). Wünscher et al. (2006, 2008) 
look at opportunity costs and transaction costs at the Nicoya peninsula of Costa Rica and find 
that, given a fixed budget, spatial targeting of the payments according to opportunity- and 
transaction costs have the potential of substantially increasing the efficiency/effectiveness of 
the program, indicating that additionality may be increased by targeting areas where 
opportunity costs of land are higher. 
 
According to Daniels et al (2010), reforestation contracts are more likely to bring about 
additionality. However, as mentioned previously, this contract modality is on the country 
level not very widespread.  
 
3.2 Cost-effectiveness and transaction costs 	  
 
Ferraro and Kiss (2002) and Ferraro and Simpson (2002) state that direct payments to 
landowners can be a more cost-effective way to promote conservation targets than traditional 
command-and-control measures such as restrictions on land use. There are, however, 
challenges related to the issue of transaction costs as well as compliance costs when it comes 
to implementing such conservation systems, especially in low-income countries (Ferraro and 
Simpson, 2002), as these costs may appear to be higher than the costs would be under 
conventional command-and-control systems. These may appear due to insecure property 
rights, as markets may not be functioning well. 
 
PES programs (together with other market-based instruments such as environmental taxes and 
tradable permits) are considered more cost-effective than command-and-control regulation 
because the market-based instruments are more flexible when it comes to e.g. levels of 
benefits of forests and the cost of conserving forest. PES may thus make it easier to target the 
forests with higher value and lower cost (Engel et al. 2008). 
Developing countries are considered to have more challenges, as there may often be weak 
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governance, high transaction costs and informational problems may create problems for 
efficiency/effectiveness, appropriate monitoring and enforcement (ibid.). 
 
Wünscher et al. (2006, 2008), as mentioned earlier, have in a study of the PSA program at the 
Nicoya Peninsula in Costa Rica, found that the PSA program has the potential of increasing 
efficiency, also when it comes to transaction costs, as more targeting of participants would 
lead to lower transaction costs in total. When considering the amount of transaction costs to 
the farmers, they base this on the maximum of 18% in administration cost of the payment 
received from FONAFIFO that is charged by the intermediary often performing the work 
between the landowner and FONAFIFO, and do not consider other transaction costs besides 
this. They therefore state that the per hectare transaction cost does not decrease with 
increasing contract size. When it comes to compliance costs for the forest protection contract, 
their survey data find that the average cost for conservation obligations (compliance costs) 
and activities are a little less than 3US$/ha. And by calculating 18% administration cost to be 
7.20US$ (2006), they estimate that transaction costs and conservation costs together, come to 
a cost of approximately 10US$/ha, which represents 15,6% of the PSA payment per hectar. 
 
Rodriguez (2008) evaluates the transaction costs of the landowners and the intermediaries 
(between the landowners and FONAFIFO), with respect to agroforestry systems contract 
(SAF) in two areas in Costa Rica. She compares two types of agroforestry contracts, 
FONAFIFO’s PSA contract and another project, ESIMSE, and separates the costs for the 
landowner/PSA participant into fixed costs and variable costs. She finds that, beside the 18% 
administration costs for the intermediary, for a SAF contract of 1642 trees, compliance 
costs/expenses to comply with requirements reached approximately 26$US, representing 
approximately 1,6% of the payment amount received. There are however variable costs 
involved as well, related to things such as transport, opportunity costs of working time and 
costs for correcting legal documents, e.g. correction of the identity card ‘cédula’ in case of 
errors. For one landholder with one trip to the regional FONAFIFO office, transport there, one 
trip to the local Agricultural Center, half a working day there and costs related to correction of 
the identity card, she estimates 78US$ for one contract, or 5% of the total amount of 
payments received. Of the total – variable and fixed costs, these represent approximately 30% 
of the total amount received.  
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Rodriguez (2008) stresses that it is difficult to estimate representative transaction costs for all 
landowners since there are always variable transaction costs that depend on the landowner 
characteristics and factors such as distance from his/her farm to the 
office/intermediary/FONAFIFO, type of transport used etc. In addition, problems with errors 
in documents and documents that do not match vary a lot from landowner to landowner. 
 
Arriagada et al (2009) find that low payments and high maintenance costs seem to be the 
main motives for an eligible farmer to decide not to participate. To many, the costs outweigh 
the benefits from the contract payments, which turn out to be insufficient. Various landowners 
expressed that there were high costs associated with technical assistance. Eligibility problems, 
for example concerning property rights also appears to be a problem to many for participating.  
 
3.3 Poverty and equity/fairness perspective 	  
 
PES is often considered to be able to reach several objectives besides providing ecosystem 
services, and work indirectly, but also criticized for not achieving much results (Ferraro and 
Kiss, 2002). However, the inclusion of poor farmers is considered to provide possibilities for 
these farmers by increasing cash flows, and diversifying sources of income/provide off-farm 
employment opportunities such as tourism and added value (ibid., Ferraro and Simpson, 
2002).     
 
According to Zbinden and Lee (2005) and Miranda et al. (2003), who have conducted studies 
of PES in Costa Rica of participation factors and household characteristics, larger and more 
well-off landowners tend to have a higher participation rate than smaller landowners with 
lower income, in addition to characteristics such as education level, and whether they live at 
their farms or more urban areas (non-participants tend to more often live at the farms), and 
more often devote family labour to the farm activities in comparison to participants (Zbinden 
and Lee, 2005).    
 
Arriagada et al. (2009) state that off-farm income is an important factor that leads farmers in 
their study not to participate in PSA. The time needed for application and maintaining the 
forest, as required by the contract appears to be critical for many farmers. The opportunity 
cost of participation is hence quite influential to the decision for many farmers. Several 
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farmers express they because of little time seldom go and see their farms. Non-participants 
living on their farm appeared to often spend most of the day outside the farm and therefore 
did not have time for the contract requirements. 
 
Costa Rica’s PSA program is not designed to work as a poverty reduction program, but is 
claimed to have the potential of reaching such objectives (Pagiola et al. 2005). Areas with 
many poor farmers are often located in areas with high levels of environmental services, such 
as biodiversity and in upper watersheds (ibid., Wünscher et al, 2006), PES programs are 
therefore considered able to reduce poverty in such areas. However, Muradian et al. (2010), 
(and Pagiola (2005)) stress the point that distribution issues should be viewed separately from 
the efficiency question, as the involved agents in such programs are important for its 
legitimacy. 
 
Rød (2010), studying PES in indigenous communities in Costa Rica, finds that when it comes 
to socio-economic objectives, the PSA program in such a community has been beneficial for 
the participants’ income opportunities and livelihoods strategies, and that they have given the 
participants new opportunities and improved their farm and family/household conditions. 
However, the program has also seemed to create large differences between participants and 
non-participants in the PSA program in the area, and it appears to be problematic to various 
landholders to apply for PSA, to that the design of the PSA program does not fit well with the 
governance structures of many indigenous territories. 
 
As mentioned, Sierra and Russmann (2006) stress the issue of focusing on landowners already 
engaged in agriculture to improve additionality. Such farmers with a major part of the 
property involved in agriculture or livestock production are usually often smaller farmers, 
suggesting that the possibility to increase additionality is greater for this group (ibid.). Even 
though ‘low social index’ is included in the list of FONAFIFO’s priority areas (see Appendix 
B), they may still find the payment too low relative to the income from the current farm 
activities, or as a result of uncertainty for the future. 
 
Pagiola et al. (2005) stress the importance of transaction costs as a possible impediment for 
poor to participate in PSA. The design of the program is important, and should address 
problems such as insecure tenure or lack of titles, access to credit and technical assistance. 
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The application process is considered tiresome for many potential applicants who may 
consider the application procedure too much work for too little money. According to Pagiola 
et al. (2005), strong local organizations such as community groups or NGOs play an 
important role in that regard. 
 
In the beginning of the program, there were considerable requirements the PSA applicants 
needed to fulfil in order to be eligible. For example, the applicants needed proof of having 
paid local taxes and not having any debt to the national health system (Miranda et al, 2003). 
Since then, the amount of requirements have been reduced substantially, and even though 
much of the previous requirements now may be checked automatically through databases, 
there still remains much paperwork that are perceived as troublesome in time and costs and 
not worth the effort. 
 
Earlier, there existed a system of collective contracts (‘contratos globales’) in order to reduce 
the impediments that transaction costs may imply for poorer landowners. This implied that 
small farmers joined the PSA program together instead of individually, and thereby spreading 
the transaction costs over all the farmers joining the contract (FONAFIFO, 2000, Chomitz et 
al. 1998 in Zbinden and Lee, 2005). However, it led to problems if one of the participants in 
such a contract if one of the members did not comply with the requirements, and the payments 
would stop to the entire group. This was also the reason that the collective contracts came to a 
stop in the case study area Hojancha, where all of the contracts signed before 2002 were made 
collectively through the Agricultural Center. Today, in comparison, the application procedure 
is considered a much more complicated and costly procedure. 
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4 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I will first introduce the economic theory behind the idea of Payments for 
Environmental Services, and the necessary conditions for PES by Wunder (2008) and others 
making up the basis for the following frameworks. Next, I will present two frameworks, one 
for analysing the efficiency of PES programs by Pagiola (2005), and a framework by Pannell, 
D.J. (2008), which focuses on how to choose the most efficient policy mechanism for 
different projects based on public and private net benefits.  
 
4.1 Definition of PES 
 
A widely recognized definition of PES: 
 
1. a voluntary transaction where 
2. a well-defined environmental service (ES) or a land-use likely to secure that ES  
3. is being ”bought” by minimum one ES buyer 
4. from minimum one ES provider 
5. if, and only if, the ES provider continuously secures ES provision (conditionality) 
              (Wunder, 2005) 
 
The PES concept is based on the theory that providers of environmental services (resource 
managers) should be compensated for the costs that are implied for providing these services. 
In contrast to the common ’polluter-pays-principle’, PES in effect works as a ”bribe” to stop 
or to reduce an economic harmful activity (Engel et al, 2008).  
 
Ideally, PES should work as a correction to market failure and be applied when there is an 
undersupply of a positive externality (e.g. biodiversity, watershed services, carbon 
sequestration and landscape aesthetics), and not only benefit the landowner (e.g. by improving 
on-farm soil quality) (Zandersen et al. 2009). 
 
“Socially optimal provision (like other externalities) of an environmental service is the point 
at which the marginal cost to a landowner (or several cooperative owners) of providing that 
service (or the management activities giving rise to that service) equals the beneficiaries´ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for that marginal change” (ibid. p.34). 
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4.2 Necessary conditions for PES 
 
Economic preconditions: 
In general, when deciding whether or not to enter a PES contract, a farmer or individual faces 
the question of which land use is the most profitable, for example whether to rather convert 
the area to cropland or pasture. The payment must by definition thus be greater than the 
opportunity cost, the option value, in addition to future options (Wunder. 2008, Engel et al. 
2008). 
 
There exist different interests between the natural resource manager and those demanding the 
environmental services, and the payment must needed for the provision of the service(s). PES 
can only work if the willingness to pay (WTP) for an environmental service is larger than the 
willingness to accept compensation (WTA) and transaction costs (TC) combined. Hence, 
WTP>WTA+TC. This implies that in the cases there TCs are very high, PES will not work, 
and if the gap between WTP and WTA is small, the TCs cannot be high if PES is to work. 
Many buyers and sellers will often lead to very high TCs. Local conditions play an important 
part here (Wunder. 2008, Zandersen et al. 2009).  
 
As mentioned previously, PES tries to put the Coase theorem into practice, which implies to 
overcome a negative externality through bargaining between the affected parties (Coase, 1960 
in Engel et al. 2008), implying that transaction costs are low and well-defined property rights 
(ibid.). 
 
Institutional preconditions  
For the seller, it is important to know that the buyer will stay to the deal, and the buyer needs 
confidence that the seller really will provide the service they are paid for (e.g. forest 
protection for biodiversity). This relates to the ‘conditionality’ term, which distinguishes PES 
from targeted subsidies, and is critical to the definition of PES. For payments to be 
conditional, it must be possible to verify the existence of the environmental service, and 
ensure additionality, to measure the additional environmental services provided to a 
predefined baseline. The ideal would be to pay for the services directly on the basis of the 
environmental service provided, but such output-based payments are often not possible, since 
there are many environmental services the land users cannot observe. Thus, most PES 
programs base payments on the adoption of particular land uses, thus ‘input-based’. Such 
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programs are often made on a ‘per-hectare’ basis, or e.g. number of trees planted (Zandersen 
et al. 2009) such as the Costa Rican PSA program. 
 
The concept of leakage (or spillage) also relates to this, and refers to the displacement of 
environmentally damaging practices to outside of the (geographical) PES area (Roberson and 
Wunder, 2005 in Pagiola, 2005). A landowner may for example receive payments to protect 
primary forest in one area he/she possesses and rather deforest somewhere else within his/her 
property/ies. 
 
Informational Preconditions: 
PES is quite information-intensive, which tends to lead to high transaction costs. They are 
also often quite large in the initial phase compared to the operational phase, or the rest of the 
period where the compliance of requirements takes place (Wunder, 2008). In general for PSA 
programs, high transaction costs may be a problem in PES programs due to high numbers and 
different kinds of environmental buyers and sellers, and complex environmental services. I 
will come back to a definition of transaction cost later in the chapter and a particular 
definition for this study in the methodology chapter. 
 
Cultural Preconditions: 
This implies that should be no strong intrinsic values on the environmental services involved. 
In the case of such intrinsic values, monetary payments may undermine the intentions of PES, 
and in some cases lead to outcomes to the contrary of the intended. This depends on local 
cultural traditions and conditions. 	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4.3 Pagiola’s framework 
 
Pagiola (2005) provides a framework for how to analyse the effectiveness of PES programs. 
The aim of PES is to make privately unprofitable, but socially desirable practices become 
profitable to individual land users, and hence lead landowners to adopt them. This is 
illustrated in case A in Figure 1 below. 	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.1.	  Framework	  for	  how	  to	  analyze	  effectiveness	  of	  PES	  	  (Pagiola,	  2005)	  
 
The horizontal axis in the figure above (Figure 1) shows land users’ net private profitability of 
land uses. The vertical axis shows the net value of the environmental services generated to 
others. Practices that belong to the top-right quadrant create a win-win situation as it generates 
both profits to land users and generating positive externalities. Practices that belong to the 
bottom-left quadrant create a lose-lose situation. 
 
In the top-left quadrant, the practices are unprofitable to land users but generate positive 
externalities, which are the land-use practices aimed for by PES programs. The bottom-right 
quadrant involves privately profitable practices, but which generate negative externalities to 
society. 
 
Pagiola identifies 3 types of inefficiencies a PES program can suffer from: 
 
Case B: The case where the payments offered are insufficient to lead landholders to adopt 
socially desirable land uses (leading socially undesirable land uses to continue). 
Case C: Including the adoption of socially undesirable land uses, that supply environmental 
services, but at a cost that is higher than the environmental service.  
Case D: Paying for adoption of practices that would have been adopted anyway. 
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I will look first and foremost at problems related to case B and D for being the most relevant 
in my case study to address with my data from the case study area. 
 
Case B concerns social inefficiency, leading social welfare to be smaller than what it 
otherwise might have been. We have here the issue that opportunity costs and transaction 
costs (participation costs) should be low. Costa Rica has been criticised for suffering from 
such inefficiencies by having a relatively low, undifferentiated and untargeted payment in the 
PSA program (Pagiola, 2005). (And case C). Case B is related to transaction costs and 
compliance costs involved in PES programs, since these costs will influence whether a 
contract will be privately profitable for the farmer or not, and in general affect the cost-
effectiveness of the program. These costs are for the Costa Rican program critizised for being 
high, and compliance costs especially, related to the reforestation contract for the 
establishment of plantations etc. are assumed to be high, and the PES payment may not be 
sufficient to cover the expenses to make the landowner undertake the desired land-use change 
(or refrain to do so in the case of protection contracts). 
 
Case D regards environmental effectiveness, hence the issue of additionality and relates to the 
problem of “money for nothing”, providing payments for actions or non-actions that the 
landowners would have performed also in the absence of payments (Pagiola, 2005; Pagiola et 
al. 2008). This is critizised for being a major issue in Costa Rica and I address it by looking at 
opportunity factors of land to see whether one may say that participants have lower 
opportunity cost than non-participants, and whether reforestation participants have higher 
opportunity cost of land than forest protection participants. In order to achieve cost-
effectiveness, the opportunity cost should be low, but low opportunity cost may lead to lack of 
additionality. Hence, these two issues need to be considered together. 	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4.4 Pannell’s ‘Public Private Benefits’ framework 
 
The ‘Public Private Benefits’ framework developed by Pannell, D.J. (2008) is designed to 
work as a guide for how to choose the right policy mechanism under different circumstances, 
in order to achieve efficient resource conservation on private lands. While Pagiola (2005)’s 
framework seems to suggest that PES is relevant under all combinations of public private 
benefits, Pannell (2008) shows that the decisions of policy mechanism should depend on the 
relative levels of i) private (or internal) net benefits, and ii) public (or external) net benefits. 
 
‘Private net benefits’: Benefits minus costs accruing to the private land manager as a result of 
the proposed changes in land management. They exclude transfers, which are part of the 
policy intervention, so that one can compare landholder behaviour with and without the 
intervention. In principle, private benefits are broader than financial benefits, and include the 
broad range or factors that influence the relative advantage of the new land use option (as 
perceived by the landholders) such as riskiness, complexity, social considerations, personal 
attitude to the environment, and farming system impacts of the land-use practice (Kabií and 
Horwitz, 2006 in Pannell, D.J. 2008) 
 
‘Public net benefits’: Benefits minus costs accruing to everyone other than the private land 
manager. They exclude any costs borne by the environmental manager in the process in 
intervening to encourage the change in land management. This will allow us to compare the 
benefits of an intervention with its costs. 
(Pannell, D.J. 2008)  
 
In order for environmental managers to choose the right policy mechanism for the different 
contexts, Pannell identifies 5 categories of policy mechanisms: 
 
1. Positive incentives: Financial or regulatory instruments intended to encourage land-
use change (e.g. command-and-control, pollution taxes, subsidies). In context of PES 
programs, payments to promote reforestation belong to this category, as the payments 
are intended to change land-use in order to provide environmental services. 
2. Negative incentives: Financial or regulatory instruments (as above) that are intended 
to make landholders not to change their land management in particular ways. When it 
comes to PES programs, conservation payments is such a negative incentive, 
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provided in order to prevent clearing of forests that are important for biodiversity etc., 
using tools such as command-and-control regulation, environmental taxes, or 
potentially subsidies as a reward for not changing land-use. 
3. Extension: Implies for example education, technology transfer and communications.  
Rather than giving payments of grants to landholders, extension is a relatively cheap 
policy instrument that helps landholders to learn about available land management 
practices, including practices that environmental managers would like to see adapted. 
4. Technology development: “Development of improved land management options, such 
as through strategic R&D, participatory R&D with landholders, provision of 
infrastructure to support a new management option”. 
5. No action 
 (Pannell, 2008) 	  	  
 
Figure	  4.2.The	  sample	  space	  for	  potential	  projects,	  involving	  specific	  changes	  in	  land	  management	  
in	  specific	  locations,	  depending	  on	  private	  and	  public	  net	  benefits.	  (Pannell,	  2008)	  	  
Figure 4.2 shows the sample space for possible projects with various levels of public and 
private net benefits. Any potential project for analysis would correspond to one point on the 
graph. Hence, there may be any combination of positive or negative net benefits of a project. 
From the figure, we see that the projects that generate net positive benefits are the projects 
belonging to the areas A, B and C. 
 
	  
35	  
In area A, public net benefits outweigh private net costs. Private net benefits are not sufficient 
to make landowners choose to perform land-use changes, hence incentives would be needed 
to achieve the desired land-use. In area C, private net benefits outweigh public net costs. It 
may for example be (very) profitable for a landowner to convert pastures into a forestry 
plantation, but this may for example result in adverse effects to downstream water users into a 
waterway, which are of such importance that the on-site benefits may not be large enough. In 
area B, there are positive net benefits for both landholders and the public.  
 
When outlining the rules for the initial guide for choosing among the different policy 
mechanisms, it is assumed that landholders will adopt all practices giving private net benefits. 
B, C and D are hence the areas giving private net benefits to the landholders, provided that 
they are able to learn about those practices. We first assume learning costs to be zero (Pannell, 
2008). 
 
Figure	  4.3.Suggested	  classes	  of	  policy	  tools	  for	  different	  levels	  of	  public	  and	  private	  benefits.	  
(Pannell,	  2008)	  	  
When to use which policy mechanism? 
The two policy mechanisms I will address with my data are positive and negative incentives, 
as these are associated with the two contract types I am studying in the case study area, 
reforestation and forest protection respectively. 
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Positive incentives  
Pannell (2008) states that positive incentives for land-use change are not recommended unless 
public net benefits of change are positive (hence, should not be given for area C, D and E), 
nor if private net costs outweigh public net benefits (hence, should not be given for F). By not 
considering transaction- or compliance costs in this part, we are here considering the 
situations in which e.g. reforestation is a cost-effective and appropriate instrument with social 
efficiency. The use of positive incentives is therefore limited to area A. Using positive 
incentives for area C, D and E would lead to lack of social efficiency/cost-effectiveness due to 
lack of public net benefits and for F the private net costs are too high. When it comes to area 
B, we have the environmental effectiveness issue, as landholders in this case would be 
adopting the land-use changes even without the incentives. This would cause lack of 
additionality, thus “money for nothing”. Extention is rather recommended for projects in this 
area.  
 
Negative incentives 
Negative incentives, in my case study, referring to payments for forest protection are assigned 
to area D in figure 4-3. In order for these incentives to be appropriate, there must be overall 
benefits from preventing the land-use changes that the private landholders would like to 
adopt. Incentives must be needed to discourage the specific land-use (Pannell, 2008): 
• The projects must generate negative public net benefits, hence there must be negative 
externalities associated with the land use, in my case deforestation. 
• The projects must generate private net benefits. Landholders must thus be likely to 
adopt the other land-use practice unless they are prevented from doing so. In the case 
of forest protection, there must therefore be a clear risk that landholders will clear 
forest unless they are paid not to do it. Otherwise, there will also in this case be waste 
of money and lack of environmental effectiveness/additionality. 
• Public net costs outweigh the private net benefits. The positive externalities must 
hence be high enough (e.g. biodiversity in case of natural forests) to outweigh the 
private benefits. 
 
I will hence be addressing the issue of additionality by looking at the protection participants’ 
opportunity cost of land (factors that are assumed to be related) compared to non-participants, 
in order to give any indications of these problems in the case study area, whether there really 
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is a great risk for deforestation. 
 
It is recommended “no action” for area C and E. In area C, private net benefits outweigh 
public net costs. Only instruments that are relatively flexible negative incentives (e.g. a 
pollution tax) are recommended in the case of uncertainty whether private net benefits are 
sufficient to outweigh public net costs. In area E, public net benefits and private net benefits 
are both negative (landholders must accurately perceive this for being the case). In this case it 
is thus not necessary to introduce any incentives not other action since it would be unlikely 
that anyone would adopt adverse practices. All cases should be weighted up against the 
alternative of no action (Pannell, 2008). 
 
Including ‘learning costs’ 
Pannell (2008)’s definition of learning costs says that these costs are to include all factors in 
the transition from the current management to the new management system. It involves 
transaction costs, hereby costs for obtaining and analysing information about the new 
practice, the presence or absence of social networks supporting learning, and constraints on 
financial equity that is required for up-front costs of the land-use change. 
 
In my case study, I will be addressing the importance of the costs to the landowner when 
participating in PES/PSA, as these costs are criticised for being too high for many landholders 
compared to the payment levels. Pannell’s definition of learning costs includes both 
transaction costs (which are associated with applicants costs in a PSA program), and 
compliance costs/other costs that can be related to especially the reforestation (plantation) 
contract in Costa Rica/the case study area. This contract type requires quite some information 
for plantation establishment, and financial equity in order to be able to undertake the land-use 
change (up-front costs). 
 
As Pannell (2008) mentions, when there are positive learning costs, the payment/incentive 
could result too little to make landowners decide to undertake land-use change (or refrain 
from it) even if the adoption of it ultimately would yield positive private net benefits. The 
costs for the landowners are therefore a key issue I address with my data, what the level of 
transaction- and compliance costs are for current participants, and whether these costs are 
important obstacles for non-participants. 
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When it comes to the size of the incentives to be implemented, the rule says that these should 
be just large enough for the landowners to decide to adopt the practice. Larger payments than 
that would (assuming a fixed budget), lead to lower capacity of the program to achieve the 
desired environmental outcomes.  
 
Cost-effectiveness of such a program hence depends on the transaction- and compliance costs 
involved in the program. The payment may therefore in some cases need to be increased in 
order to cover these “learning costs”. 	  
 
Figure	  4.4.Efficient	  policy	  mechanisms	  for	  encouraging	  land	  use	  on	  private	  land,	  refined	  to	  account	  
for	  lags	  to	  adoption	  and	  learning	  costs,	  and	  assuming	  that	  managers	  require	  benefit-­‐cost-­‐ratio	  ≥	  
2.0.	  (Pannell,	  2008)	  	  	  
The resulting figure over (figure 4.4) shows figure 4.3, but in which the incentives are 
adjusted, in order to account for learning costs and lags in adoption in the absence of 
incentives1. From the figure, we see that the areas, for which positive or negative incentives 
are the appropriate measures, are reduced, and there are more areas in which there rather 
should be taken ”no action”. Hence, with positive learning/transaction costs, fewer projects 
will lead to total net benefits and cost effectiveness, which is important to take into account in 
the design of PES schemes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  costs	  are	  2,50$/ha	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5 Methodology and data collection 	  
In this chapter, I will first go through how the process of the data collection. Next, I will go 
into the transaction cost part, where I will give a definition of transaction costs and 
compliance costs used for the thesis and the way in which the calculation has been performed 
for this study. Then, I will go into the econometric and statistical methods used, and finally, I 
will look at some issues with respect to validity of the analysis. 
 
5.1 Data  
5.1.1 Data sources used in the study 
For this thesis I have used both quantitative and qualitative data sources; the quantitative part 
being the main basis for the results and are obtained through a household survey. The 
qualitative data are mainly used as a supplement and for supporting the design of the survey, 
and are collected through semi-structured interviews with public officials and other relevant 
institutions, in addition to statistics at the FONAFIFO web page. All data are collected 
through a fieldwork in Costa Rica in 2011.  
 
5.1.2 Household survey – data collection and sampling 
The quantitative part, representing the main basis for my results is made up of a household 
survey of farmers conducted by assistants and myself between March 21st and May 21st, 2011. 
During the period, my assistants and I conducted in-person interviews with the selected 
farmers in their homes.  
 
In order to perform analyses to find differences between PSA participants and non-
participants, we looked for both landholders that had or had had contracts, and landholders 
that had not had a PSA contract. Of those not having a contract, we found some farmers that 
had applied for one but not received, and many that had never applied for a contract. The 
information from both these two last groups gave interesting information on reasons that 
landholders cannot enter or no not wish to enter this program. Since the case study area 
Hojancha is an area where half of the contracts signed are reforestation contracts, the focus 
was put equally on the two contract modalities. Hence, we intended to find equal amount of 
participating respondents for each of the two modalities. 
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In total we ended up with 207 respondents/households. Out of these, 122 had never applied 
for a PSA contract, 13 had applied but not received a contract, 1 had also been rejected but 
received contract previously, and 3 were on waiting lists. Hence, 69 of the respondents had a 
contract of had had one since the program started in 1997.  
 
If the respondents had both a forest protection and a reforestation contract (or more), this was 
noted, but the follow-up questions were related to one of the contract types, the most relevant, 
being the most recent of them, but to have lasted for at least one period (5 years).  
 
Since many of the landowners that are receiving PSA contracts in the region of the case study 
area are enterprises, we intended to include these and compare them as a separate group 
(participants/non-participants). As this would turn out very complicated and require much 
effort, I decided to leave them out of the survey. However, as the survey went on, it appeared 
that quite many of the family farms were enterprises, and it was common that friends had 
made enterprises out of several farms. Hence, very many respondents would have to be left 
out if these were not to be included. I therefore decided to include them, and the respondents 
are therefore a mix of single owners and owners whose farm is an enterprise they have 
together with either family and/or others. But all of the respondents are among those making 
decisions related to management on behalf of the farm(s). 
 
Selection of ‘participants’ 
The list of farmers from which we selected the ’participants’, was a list from FONAFIFO 
over PSA participants in the canton, as well as lists of farmers who had applied for a contract, 
but who had not received one. The Agricultural Centre also provided us with lists of PSA 
participants. For the selection process, we started out with a list of 62 participants, involved in 
forest protection, reforestation, or both. There were a few of the respondents who had both 
contract types, who were asked about only one of the contract types.  
 
Selection of ‘non-participants’ 
The non-participants were selected from the FONAFIFO list of farmers who had applied for a 
contract, but not received one, in addition to lists provided by the local office of CATIE and 
MAG (local agricultural office). From the list of farmers having applied for a contract but not 
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received one, several of these had previously had a contract, and these were excluded since 
we were looking for farmers that had not had a contract previously either. For this group we 
ended up with 12 farmers, which should ideally have been more since it would have permitted 
us to get a better perception of differences between farmers that had applied for a contract and 
not received, and farmers that had received one or more contracts. 
  
In general, we looked for farmers who had at least some amount of either forest or forest 
plantations, preferable more than 2ha, since that is the limit of FONAFIFO for applying for a 
forest protection contract. It also turned out that some farmers on the lists did have a contract, 
and some of them had sold their farm and did not any longer have the farm in question, and 
some farmers only had pasture area, and were therefore not included in the survey. We also 
made sure that for every area where we selected some participants, we would have some non-
participants as well.  
 
In general, almost all of the farmers that were asked to participate in the survey, accepted. 
However, as the survey went on we realised that several of the farmers on the lists we had of 
participants, were difficult to reach since several of them did not live in the region, but only 
had their farm there. As it would require very much time to get hold of these, they were not 
included in the survey, which shortened the list. When it comes to the non-participants, as 
mentioned, many of the farmers on the lists, were not used for the survey for mentioned 
reasons, and some of them could not be found. It therefore became necessary to look for new 
areas to find more respondents. We found lists of more farmers at the local Ministry of 
Agriculture (MAG) in the neighbouring canton, Nandayure. Since this is a much larger 
canton, and we wished to stay close to Hojancha both because of practical reasons and 
because many of the farmers living close to the border of Hojancha have connections to 
Hojancha, either through family or by having their farm in Hojancha. We also went to the 
second neighbouring canton, Nicoya, where we received new names of farmers in that canton 
from the canton’s MAG office. To find non-participants, we asked the respondents we had 
names and numbers for and in that way found new respondents. Also Nicoya is a large 
canton, and we stayed mostly to the areas closest to the Hojancha border, on the route south 
towards the ocean from the canton centre (the town of Nicoya). 
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5.1.3 Semi-structured interviews/qualitative part 
The qualitative part consists of semi-structured interviews with persons in relevant 
institutions, such as the national forest agency, FONAFIFO, located in the capital of San José, 
in addition to local officers in the region in which the survey was conducted, and the local 
Agricultural Center (‘Centro Agrícola’) in Hojancha. In order to improve the questionnaire for 
the household survey, I also talked to officers in the local ministry of agriculture, MAG, prior 
to beginning the household survey in order to get more information on the program in the 
specific area. In addition, I conducted some semi-structured interviews with a few farmers in 
order to try out the draft of the questionnaire for the household survey, but also to obtain 
wider opinions of the program on behalf of the farmers and a broader understanding of the 
program.  
 
5.1.4 The questionnaire 
The questionnaire was split into several parts. The first consisted of information about the 
farm (the most important economically in case they possessed various), length of possession, 
size of farm, different land-uses of the farm, whether they possessed other farms/parcels as 
well, about the access to the farm in dry and rainy season, water sources at the farm, 
documents they possessed of their farm, distance to the nearest forest/agricultural offices, 
number of cattle and percentage of poor soil and steepness (biophysical characteristics). 
    
The second part was about PSA, whether they had received any kind of forestry incentive 
earlier, if they had ever applied, if they had received a contract, and if yes, what kind of 
contract, and if they had not applied for a contract, for what reason. Then the questions were 
split into type of contract for those who had been/were participants. The first section here was 
general information about the contract(s) they had/had had and how they perceived the 
process/program, what the payments they received mainly were spent on, what they thought 
should be improved etc. in addition to what land-uses the farm would have if they were not 
participating in PSA.  
 
The next section was related to costs related to application process and costs implied with the 
contract requirements, split into sections for each type of contract. There was also a section 
for those who had applied for a contract but not received, with questions about the contract(s) 
applied for and the costs and possible costs involved The last part of the questionnaire was 
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dedicated to questions about socio-economic issues.   
 
As a help to design the questionnaire, I based it on two surveys previously conducted in Costa 
Rica. One of them was conducted by Rodrigo Arrigada, who performed a household study in 
Costa Rica in 2005 (Arrigada, 2008), and the other was done by Tobias Wünscher, at the 
Nicoya peninsula in Costa Rica in 2005 (Wünscher et al. 2006, 2008). Many of the questions, 
especially in Arriagada’s questionnaire were relevant for my study and gave me an idea of 
how to build it up. These questionnaires were also very useful as the questions were adapted 
to the local conditions, also by already being in Spanish, which helped me to get them well 
formulated and in such a way to make the respondents understand well the questions.  
 
The questionnaire was, as mentioned, tested at the first visit to the case study area on a couple 
of farmers, and we found that several of the questions needed to be formulated differently, 
changed or skipped.  
 
5.2 Transaction- and compliance costs 
Based on the information retrieved from the household survey, concerning participation costs, 
I calculated the transaction- and compliance costs the farmers had had with their respective 
PSA contracts, in order to get information on the amount of transaction costs and compliance 
costs related to the payments the landowners receive. In this section I will define these costs 
and explain the costs that were used in the calculation for the study. I will in the end explain 
the different interpretations I have made of maintenance costs and establishment costs for the 
results section. 
 
5.2.1 Definition of transaction- and compliance costs 
For estimating costs related to an economic instrument such as PES, it is natural to distinguish 
between ‘transaction costs’ and ‘compliance costs’, which may also be referred to as 
‘implementation costs’.  
 
In the case of PES, transaction costs include the costs that are associated with the application 
process in order to be included in the program. This relates to legislation and institutions, and 
what concerns seeking, gathering and exchanging information, making decisions, and 
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contracting. In addition, they include monitoring and enforcement of the contract 
requirements (first and foremost related to intermediaries and authorities).   
 
Compliance costs or implementation costs are, in relation to the two PES contracts in Costa 
Rica, associated with fulfilment of the contract requirements, such as putting up fences to 
make sure cattle do not enter the forest, areas, creating firebreaks etc. The costs concerning 
the protection contract are related to refraining from the undesired practices. In the case of 
reforestation contracts, these costs imply establishment of plantation(s) and the costs related 
to the maintenance of these plantations. 
 
Both transaction costs and the implementation- or compliance costs for the landowners may 
be divided into different groups – material and immaterial costs. The material costs to the 
farmer would normally imply expenses for things such as making copies of the required 
documents of the farm, transport etc. in addition to a potential correction of documents 
containing errors, which implies additional costs. The immaterial costs refer to the farmers’ 
opportunity costs of time, the income they are missing by performing the work related to the 
application procedures, attending meetings with forest officials, or related to 
implementation/maintenance.  
 
When I next will be describing the transaction costs and implementation costs from my study 
further, I divide both transaction costs and implementation costs into material and immaterial 
costs.  
 
5.2.2 Transaction- and compliance costs to landholder 
Transaction costs  
The transaction costs to the landowner are those costs related to the application procedure. In 
the survey, in the section related to the application, I included questions concerning the time 
spent for this procedure, related to visits to the necessary offices/forest officials, making 
copies etc. In the survey, I focused mainly on the time spent, since many of the landowners 
participated quite some years ago, and it would be easier to remember as well.  
 
• Material costs: When it comes to the application process, the specific material costs I 
asked for were possible costs related to the need for an attorney in the case of 
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problems with documents, and other likely costs, e.g. for topographer in order to 
create new cadastral map of the farm (one of the requirements) etc. In the calculation 
of these costs, when used to compare per hectare costs, the possible costs for 
topographer were divided on the number of hectares (assumed to be variable) and the 
other costs were assumed fixed. 
 
• Immaterial costs: These costs relate, as mentioned, to the opportunity costs of the 
farmer, the time he/she spent for things such as meetings with forest officials, 
intermediaries, paperwork etc. In order to calculate the value of the time spent by the 
farmers for these things, as well as for the implementation/compliance phase, I have 
tried to find the value (shadow price) of an average working hour for the specific 
farmer involved. I have assumed average working hours during a month to be 140 
hours (7hrs/day, 5 days/week, 4 weeks/month). I have then used the information 
obtained from the household survey about the monthly consume by the family and 
divided this on average monthly working hours (concerning the monthly consume of 
the family, it should be mentioned that the survey question consisted of alternatives 
with intervals, and that for the calculation, the median of the interval is used as the 
specific number). I have hence assumed monthly consume to be the same as monthly 
income, which of course may not be the case due to savings or earnings of other 
family members apart from the respondent interviewed. I asked for monthly consume 
instead of income since farmers may be more reluctant to give up information on 
income than consumption, and generally, these two numbers are quite close.  
 
• Material/immaterial costs: Most of the landowners interviewed, applied through an 
intermediary, which in the case study area are the Agricultural Centres (‘Centro 
Agrícola’). This implies that the intermediary takes care of most of the administrative 
procedures, and works as the intermediary between FONAFIFO and the landowners 
applying for a PSA contract. According to the Forestry Law 75752, the intermediaries 
are allowed to charge up to 18% of the payments received from FONAFIFO for the 
work as the intermediary for PSA contracts. Since there are very few of the farmers 
interviewed that applied directly to FONAFIFO (which is the other option), I have 
excluded these respondents when making the analysis. The 18% administration costs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://www.elaw.org/system/files/Ley+Forestal+CR.pdf	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are hence assumed to be fixed and are added to the transaction cost part in the final 
aggregation. 
 
Compliance/implementation/establishment costs  
Since I included two types of contracts, the forest protection- and the reforestation contract, 
there are of course different types of costs involved when it comes to ‘compliance’ costs, so I 
have calculated these separately. 
 
As to the forest protection contract, the costs are related to the whole contract period, since 
the costs will be quite spread over the period (also reflected in the equal payment amount 
given over the 5-year period). When it comes to the reforestation contract, the payments are 
given out differently, with the majority of the payments given in the first year, indicating that 
most of the expenses are related to this first year. These costs related to the establishment of 
the plantations may be substantial. I have hence separated these costs from those that relate to 
maintenance over the rest of the period in order to be able to distinguish between the two. 
 
• Material costs: The material costs for the forest protection contract refer partly to the 
preparation for the contract period, in relation to the contract requirements involving 
putting up fences to protect the forest for entering livestock, put up signs and create 
firebreaks. There are as well maintenance costs involved, for maintenance of fences 
and signs. I did not include a question concerning of specific material costs related to 
these issues, but some farmers gave this information during the survey. However, 
since I did not originally have questions about these costs, and thus only received this 
information from some of the farmers, I decided not to include them in the analysis 
and only kept the time costs/labour costs (as the results might have become misleading 
otherwise).  
 
When it comes to the reforestation contract, the material costs naturally relate to the 
specific costs in relation to the establishment of the plantation(s) – transport and 
purchase of tree-plants, equipment etc. Neither for this contract did I include questions 
about this, but rather focused on time involved. As to the maintenance costs, the 
farmers were asked about costs per year. I have thus aggregated these costs over the 5-
year period (less if they had not completed the contract period yet for the first cost 
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interpretation). Separation between the ‘preparation’ phase and the ‘maintenance’ 
period should also have been done with the protection contract in order to obtain more 
accurate cost information. 
 
• Immaterial costs: The value of one working hour was calculated the same way as 
described under the transaction cost section. The time costs here are related to the time 
spent by the farmer for the associated activities, preparation, plantation establishment, 
and maintenance. 
 
• Material/immaterial costs: Many of the farmers appeared to have hired labour for the 
implementation/compliance cost part of the contract. This question was hence quickly 
included in the survey. Some farmers gave this information in expenses for labour per 
day, other in per hour payment and number of days spent for the work in total. In these 
cases, it is assumed a working day of 6 hours since this number appeared to be the 
usual amount of working hours for this type of work for the calculation. If specific 
payments were not given, it was assumed US$2 per hour and US$12 per day (2010-
value). 
 
When it comes to calculation of the percentages (the costs as a percentage of the payment 
received from FONAFIFO), I have looked up the level of payments for the relevant years 
(1998-2010) and when having all values in dollars, the 2010-value (inflation) was calculated 
through the consumer price index for this type of calculation (Banco Central, 2011). 
 
Uncertainties of the data 
There may be several uncertainties related to the cost calculations due to possible 
misunderstandings with the questions, which might have been better designed to obtain more 
accurate information. It was probably not given a sufficient specification of time frame for the 
costs, as many of the farmers/landholders have or have had several contracts and/or renewed 
contracts. This issue was not taken into account when designing the survey and not considered 
enough when performing it. This effect is probably smaller for the information related to 
protection contracts, since these contracts are often renewed, and there are less costs related to 
renewed contracts than new contracts. In general, however, the calculation has been directed 
to one contract period, the last fulfilled. If the contract was signed few years before the 
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interview (thus not yet a completed contract), the costs have been modified, comparing with 
other similar contracts/landholders. In the cases where the landholder had two contracts 
signed close in time (e.g. one year), it could be assumed that the costs were related to both of 
them. 
 
It is particularly difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the maintenance costs of reforestation 
contracts, as it implies to ask for the costs/time related to each year of the contract, as this 
varies according to the growth level of the trees and how much work/maintenance that is 
necessary in different periods. In addition, there had been a long time for many of the 
landowners since they entered the program, and did therefore often have difficulties with 
remembering exactly the time and costs involved. Some of them gave time information in 
weeks, for example, hence sometimes making accurate estimation of time costs challenging. 
When it comes to transaction costs, it is important to keep in mind that before 2002, all 
contracts were group contracts (‘contratos globales’), which had a great significance of the 
level of transaction costs where these costs were spread over the whole group rather than each 
one having to make all the procedures him/herself. 
 
5.2.3 Interpretations of compliance costs for the reforestation contract 
Due to uncertainties of how best to understand the costs related to maintenance and 
establishment for the reforestation contract, I have make 4 interpretations of the maintenance 
costs, and 2 different interpretations of the establishment costs.  
 
Maintenance 
•  The first interpretation at 129% include all observations providing transaction cost 
information and multiplying the given per year maintenance cost for the plantation 
with the number of years the contract had been in force.  
• For interpretation 2, I have removed one observation related to the maintenance costs, 
which I consider an outlier and substantially affecting the mean percentage.  
• Interpretation 3 implies removing 3 observations related to the establishment costs that 
imply over US$1000 per hectare in establishment, which I consider unlikely. 
• In interpretation 4, the maintenance costs are not multiplied by the number of years the 
contract has been in force as in interpretation 1. This is because the results from 
interpretation 1 may seem unlikely high, and is likely to contain some kind of error. 
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The question in the survey related to the level of these costs was intended to be 
maintenance costs per year, hence these costs were originally summed up by 5 years, 
but there are very high variances in these numbers, so many of the farmers may have 
given the total sum for all contract period, 5 years. Hence, here those contracts that 
have not passed the whole period have been corrected for according to how many 
years they have had a contract and hence had maintenance costs (assuming the 
information given by the farmers was for the entire period and not for each year). 
 
Establishment 
• The first interpretation in which all observations are included show that based on my 
results, the total establishment costs represent a percentage of 62% of the first PSA 
payment of the reforestation contract (50% of the total).  
• The second interpretation is obtained by removing the 3 extreme values which 
represent establishment costs of more then US$1000 per hectare). 
 
5.3 Econometric and statistical methods  
In order to say something about the basis for additionality of participants compared to non-
participants, characteristics of participants vs. non-participants, in addition to characteristics 
of the farmers related to the level of transaction costs, there was used econometric methods, 
first and foremost the logistic model for binary response, and the OLS estimation method 
related to the transaction costs vs. possible associated variables. 
 
In general, many of the variables were correlated, which in the case they had been run 
together may have led to reducing the significance of the variables. The variables with more 
than 0,35 correlation were therefore run separately.  
 
Several of the variables have been redefined and converted to dummy variables in order to get 
more accurate results. 
 
5.3.1 The multiple regression model 
The multiple regression model and the estimation method Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are 
central when it comes to predicting the marginal effect of a dependent variable on an 
independent variable, holding all other variables constant. 
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Some assumptions that are needed to obtain the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE), 
which is the estimator with the smallest variance (Gauss-Markov). The assumptions for Gauss 
Markov theorem are: Linearity in parameters, random sampling, no perfect collinearity, zero 
conditional mean, homoscedasticity and normality. Potential problems of heteroskedasticity 
are accounted for by using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Wooldridge, 2009). 
 
OLS and transaction costs 
In order to find out which factors/characteristics of the landowners that might affect the level 
of transaction costs (application costs), OLS regressions were applied. These results are 
supposed to supplement the equity part. The independent variable (y) is the level of 
transaction costs per hectare, and the dependent variables are the characteristics assumed to 
affect the landowner’s level of transaction costs. The variables included are: whether the 
landowner has earlier received incentives (prior to the PSA program); the distance to public 
offices (MINAET, FONAFIFO), type of document possessed by the landholder, monthly 
consume of the family (proxy for income), education level, and the number of contracts they 
have/have had.  
 
5.3.2 Probability models – binary response models 
 
The logit model 
The logit model is a discrete choice model for binary response where the response probability 
is the logit function evaluated at a linear function of the explanatory variables.  
 
A binary dependent variable is an example of a limited dependent variable, which is a 
variable for which the value is somehow restricted. It implies that the variable may contain 
two values, zero and one (Wooldridge, 2009).   
 
 
In this study, I have used the logit model for three purposes: 
 
1. The first is in order to find out whether PSA participants have lower opportunity costs 
of land than non-participants. I have therefore run regressions with independent 
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variable (y=1) for appliants and (y=0) for non-applicants in addition to similar 
regression in which (y=1) for participants and (y=0) for non-participant. I run 
regressions for both applicants and participants since it is interesting to see whether 
there are differences when it comes to the opportunity cost factors between these two 
independent variables, even though most of the applicants receive contract in the case 
study area. I will be looking at the differences between these regressions also to see 
whether one may say anything concerning the targeting of payments, hence 
differences in characteristics between the applicant group and the contract recipient 
group. If there is no difference between the two groups, it may indicate little if any 
targeting of the PSA funds, and that there is a potential for increasing cost-
effectiveness of the program. Since I assume differences in opportunity costs of land 
between forest protection participants and reforestation participants, there are made 
separate regressions for these. When running these regressions, I am using the 
following opportunity cost factors of land: biophysical characteristics of the land 
(percentage of amount of poor soils and steep slope of the farm), number of cattle, 
whether the farmers have a second occupation, off-farm income, the level of access to 
the farm during rainy season; and whether the landowner has been offered to sell the 
farm during the last 10 years. 
 
2. The second issue I will use the logit-model for, regards opportunity cost factors of 
land related to the type of contract the farmer has. In this case, (y=1) implies a forest 
protection contract, and (y=0) a reforestation contract. I am hence looking for whether 
it is more likely to have a reforestation contract than forest protection contract if the 
opportunity cost of land appears higher. The same variables are used above. 
 
3. The third concerns the equity issue, for which I will look at variables that are assumed 
related to whether farmers participate in PSA or not. It concerns the response 
probability for participating in PSA with certain characteristics. The dependent 
variable will be  (y=1) for participant (forest protection or reforestation), and (y=0) for 
non-participant. The variables included in this analysis are: number of hectares, 
number of more farms (additional), distance from farm to MAG office, distance to 
FONAFIFO regional office, level of education, whether the farmer has a second 
occupation, the level of off-farm income, whether the landowner has previously 
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received forest incentives (e.g. CAF), and whether they live on the farm or not. I have 
also run regressions with the same independent variables, but in which the dependent 
variable is (y=1) applicant and (y=0) non-applicant. 
 
 
5.4 Validity considerations 
 
I will in this section look at some factors that should be considered in relation to validity of 
the results of the study. 
 
Selection 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, it was difficult to perform a random selection of 
respondents since the case study area is a small canton and it ended up with mostly including 
those landholders that were possible get hold of. It is also important to take into account that 
for example many participants in PSA in the case study area did not live in the area and were 
not included in the survey due to limited time. These are probably quite wealthy landowners 
and the inclusion of these would have made the result more representative for the population. 
 
Measuring of variables 
There could probably have been better ways of measuring some of the variables more 
accurately, and questions that should have been made clearer. This especially goes for the 
participation cost part, also mentioned earlier, which ended up with very high variations. 
Some data was lacking as well. Measuring opportunity cost of time of the landholders is a 
particular issue that has large implications and could have been done differently by focusing 
on the specific landholder, in order to obtain more specific individual opportunity costs. 
 
Applicability to other settings 
It would be difficult to apply findings from this analysis to other settings and situations, as 
Hojancha is a quite particular place and has a different setting than many other areas 
concerning deforestation with respect to the historical trends in this area.  
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6 Results and discussion 
 
In this chapter, I will first go through the results and hypotheses. I will first look at the 
environmental effectiveness part and the hypotheses regarding opportunity cost of land and 
the differences related to these and the type of contract. Next, I will look at the cost-
effectiveness part concerning transaction- and compliance costs related to the landowner and 
opportunity costs. Finally, I will go through the hypotheses and result that relate to the equity 
part and participatory factors, and in the last part of the chapter I will have a discussion 
section. 	  
Table	  6.1	  Explication	  and	  description	  of	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  regressions	  in	  the	  chapter	  	  
Variable	  
name	  
Description	  of	  variable	   Type	  of	  measure	   Average/no	  of	  obs.	   Min	  value	   Max	  value	   Standard	  deviation	  
Number	  of	  
hectares	  
Continuous,	  number	  of	  hectares	  at	  the	  farm	  in	  question	   Hectares	   57,7	   2,5	   787	   87,58	  
Number	  of	  
more	  farms	  
Continuous,	  number	  of	  farms/parcels	  besides	  the	  farm	  in	  question	   Number	  of	  farms	  or	  parcels	   0,7	   0	   6	   0,9	  
Cattle	  in	  
2011	  
Continuous,	  average	  number	  of	  adult	  cattle	  (>1	  year)	  in	  2011	   Number	  of	  cattle	   25	   0	   400	   38,2	  
Poor	  soils	   Continuous,	  percentage	  of	  poor	  soils	  (not	  appropriate	  for	  agriculture)	  at	  the	  farm	  in	  question	  
Percentage	   10,9	   0	   100	   20,2	  
Steep	  slope	   Continuous,	  percentage	  of	  farm	  in	  question	  that	  contains	  steep	  slope	  (not	  appropriate	  for	  agriculture)	   Percentage	   34,3	   0	   100	   25,7	  
Off-­‐farm	  
income	  
2011	  
Continuous,	  percentage	  of	  family’s	  total	  income	  that	  does	  not	  come	  from	  the	  farm	  in	  question	  in	  2011	   Percentage	   47,1	   0	   100	   40,5	  
Access	  
rainy	  
season	  
Dummy	  variable	  	  1=Accessible	  by	  car,	  	  0=Accessible	  by	  either	  motorcycle,	  horse	  or	  by	  foot	  
Mean	  of	  transport	   1=139	  0=68	   	   	   	  
Second	  
occupation	  
Dummy	  variable	  	  1=Has	  a	  second	  occupation,	  0=Does	  not	  have	  a	  second	  occupation	  
	   1=83	  0=124	   	   	   	  
Distance	  
MAG	  
Continuous,	  distance	  in	  minutes	  from	  farm	  in	  question	  to	  closest	  MAG	  office	  	   Minutes	   29,7	   2	   120	   18,6	  
Distance	  
FONFAFIFO	  
Continuous,	  distance	  in	  minutes	  from	  farm	  in	  question	  to	  closest	  FONAFIFO	  office	   Minutes	   59,1	   5	   180	   32,8	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Live	  at	  
farm	  
Dummy	  variable,	  whether	  the	  landowner	  lives	  at	  the	  farm	  in	  question	  or	  not	   	   1=73	  0=133	   	   	   	  
Participant	  
CAF	  
Dummy	  variable	  	  1=landowner	  has	  received	  any	  forest	  incentives	  (CAF	  or	  similar)	  before	  1997	  	  0	  =not	  received	  
	   1=65	  0=142	   	   	   	  
Ever	  
applied	  
Dummy	  variable	  	  1=	  has	  ever	  applied	  for	  a	  PSA	  contract	  between	  1997	  and	  2011,	  	  0=has	  never	  applied	  for	  a	  PSA	  contract	  
	   1=	  85	  	  	  0=122	   	   	   	  
Received	  
contract	  
Dummy	  variable,	  	  1=has	  received	  a	  PSA	  contract	  between	  1998	  and	  2011,	  0=has	  not	  received	  a	  PSA	  contract	  between	  1998	  and	  2011	  
	   1=71	  0=13	   	   	   	  
Education	   Dummy	  variable,	  	  1=has	  higher	  completed	  education	  than	  secondary	  school,	  0=has	  lower	  education	  than	  secondary	  school	  
Level	  of	  completed	  education	   1=29	  0=178	   	   	   	  
Offer	  to	  sell	   Dummy	  variable,	  	  1=has	  been	  offered	  to	  sell	  the	  farm	  in	  question	  during	  the	  last	  10	  years,	  0=not	  received	  offer	  
	   1=108	  0=99	   	   	   	  
	  
Many of the variables were correlated. They are therefore run separately in the regressions 
(see Appendix C). 
6.1 Environmental effectiveness and opportunity cost of land 
In this section, I will first go through the first hypotheses; H.1-H.6 related to opportunity cost 
of land. I have been using two different dependent variables for the regressions here, 
ever_applied and received_contract (see table 6.1). The results from both these dependent 
variables are applied since they are assumed to be different and it is interesting to see whether 
there is any difference, and in that case, which differences there are. 
 
I will analyse the difference in opportunity factors between PSA participants and non-
participants using regressions with both the dependent variables, separately for the contract 
types and finally also with the two groups pooled. Next, I will analyse the differences between 
protection participants and reforestation participants. 
 
I will start by looking at H.1.a-H.6.a (related to the forest protection contract) and then go 
through the same hypotheses (with respect to the reforestation contract, where some of the 
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hypotheses from the protection part are excluded as they are not logic with respect to the 
reforestation contract). Next, I will go through hypotheses H.7.- H.9. by first looking at the 
regressions relating to opportunity cost factors of land with respect to type of contract, and 
then the results from what the participants themselves expressed would be the alternative use 
of the land. I have also added tables concerning the main uses of the payment the participants 
receive, as reported by the landowners. 
 
6.1.1 Forest protection – opportunity cost of land 
	  
Table	  6.2	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  forest	  protection	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  ever_applied	  
Opportunity	  cost	  
factors	  
Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  other	  
farms	  
0,305	  (1,24)	   0,297	  (1,28)	   0,262	  (1,10)	   0,197	  (0,86)	  
H.6.	  Access	  rainy	  
season	  
-­‐0,957***	  (-­‐2,40)	   -­‐0,975***	  (-­‐2,41)	   -­‐1,004***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐2,48)	   -­‐0,781***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐2,01)	  
H.1.	  Cattle	  in	  2011	   -­‐0,003	  (-­‐0,52)	   	   	   	  
H.2.	  Poor	  soils	   0,004	  (0,48)	   0,005	  (0,50)	   0,005	  (1,73)	   	  
H.2.	  Steep	  slope	   0,008	  (0,97)	   0,008	  (1,01)	   0,008	  (0,99)	   0,010	  (1,32)	  
H.5.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  
in	  2011	  
-­‐0,003	  (-­‐0,54)	   	   -­‐0,002	  (-­‐0,49)	   -­‐0,003	  (-­‐0,61)	  
H.5.	  Second	  
occupation	  
	   -­‐0,151	  (-­‐0,37)	   	   	  
H.3.	  Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   0,194	  (0,49)	   0,119	  (0,29)	   0,084	  (0,21)	   0,052	  (0,14)	  
H.4	  Number	  of	  
hectares	  
	   0,004**	  (1,74)	   0,004**(1,73)	   0,004**	  (1,86)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   -­‐0,975	   -­‐1,334	   -­‐1,206	   -­‐1,199	  
Wald	  Chi2	   10,21	   12,88	   13,05	   11,50	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,1770	   0,0750	   0,0708	   0,0742	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,0593	   0,0746	   0,0759	   0,0622	  
N	   154	   155	   154	   161	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%3	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I	  choose	  to	  use	  15%	  significance	  level	  as	  well,	  since	  the	  sample	  is	  quite	  small.	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Table	  6.3	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  forest	  protection	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  received_contract	  
Opportunity	  cost	  factors	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  other	  
farms	  
0,309	  (0,55)	   0,679	  (1,00)	   0,584	  (0,86)	  
H.6.	  Access	  rainy	  season	   0,319	  (0,34)	   -­‐0,876	  (-­‐0,89)	   -­‐1,273	  (-­‐1,21)	  
H.1.	  Cattle	  in	  2011	   -­‐0,017	  (-­‐1,05)	   	   	  
H.2.	  Poor	  soils	   0,036	  (1,20)	   0,039	  (1,22)	   0,037	  (1,13)	  
H.2.	  Steep	  slope	   -­‐0,010	  (-­‐0,61)	   -­‐0,009	  (-­‐0,58)	   -­‐0,007	  (-­‐0,47)	  
H.5.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  
2011	  
-­‐0,0001	  (-­‐0,01)	   	   -­‐0,010	  (-­‐0,85)	  
H.5.	  Second	  occupation	   	   0,735	  (0,73)	   	  
H.3.	  Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   -­‐0,238	  (-­‐0,26)	   -­‐0,656	  (-­‐0,63)	   -­‐0,633	  (-­‐0,61)	  
H.4.Number	  of	  hectares	   	   0,021	  (1,57)*	   0,028	  (1,84)**	  
	   	   	   	  
Constant	   1,561	   -­‐0,083	   0,489	  
Wald	  Chi2	   3,06	   6,90	   7,10	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,8791	   0,4396	   0,4189	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,0783	   0,1764	   0,1814	  
N	   38	   38	   38	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  	  
 
H. 1a:  Forest protection participants are less likely to have cattle/livestock than non-
participants 
 
The variable cattle in 2011 is not significant in either table 6.2 (ever_applied) or table 6.3 
(received_contract). As to the opportunity cost issue, we would expect a negative relationship 
between the number of cattle and whether they would like to apply for/participate in PSA, 
since, if there are few or no cattle at the farm, we assume the farm area to be less valuable or 
useful for agriculture than if there were more cattle. However, the survey question related to 
the number of cattle at the farm was referring to the year 2011. The data for some of the 
farmers may therefore be somewhat inaccurate, as I included participants from the year 1998 
to 2011, and some landowners may have acquired (more) cattle after the contract was 
finished. Farmers may also still have many cattle even though they are participants if they 
possess of several farms.  
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H. 2a: Forest protection participants are more likely to have less favourable biophysical 
conditions (poor soils and steep slope) than non-participants. 
 
Since soil quality and steepness of the land are characteristics affecting the opportunity cost of 
land, hence alternative land uses. We expect a positive relationship between the variables 
poor soils/steep slope and application/participation in PSA. Less favourable biophysical 
conditions of the farm would most likely make it more attractive to apply for a PSA contract 
since such areas may not be very useful for other purposes such as agriculture. According to 
Zbinden and Lee (2005), farms with relatively degraded area in their study, were more likely 
to participate in PSA. Also according to Arriagada et al. (2009), farmers with unfavourable 
biophysical conditions are more likely to apply for PSA due to lack of other alternative land 
uses. In my study, however, none of these two variables are significant in any of the 
regressions. It may be that many non-participants with unfavourable biophysical conditions 
do not wish to apply/participate because they find costs too high as well. 
 
H. 3a: Forest protection participants are less likely to have been offered to sell their property 
than non-participants. 
 
As there is an increasing interest by foreigners to buy real estate in this part of the country 
especially, we expected the variable offer to sell farm to be negatively related to 
application/participation in PSA, since an offer to sell would indicate that the farm has more 
value and that the farmer would be more likely to wish to sell the farm than participating in 
PSA. The variable is however, not significant in any of the regressions in table 6.2 or 6.3. An 
explication of the lack of significance here may be that many of the farmers do not wish to 
sell due to being family farms and if they do not have any other properties they would often 
prefer to keep the farm they have.  
 
 
H. 4a: Forest protection participants are more likely to have larger property and/or several 
parcels than non-participants 
 
We expect farm size and number of parcels to be positively related to the decision to 
apply/participate for PSA protection, since more area available could be assumed to make 
landowners decide to spend/let some of the area be used for other purposes, such as 
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agriculture. Zbinden and Lee (2005) find that farm area is positively related to PSA 
participation. In my study, the variable hectares is significant in both table 6.2 at 10% level, 
and at 10% and 15% in table 6.3 (received_contract), in all with positive sign, suggesting that 
the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Number of other farms is however, not significant in any of 
the regressions. 
 
 
H. 5a: Forest protection participants are more likely to have off-farm income/a second 
occupation than non-participants. 
 
According to Zbinden and Lee (2005), more off-farm income increased the probability of 
participating in PSA. Arriagada et al (2009) rather found that most of the non-participants had 
off-farm income, and that off-farm income seemed to make landowners not to participate in 
PSA. It would be likely to expect off-farm to be positively related to participation due to this 
indicating less opportunity cost of the farmland. On the other hand, it is also likely to believe 
that farmers applying for/participating in PSA are in need for the extra income, and poorer 
farmers may therefore be expected to seek for extra income by applying for PSA. But also, if 
they are working off-farm, which is often the case, they will have little time for their own 
farm and for complying with requirements (maintenance) (Arriagada et al. 2009).  The 
relationship between the variable off-farm income in 2011 and ever applying for 
PSA/participating may be expected to have either positive or negative sign. The variable 
second occupation is a dummy variable for whether the respondent has a second occupation 
or not. As this variable only refers to the respondent and not other family members as well, 
the variable off-farm income may be more accurate to use for this purpose. However, none of 
the two variables are significant in any of the regressions, however. It must be noted that the 
survey question is related to off-farm income in 2011, and not necessarily to the time they had 
PSA contract. The data may therefore be somewhat inaccurate. It would probably have been 
better to ask for this percentage for the year the landowners entered the (first) PSA contract 
(in case of participation). On the other hand, it might have been difficult for several of the 
landowners entering the program quite some time ago to remember the exact number. 
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H. 6a: Forest protection participants are more likely to have more difficult access to their 
farm than non-participants. 
 
We expect forest protection applicants/participants to have poorer access to their farms than 
non-participants, since we understand poor access (only reached by foot or horse) as a sign of 
low opportunity cost of the land. More difficult access makes it more difficult to have cattle 
on the area and use it for other purposes that would require transport. Sierra and Russmann 
(2006) also state that farmers with more difficult access to markets, thus higher transportation 
costs would give less incentives to clear forest for agriculture. The variable access in rainy 
season is significant at 5% level with the dependent variable ever_applied, with a negative 
sign, which is what we expect. The hypothesis can hence not be rejected.  
 
There are not many significant variables in table 6.2 and 6.3, only two for ever_applied and 
one for received_contract. This does not give many indications of lower opportunity costs 
among participants (counting only with protection contract). It should be noted that most of 
the PSA applicants in the case study receive(d) contract. Out of 85 applicants, 13 did not 
receive contract. 
 
6.1.2 Reforestation – opportunity cost of land 
In this part, I will go through the same hypotheses as for the protection contract over, but this 
time related to the reforestation contract. 
	  
Table	  6.4	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  ever_applied	  
Opportunity	  cost	  factors	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  other	  
farms	  
0,692	  (2,88)****	   0,485	  (2,36)***	   0,459	  (2,19)***	   0,655	  (2,78)****	  
H.6.	  Access	  rainy	  season	   0,328	  (0,72)	   0,282	  (0,65)	   0,245	  (0,56)	  	   0,233	  (0,53)	  
H.1.	  Cattle	  in	  2011	   -­‐0,022	  (-­‐2,41)**	   	   	   -­‐0,020	  (-­‐2,32)***	  
H.2.	  Poor	  soils	   0,004	  (0,44)	   0,0009	  (0,08)	   0,001	  (0,14)	   	  
H.2	  Steep	  slope	   -­‐0,002	  (-­‐0,03)	   -­‐0,0002	  (-­‐0,03)	   -­‐0,001	  (-­‐0,14)	   0,004	  (0,05)	  
H.5.Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  
2011	  
-­‐0,005	  (-­‐0,98)	   	   -­‐0,002	  (-­‐0,47)	   -­‐0,005	  (-­‐1,02)	  
H.5.	  Second	  occupation	   	   0,019	  (0,49)	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H.3.	  Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   -­‐0,008	  (-­‐0,02)	   0,022	  (0,05)	   0,027	  (0,07)	   -­‐0,061	  (-­‐0,16)	  
H.4	  Number	  of	  hectares	   	   0,0008	  (0,40)	   0,0007	  (0,36)	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   -­‐1,224	   -­‐1,840	   -­‐1,565	   -­‐1,091	  
Wald	  Chi2	   14,76	   7,18	   6,92	   13,76	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,0392	   0,4099	   0,4373	   0,0325	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,0857	   0,0416	   0,0402	   0,0779	  
N	   154	   155	   154	   158	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  
	  
Table	  6.5	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  with	  dependent	  variable	  received_contract	  
Opportunity	  cost	  factors	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  other	  
farms	  
0,464	  (0,65)	   0,593	  (0,63)	   0,811(0,78)	   0,433	  (0,64)	  
H.6.	  Access	  rainy	  season	   2,048	  (1,35)	   1,591	  (1,16)	   1,448	  (1,05)	  	   1,662	  (1,18)	  
H.1.	  Cattle	  in	  2011	   0,089	  (1,34)	   	   	   0,089	  (1,31)	  
H.2.	  Poor	  soils	   -­‐0,014	  (-­‐0,46)	   -­‐0,003	  (-­‐0,10)	   -­‐0,009	  (-­‐0,31)	   	  
H.2.	  Steep	  slope	   -­‐0,040	  (-­‐1,82)***	   -­‐0,030	  (-­‐1,48)*	   -­‐0,027	  (-­‐1,40)	   -­‐0,040	  (-­‐1,83)***	  
H.5.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  
2011	  
-­‐0,018	  (-­‐1,37)	   	   -­‐0,021	  (-­‐1,36)	   -­‐0,021	  (-­‐1,56)*	  
H.5.	  Second	  occupation	   	   -­‐1,615	  (-­‐1,29)	   	   	  
H.3.	  Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   -­‐0,171	  (-­‐0,12)	   -­‐0,230	  (-­‐0,16)	   -­‐0,560	  (-­‐0,39)	   -­‐0,105	  (-­‐0,08)	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  hectares	   	   0,054	  (1,40)	   0,040	  (1,29)	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   1,517	   0,475	   1,241	   1,810	  
Wald	  Chi2	   10,03	   9,92	   10,16	   9,59	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,1868	   0,1929	   0,1797	   0,1430	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,3026	   0,2994	   0,3065	   0,2864	  
N	   38	   38	   38	   39	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  	  
 
H. 1b:  Reforestation participants are less likely to have cattle/livestock than non-participants 
 
Also for the reforestation contract, we expect the applicants/participants to have fewer cattle 
than non-participants. However, we might assume that the farm is more relevant for livestock 
production (as compared to protection participants) since landowners, if they are able to, often 
quit cattle farming or sell some of the livestock in order to establish timber plantations. From 
table 6.4, we see that the variable cattle in 2011 is significant at 5% and 10% significance 
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level for ever_applied. The sign is negative, thus indicating that less cattle gives larger 
probability of participating in reforestation, which is as expected. The hypothesis can thus not 
be rejected. 
 
H. 2b: Reforestation participants are more likely to have less favourable biophysical 
conditions (poor soils and steep slope) than non-participants. 
 
We expect PSA participants in general to have lower opportunity cost of land than non-
participants, but we assume that soil quality and inclination of the land to be considerably 
better for reforestation participants than for protection participants. The variables poor soils 
and steep slope are not significant in table 6.3, but steep slope is significant at 5% and 15% 
significance level in table 6.4 (received_contract). However, it shows negative sign, which is 
contrary to what we expect, as we originally assume a positive relationship here. But as 
mentioned, the land cannot have too much inclination in order to establish a plantation, so it is 
not very surprising that the results do not show the expected results for PSA participants here. 
 
H. 4b: Reforestation participants are more likely to have larger property and/or several 
parcels than non-participants 
 
We expect the reforestation participants to be more likely to have more (available) area or 
several land areas (parcels) than non-participants, as we assume them to have less opportunity 
cost of land than non-participants. Farmers with larger properties and/or several parcels may 
have the possibility of planting/establishing plantations at some of the area/one of the parcels. 
Hence, they do not depend on all the farm area, and have something to spare for other 
activities. We hence expect the variables hectares and number of other farms to have a 
positive sign. Number of other farms is in table 6.4 (received_contract) significant at 1% and 
5% significance level, with expected positive sign. The hypothesis can therefore not be 
rejected. 
 
 
 
H. 5b: Reforestation participants are more likely to have off-farm income/a second 
occupation than non-participants. 
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As mentioned under the previous section for protection contract, there can be two different 
expected outcomes for the variable off-farm income 2011. It may be that farmers apply for 
PSA in order to obtain some more income (diversifying their income) or they may not depend 
that much on their farm, hence find it easier to include it in PSA to get some extra income. 
When it comes to the reforestation contract, it is a bit different, since there are substantial 
investment costs related to establishing a plantation. In fact, off-farm income may be needed 
in order to be able to establish the plantation as there are no payments given in advance. 
However, this is an issue I will come back to under the transaction cost/compliance cost 
section. In table 6.4 (received_contract), the variable off-farm income 2011 is significant at 
15% level. It has a negative sign, indicating that more off-farm income reduces the probability 
of participating in PSA reforestation. As mentioned previously, Arriagada et al (2009) also 
found this, focusing on forest protection participants. Reforestation participants should be 
expected to be more in need for off-farm income, but from this it might seem that they may be 
able to undertake the investment even with little off-farm income. It should again be noted 
that there might have been changes to the level of off-farm income from they entered the 
contract and until 2011, which is the year asked for in the survey. The variable second 
occupation is not significant in either of the tables. 
 
In table 6.6 and 6.7 under, I have pooled the protection and reforestation participants in order 
to obtain a higher observation number, and find out whether there may appear more 
significant variables this way. Even though we expect some of the variables to show different 
results with respect to contract type, it could be worth to check out. Table 6.6 refers to the 
dependent variable ever_applied, and table 6.7 to received_contract. 	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Table	  6.6	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  with	  both	  contract	  types	  with	  dependent	  variable	  ever_applied	  
Opportunity	  cost	  factors	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  other	  
farms	  
0,429	  (2,34)***	   0,392	  (2,18)***	   0,354	  (1,93)**	   0,354	  (1,93)**	  
H.6.	  Access	  rainy	  season	   -­‐0,321	  (-­‐0,99)	   -­‐0,305	  (-­‐0,96)	   -­‐0,352	  (-­‐1,10)	   -­‐0,353	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,11)	  
H.1.	  Cattle	  in	  2011	   -­‐0,008	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,51)*	   	   	   	  
H.2.	  Poor	  soils	   0,004	  (0,50)	   0,003	  (0,38)	   0,003	  (0,40)	   	  
H.2.	  Steep	  slope	   0,004	  (0,68)	   0,004	  (0,67)	   0,004	  (0,65)	   0,004	  (0,66)	  
H.5.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  
2011	  
-­‐0,004	  (-­‐1,12)	   	   -­‐0,003	  (-­‐0,83)	   -­‐0,003	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐0,83)	  
H.5.	  Second	  occupation	   	   -­‐0,128	  (-­‐0,42)	   	   	  
H.3.	  Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   0,054	  (0,18)	   0,0002	  (-­‐0,00)	   -­‐0,020	  (-­‐0,06)	   	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  hectares	   	   0,002	  (1,21)	   0,002	  (1,20)	   0,002	  (1,21)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   -­‐0,276	   -­‐0,709	   -­‐1,532	   -­‐0,541	  
Wald	  Chi2	   11,35	   9,67	   10,07	   10,07	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,1242	   0,2081	   0,1846	   0,1219	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,0428	   0,0363	   0,0380	   0,0380	  
N	   196	   197	   196	   196	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  	  	  
Table	  6.7	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  with	  both	  contract	  types	  with	  dependent	  variable	  received_contract	  
Opportunity	  cost	  factors	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  other	  
farms	  
0,340	  (0,89)	   0,635	  (1,31)	   0,677	  (1,23)	   0,384	  (0,84)	  
H.6.	  Access	  rainy	  season	   0,124	  (0,40)	   0,154	  (0,50)	   0,269	  (0,82)	   -­‐0,303	  (-­‐0,44)	  
H.1.	  Cattle	  in	  2011	   -­‐0,005	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐0,39)	   	   	   	  
H.2.	  Poor	  soils	   0,012	  (0,65)	   0,012	  (0,69)	   0,014	  (0,75)	   	  
H.2.	  Steep	  slope	   -­‐0,019	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,59)*	   -­‐0,020	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,68)**	   -­‐0,020	  (-­‐1,64)**	   -­‐0,017	  (-­‐1,45)*	  
H.5.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  
2011	  
-­‐0,011	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,38)	   	   -­‐0,014	  (-­‐1,60)*	   -­‐0,014	  (-­‐1,63)*	  
H.5.	  Second	  occupation	   	   -­‐0,107	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐0,16)	   	   	  
H.3.	  Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   0,134	  (0,20)	   -­‐0,401	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐0,55)	   -­‐0,405	  (-­‐0,55)	   	  
H.4.	  Number	  of	  hectares	   	   0,154	  (1,73)**	   0,020	  (1,87)**	   0,017	  (1,72)**	  
	  
64	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   2,412	   0,899	   1,280	   2,181	  
Wald	  Chi2	   7,30	   9,57	   12,29	   10,92	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,3980	   0,2142	   0,0916	   0,0530	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,1929	   0,1348	   0,1730	   0,1501	  
N	   80	   80	   80	   85	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  	  	  
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 shows that pooling the protection and reforestation participant result in the 
same significant variables as in the separate regressions (6.2-6.5), with exception of access in 
rainy season, which does not appear significant in table 6.6 nor table 6.7. It hence results that 
more observations did not give more significant variables. 	  	  	  
Table	  6.8	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  of	  land,	  summary	  table	  of	  tables	  1-­‐4.	  	  
	   Forest	  
protection	  
contract	  
Forest	  
protection	  
contract	  
Reforestation	  
contract	  
Reforestat
ion	  
contract	  
	  
Hypotheses	   Ever_applied	   Received_	  contract	   Ever_applied	   Received_contract	   Can	  reject	  	  hypothesis?	  
H.1.	  Cattle	  	   	   	   -­‐	   	   No	  
H.2.	  Poor	  soils	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
H.2	  Steep	  slope	   	   	   	   -­‐	   No	  
H.3	  Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   	   	   	   	   	  
H.4.	  Hectares	  	   +	  	   +	   	   	   No	  
H.4	  More	  farms	   	   	   +	   	   No	  
H.5.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	   	   	   	   -­‐	   ?	  
H.5	  Second	  occupation	   	   	   	   	   	  
H.6	  Access	  rainy	  season	   -­‐	   	   	   	   No	  	  
The table shows which variables of the hypotheses that resulted significant for the different regression 
types related to opportunity cost factors, and with which sign they had. 
 
From the summary of tables of opportunity cost factors of land in table 6.8, we see that 
overall, there are few significant variables. Even though the variables are significant, there 
does not seem to be enough evidence to claim that participants have lower opportunity cost of 
land than non-participants. 
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6.1.3 Opportunity cost of land – type of contract 
In this section I will look at the differences in the opportunity cost factors between farms 
related to the two contract types forest protection and reforestation. I will first look at 
hypothesis H.7, by studying regressions with opportunity cost factors of land with respect to 
type of contract. Then I will go through H.8. and H.9 by looking at tables regarding farmers’ 
self-reported alternative land uses and what the farmers said were the main uses of the PSA 
payments they received.  
 
 
 
 
H. 7: Reforestation participants have higher opportunity cost of land than protection 
participants (same factors as under protection contract). 
	  
Table	  6.9	  Opportunity	  cost	  factors	  related	  to	  the	  type	  of	  contract,	  regressions	  1-­‐7	  
Opportunity	  cost	  factors	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  
Number	  of	  other	  farms	   -­‐0,343	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,19)	   -­‐0,329	  (-­‐1,11)	   -­‐0,445	  (-­‐1,40)	   -­‐0,426	  (-­‐1,38)	  
Access	  rainy	  season	   -­‐1,846	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐2,63)****	   -­‐1,776	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐2,57)***	   -­‐1,908	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐2,66)****	   -­‐1,848	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐2,61)****	  
Cattle	  in	  2011	   0,016	  (1,18)	   0,014	  (1,04)	   0,016	  (1,16)	   	  
Poor	  soils	   -­‐0,003	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐0,16)	   -­‐0,002	  (-­‐0,10)	   -­‐0,002	  (-­‐0,11)	   0,005	  (0,28)	  
Steep	  slope	   0,028	  (1,94)**	   0,027	  (1,90)**	   0,031	  (2,03)***	   0,028	  (1,86)**	  
Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  2011	   	   -­‐0,002	  (-­‐0,22)	   -­‐0,004	  (-­‐0,45)	   	  
Second	  occupation	   -­‐0,532	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐0,85)	   	   	   -­‐0,478	  (-­‐0,77)	  
Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   	   	   0,737	  (1,08)	   0,641	  (0,94)	  
Number	  of	  hectares	   	   	   	   0,001	  (0,45)	  
Constant	   0,346	   0,176	   -­‐0,129	   0,162	  
Wald	  Chi2	   13,85	   13,16	   14,39	   13,84	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,0313	   0,0406	   0,0447	   0,0541	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,1729	   0,1642	   0,1796	   0,1727	  
N	   58	   58	   58	   58	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	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Opportunity	  cost	  factors	   Regression	  5	   Regression	  6	   Regression	  7	  
Number	  of	  other	  farms	   -­‐0,432	  (-­‐1,53)*	   -­‐0,412	  (-­‐1,48)*	   -­‐0,413	  (-­‐1,48)*	  
Access	  rainy	  season	   -­‐1,359	  (-­‐2,13)***	   -­‐1,375	  (-­‐2,16)***	   -­‐1,332	  (-­‐2,08)***	  
Cattle	  in	  2011	   	   0,012	  (0,98)	   	  
Poor	  soils	   	   	   	  
Steep	  slope	   0,028	  (2,13)***	   0,028	  (2,23)***	   0,029	  (2,29)***	  
Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  2011	   	   	   	  
Second	  occupation	   -­‐0,244	  (-­‐0,43)	   -­‐0,325	  (-­‐0,57)	   -­‐0,255	  (-­‐0,45)	  
Offer	  to	  sell	  farm	   0,606	  (0,98)	   0,699	  (1,14)	   0,667	  (1,10)	  
Number	  of	  hectares	   0,001	  (0,50)	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
Constant	   -­‐0,071	   -­‐0,231	   -­‐0,067	  
Wald	  Chi2	   11,49	   12,18	   11,22	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,0313	   0,0580	   0,0472	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,0745	   0,1395	   0,1285	  
N	   63	   63	   63	  
	  
• We expect the variable number of farms to be positively related to participation in 
forest protection, hence that protection participants are more likely to have more farms 
than reforestation participants. In table 6.9, we find that this variable is significant at 
15% level, with negative sign. This is hence the opposite of what we expected. 
However, it may indicate that reforestation participants need more area than protection 
participants (or that they more often have more parcels) in order to participate. 
 
• The variable access rainy season is expected to have a negative relationship to forest 
protection participation, hence that reforestation farms are assumed to have better 
access (by car) than farms involved in conservation. This, first and foremost because 
when it comes to reforestation, one needs better access to the farm than protection 
participants do. Reforestation participants have plantations that they are allowed to 
harvest after 15 years, and they therefore depend on good access in order to facilitate 
harvesting and transport to markets. In tables 6.9 we find the variable significant at 5% 
and 1% level, with negative sign, which is what we expected. 
 
• We expected the variable cattle 2011 to be negatively related to protection 
participation, hence that it was a greater probability for reforestation participants 
having more cattle than protection participants. This variable is however, not 
significant in any of the regressions in table 6.9. 
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• Reforestation participants are assumed to have better biophysical conditions of their 
farms than protection participants. We thus assume a positive relationship for both 
steep slope and poor soils related to participation in forest protection as compared to 
reforestation. That is because reforestation participants in order to establish plantations 
need biophysically favourable conditions on the land (like an agricultural crop). We 
find that the variable steep slope is significant at 5% and 10% level in tables 6.9. and 
with positive signs, which is as expected. 
 
• The variable off-farm income can be expected to have either of the signs, as mentioned 
previously. However, when considering differences between protection and 
reforestation participants, the reforestation participants can be assumed to be more in 
need for off-farm income in order to participate than protection participants (as 
previously mentioned). This variable however, is not significant in any of the 
regressions. 
 
• Second occupation would also be expected to have either sign for the same reasons as 
for off-farm income 2011 over. This variable is not significant in any of the regressions 
either. 
 
• We expect offer to sell farm to be negatively related to protection participation, since 
we expect reforestation participants in general to be offered to sell their farm than 
protection participants. This variable is, however, not significant in any of the 
regressions in the table 6.9. As mentioned previously, there may be several reasons for 
that the variable is not significant.  
 
Out of the regressions in table 6.9., there are hence two significant variables showing 
expected sign. 
 
 
H. 8: Forest protection participants would report they would not have cleared the forest even 
in the absence of payment. 
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This hypothesis is also related to the issue of opportunity cost of land and hence additionality, 
and concerns what the PSA participants themselves think when it comes to what they would 
have used their land for if they were not participating (the alternative use of the area). Table 
6.10 and 6.11 give an indication of the most likely alternative uses for PSA participants in 
Hojancha if they had not been participating.  	  
Table	  6.10	  The	  percentages	  of	  the	  self-­‐reported	  area	  in	  PSA	  contract	  that	  would	  be	  used	  for	  the	  different	  
purposes	  if	  not	  participating	  in	  PSA	  protection	  
FOREST	  PROTECTION	   	  
Percentage	  that	  would	  stay	  forest	   Percentage	  of	  forest	  protection	  
participants	  
0	  %	   15%	  (5)	  
13-­‐994	  %	   20%	  (7)	  
100	  %	   65%	  	  (22)	  
	   	  
Percentage	  used	  for	  sustainable	  
management	  
	  
0	  %	   91%	  (31)	  
12-­‐135	  %	   6%	  (2)	  
100	  %	   3%	  (1)	  
	   	  
Percentage	  conversion	  to	  pastures	   	  
0	  %	   85%	  (29)	  
42-­‐656	  %	   9%	  (3)	  
100	  %	   6%	  (2)	  
	   	  
Percentage	  conversion	  to	  plantations	   	  
0	  %	   94%	  (32)	  
5	  %	   3%	  (1)	  
50	  %	   3%	  (1)	  
	   	  
Percentage	  conversion	  to	  agricultural	  
crops	  
	  
0	  %	   94%	  (32)	  
5	  %	   3%	  (1)	  
22	  %	   3%	  (1)	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  7	  observations	  ranging	  from	  13-­‐99,70%	  5	  12,70	  and	  13,50	  6	  3	  observations	  from	  42,30	  and	  65,20%	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Percentage	  that	  would	  be	  sold7	   	  
0	  %	   94%	  (32)	  
100	  %	   6%	  (2)	  	  
Table 6.10 relates to the protection participants and their alternative use of the land they 
conserve(d) in the PSA program. There are 6 different alternatives, and the first columns 
shows the percentages of the different alternative uses of land the area would have been used 
for. The second column consists of the percentage of the protection participants that gave the 
specific number in the first column (in some cases the numbers are aggregated), with the 
number of observations in parenthesis. The percentages are calculated from the survey 
question in which I asked for the number of hectares (of the contract) that would be used for 
the different purposes in the absence of PSA. The number of respondents is not very high, but 
the numbers still give a quite clear indication of the trends. 
 
Looking at table 6.10, we find that 65% of the forest protection participants say they would 
have let all the area (100%) that they included in PSA protection contract, stay forest even if 
they had not received payments for it. An additional 20% say they would let part of the area 
(13%-99%) stay forest. Hence, it seems that the majority of the protection participants in the 
case study area would have conserved the forest at their land even in the absence of PSA 
payments, indicating a low level of additionality of the forest protection contract. However, it 
is important to keep in mind that the Costa Rican Forest Law from 1996 prohibits forest 
clearing, and even though the survey question related to these tables intended to specify the 
alternative use even in the absence of the Forest Law, farmers are now used to a system in 
which land-use change of natural and regenerated forest is not allowed, and may have 
difficulties of picturing the situation in which they are able to clear forest and use it for other 
purposes, for example pastures for livestock production. In general, farmers in Costa Rica 
comply with the law to a large extent.  
 
Based on the data in table 6.10, hypothesis H.8 cannot be rejected. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  alternative	  was	  not	  initially	  included	  in	  the	  questionnaire,	  but	  included	  afterwards	  as	  several	  farmers	  informed	  that	  they	  would	  have	  sold	  the	  farm	  if	  not	  participating	  in	  PSA.	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H. 9: Reforestation participants would report that they would have reforested the area even in 
the absence of payment. 
 
For this hypothesis we have table 6.11, regarding the alternative land uses of the PSA area, as 
told by the reforestation participants. 	  
Table	  6.11	  The	  percentages	  of	  the	  self-­‐reported	  area	  in	  PSA	  contract	  that	  would	  be	  used	  for	  the	  different	  
purposes	  if	  not	  participating	  in	  PSA	  reforestation	  
REFORESTATION	   	  
Percentage	  that	  would	  be	  
plantations	  
Percentage	  of	  reforestation	  
participants	  
0	  %	   79%	  (22)	  
50	  %	   3%	  (1)	  
100	  %	   18%	  (5)	  
	   	  
Percentage	  that	  would	  be	  
agricultural	  crops	  
Percentage	  of	  reforestation	  
participants	  
0	  %	   93%	  (26)	  
100	  %	   7%	  (2)	  
	   	  
Percentage	  that	  would	  stay	  
pastures	  
Percentage	  of	  reforestation	  
participants	  
0	  %	   39%	  (11)	  
50	  %	   4%	  (1)	  
100	  %	   57%	  (16)	  
	   	  
Percentage	  left	  for	  
regeneration/not	  used	  
Percentage	  of	  reforestation	  
participants	  
100	  %	   14%	  (4)	  
0	  %	   86%	  (24)	  
 
In table 6.11, we see that, compared to the forest protection participants, the results differ 
quite a lot from table 6. 79% of the reforestation participants express that they would not have 
planted anything if they had not received PSA. 18% say they would have planted all the area 
they have planted in the contract even in the absence of the payments. This indicates that also 
some reforestation participants would have planted even in the absence of payments, but 
compared to table 6 and protection participants, it suggests that the PSA payments are more 
important for the reforestation participants. Opportunity cost of land therefore seems to be 
higher for reforestation participants, and thus also probably higher possibility additionality 
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for reforestation contracts than for protection. The results in table 6.10 and 6.11 therefore 
support the hypothesis of higher additionality (in terms of forest cover) among reforestation 
participants than protection participants. 
 
 
6.1.4 More on additionality and opportunity cost of land 
In this section, I will look further at the additionality issue. I will look at tables over the main 
uses of payments for protection participants and reforestation participants in order to obtain a 
wider perspective of opportunity cost. 
Main uses of payments  	  
Table	  6.12	  Main	  uses	  of	  PSA	  payments	  for	  forest	  protection	  participants	  Main	  uses	  of	  payment	  –	  protection	  contract	   Percentage	  of	  respondents	   Number	  of	  respondents	  
Investment	  in	  the	  
farm/maintenance	  
35%	   12	  
Subsistence/consume	   29%	   10	  
Investment	  in	  
farm&subsistence/consume	  
29%	   10	  
Subsistence/consume&fencing	  
of	  PSA	  area	  
3%	   1	  
Investment	  in	  farm&expenses	  
for	  lawyer/topographer	  
3%	   1	  
	  
	  
Table	  6.13	  Main	  uses	  of	  PSA	  payments	  for	  reforestation	  participants	  Main	  uses	  of	  payment	  –	  reforestation	  contract	   Percentage	  of	  respondents	   Number	  of	  respondents	  
For	  savings	   3%	   1	  
Investment	  in	  the	  farm	   80%	   24	  
Investment	  in	  other	  
economic	  activities	  outside	  
the	  farm	  
3%	   1	  
Subsistence/consume	   3%	   1	  
Investment	  in	  
farm&subsistence/consume	  
10%	   3	  	  
From the tables 6.12 and 6.13 we see that there are some differences regarding what the PSA 
participants primarily spend the payments they receive on, related to the type of contract they 
have. It seems that the reforestation participants to a larger extent use the payments for 
investment at the farm than protection participants. 80% of the reforestation participants say 
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they spend/spent most of the payment for this purpose. We may therefore assume that the 
payments for reforestation contract are used mostly for plantation establishment and 
maintenance expenses/costs. 
 
Sierra and Russmann (2006) found that many of the PSA participants spend the payments 
they receive for economic activities outside the farm, which may indicate that the farmers 
used the payments in order to switch from agricultural activities to more urban activities. It 
could also be interpreted as the farmers not really being in need for the payments, hence little 
opportunity cost of land (indicating little additionality). Their study was related to forest 
protection participants; however, comparing to my study in Hojancha, only 3% of the farmers 
(1 reforestation participant) chose this alternative. One of the reasons for this may be that the 
survey question many times was asked without giving the alternatives, and instead just asked 
for the main uses of the payment. Another thing is that many farmers often possess 
of/administer several farms, and they may therefore have had difficulties with distinguishing 
between the different farms when choosing the alternative “investment at the farm”. The 
question may have been interpreted as investment at whichever of the farms they possess, and 
the alternative “economic activities at other farms” may not have been clear and to be 
separated from the farm in question. It may also be the case that payments that are used for 
family consumption, and other family funds are than used for other activities outside the farm 
instead. 
 
When it comes to the protection contract, 30% of the farmers say they spend most of the 
payments for subsistence/consume, which may suggest that protection participants are poorer 
than reforestation participants by having to spend a larger part of the payments they receive 
on consume. But it may also indicate that these farmers do not have to spend very much of the 
payments on contract requirements and rather spend it on other things. 
 
However, there seems to be a quite substantial difference when it comes to the difference in 
choices between the two contract types. Reforestation participants appear to need more of the 
payments for the farm (although it may be the case that some farmers also here have mixed up 
this alternative with other activities, and spent some or more of the payments for activities at 
other farms). Anyway, plantation establishment is usually considered an investment at the 
farm. It may be difficult to draw strict conclusions of the additionality question from tables 
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6.12 and 6.13, but they seem to strengthen the hypothesis that a larger part of the payment that 
reforestation participants receive go to fulfilling contract requirements than it does for 
protection participants, hence that reforestation participants are more in need for the payments 
than protection participants. It may hence indicate a lower opportunity cost for the protection 
participants than for reforestation participants.  
 
6.2 Cost-effectiveness 	  
In this section, I will first look at hypothesis H.10 and H.11 regarding transaction- and 
compliance costs. Then I will analyse hypothesis H.12., by comparing the differences in 
results in opportunity costs of land with respect to contract applicants and contract recipients. 
 
6.2.1 Transaction- and compliance costs 
In this part, I will go through the hypotheses H.10-H.12, which are related to the amount of 
transaction costs and compliance costs that the PSA participants have/have had in relation to 
their contract(s) as a percentage of the payments they receive(d). The tables that follow under 
show percentages of transaction costs (appliance costs) and compliance costs related to 
corresponding contract type. The first table, table 6.14 regards the forest protection contract, 
and consists of percentages of application- and compliance costs, and the two added, and 
finally, included the 18% administrative costs charged by the intermediary. Since most of the 
farmers apply through an intermediary, the few landowners (8 in total) that applied directly to 
FONAFIFO were excluded when calculating these costs. 
 
Table 6.15, 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18 relate to the reforestation contract. The calculation of these 
costs and the presentation is somewhat more complicated due to separated establishment costs 
and maintenance costs, having to create several interpretations of the numbers since I found 
the numbers to appear quite uncertain and the numbers of costs given by the farmers were 
varying a lot. 
 
Table 6.15 shows application/transaction costs (same numbers as for protection contract in 
table 6.14, since I assumed application costs not to differ substantially between protection and 
reforestation participants), and the results for the separate establishment and maintenance 
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costs. Table 6.16 gives the different interpretations of the total compliance costs 
(establishment and maintenance costs combined) for reforestation contract. Table 6.17 shows 
the percentage of total transaction (application)- and compliance costs for reforestation 
contract, and table 6.18 shows the same numbers as table 6.17, but in which 18% 
administrative costs charged by intermediary is added to the percentages. The payment level 
is in the calculation therefore deducted by the 18% charged by the intermediary. 	  
Table	  6.14	  Transaction-­‐	  and	  compliance	  costs	  for	  forest	  protection	  contract	  
	  
	  
Table	  6.15	  Application	  costs,	  establishment	  costs	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  separated	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Both	  contract	  types	  included	  9	  Paid	  to	  intermediary	  for	  facilitating	  application	  process	  10	  Same	  as	  footnote	  7	  11	  Removed	  obs.	  109,	  125	  and	  149	  due	  to	  outliers	  (over	  1000US$	  in	  establishment	  costs	  per	  hectare).	  
T	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  
the	  PSA	  
payment	  
St.dev	   Min	  	   Max	   Number	  of	  
observations	  
Application	  costs8	   1,3%	   2,192	   0,04	   13	   51	  
Compliance	  costs	   4,3%	   3,361	   0,11	   12	   27	  
Application+compliance	  
costs	  
6,2%	   5,220	   0,32	   20	   27	  
Application+compliance	  
costs	  (incl.	  18%	  
adm.costs9)	  
24	  %	   5,220	   18,3	   38	   27	  
	   Percentage	  of	  
the	  PSA	  payment	  
St.dev	   Min	   Max	   Number	  
of	  obs	  
Application	  costs10	   1,3%	   2,192	   0,04	   13	   51	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Establishment	  costs	  
(compliance	  costs)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Interpretation	  1	   31%	   36,94	   2,1	   125	   23	  
Interpretation	  211	   19%	   18,23	   2,1	   84	   20	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Table	  6.16	  Establishment	  costs	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  combined	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  
	  
	  
Table	  6.17	  Transaction-­‐	  and	  compliance	  costs	  combined	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Removed	  obs.	  125	  due	  to	  unlikely	  high	  number	  for	  maintenance	  costs	  (outlier)	  13	  Maintenance	  costs	  not	  multiplied	  by	  5	  years	  (or	  the	  number	  of	  years	  the	  contract	  had	  been	  in	  force).	  See	  methodology	  chapter,	  section	  5.2.3	  14	  Removed	  obs.	  125	  due	  to	  unlikely	  high	  number	  for	  maintenance	  costs	  (outlier)	  15	  Removed	  obs.	  108,	  125	  and	  149	  due	  to	  very	  high	  establishment	  costs	  (more	  than	  1000US$)	  16	  Maintenance	  costs	  adjusted	  as	  explained	  under	  footnote	  13	  17	  Same	  as	  footnote	  12	  18	  Same	  as	  footnote	  11	  19	  Maintenance	  costs	  adjusted	  as	  explained	  under	  footnote	  13	  
Maintenance	  costs	  
(compliance	  costs)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Interpretation	  1	   69%	   98,85	   1,3	   437	   20	  
Interpretation	  212	   55%	   51,43	   3,2	   185	   19	  
Interpretation	  313	   17%	   22,13	   0,7	   87	   20	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Percentage	  of	  the	  PSA	  payment	   St.dev.	   Min	   Max	   N	  
Establishment	  and	  
maintenance	  costs	  (total	  
compliance	  costs)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Interpretation	  1	   103%	   123,13	   5,5	   535	   20	  
Interpretation	  214	   85%	   72,86	   5,5	   263	   19	  
Interpretation	  315	   69%	   54,20	   5,5	   219	   17	  
Interpretation	  416	   51%	   52,29	   2,7	   186	   20	  
	  
Total	  reforestation	  costs	  
(application/TCs&compliance	  
costs)	  
Percentage	  of	  the	  PSA	  payment	   St.dev.	   Min	   Max	   N	  
Interpretation	  1	   111%	   125,41	   6,8	   537	   19	  
Interpretation	  217	   91%	   74,32	   6,8	   274	   18	  
Interpretation	  318	   73%	   55,79	   6,8	   221	   16	  
Interpretation	  419	   54%	   54,83	   4,1	   188	   19	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Table	  6.18	  Total	  transaction-­‐	  and	  compliance	  costs	  for	  reforestation	  contract	  
	  	  
H. 10: The transaction costs and compliance costs (combined) represent more than 30% of 
the PES payment received.  
 
When it comes to the transaction- and compliance costs related to the forest protection 
contract, we see from table 10 that including the 18% administration costs, the percentage 
reaches 24% when calculating the expenses of 27 PSA protection participants. It does not 
exceed the 30% calculated by Rodriguez (2008), but my numbers do not include specific 
material costs, such as the fixed costs related to fencing the contract area, and signs. In some 
cases the area may already be fenced, but in most cases not. The percentage could therefore in 
reality be significantly higher. Another issue related to Rodriguez’s (2008) calculation, is that 
she operated with a fixed opportunity cost of time for the farmer, US$2 per hour. In reality, 
this opportunity cost may be quite a bit higher, depending on the farmer. As there were great 
economic differences between the farmers that were interviewed in my survey, and many of 
them had second occupations and off-farm income, it was natural to assume different 
opportunity costs of time among them. This was therefore calculated based on the total family 
consume, even though this may not be very accurate, as the monthly family consume level 
may consist of more than the farmer in question’s income. My calculation is mainly based on 
the opportunity cost of time of the farmers and the costs related to hiring labour for fulfilling 
the requirements of the contract.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Same	  as	  footnote	  8	  21	  Same	  as	  footnote	  9	  22	  Maintenance	  costs	  adjusted	  as	  explained	  under	  footnote	  13	  
	  
Total	  transaction	  and	  compliance	  
costs	  (included	  18%	  adm.)	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  the	  total	  payment	  
received	  (whole	  period)	  for	  
reforestation	  contract.	  
Percentage	  of	  the	  PSA	  payment	   St.dev.	   Min	   Max	   N	  
Interpretation	  1	   129%	   125,41	   25	   555	   19	  
Interpretation	  220	   109%	   74,32	   25	   292	   18	  
Interpretation	  321	   91%	   55,79	   25	   239	   16	  
Interpretation	  422	   72%	   54,83	   22	   206	   19	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  23	  Even	  though	  the	  reforestation	  contract	  implies	  more	  costs	  than	  the	  forest	  protection	  contract,	  the	  payments	  for	  the	  reforestation	  contracts	  are	  higher;	  hence	  one	  will	  assume	  the	  percentage	  of	  costs	  of	  the	  payment	  not	  to	  differ	  too	  much	  from	  that	  for	  the	  protection	  contract.	  The	  percentage	  30%	  from	  Rodriguez	  (2008)	  was	  based	  on	  an	  agroforestry	  contract,	  which	  implies	  planting	  as	  well	  (but	  native	  species	  mostly).	  It	  should	  hence	  be	  possible	  to	  compare	  these	  numbers.	  
As to the total percentages for the reforestation contract, we have table 6.18, which shows 
the total transaction- and compliance cost for reforestation participants, ranging from 72% to 
129% with the different interpretations. There are several interpretations of the compliance 
costs for the reforestation contract due to uncertainties in how to interpret right the numbers 
and inaccuracies when the survey was conducted (see section 5.2.2). Also because the costs 
for maintenance vary a lot from year to year according to the varying needs for maintenance 
etc., it may be a better option to interpret the numbers in different ways.  
 
Even though a reforestation contract implies higher costs than a protection contract, the 
payment amount given to the farmers is higher as well. When calculating these numbers, 
material costs for establishment (purchasing of plants, transport, equipment etc.) were not 
included as I did not have this question in the survey from the beginning. The actual numbers 
are therefore most likely higher, and we may at least conclude that the costs exceed 30%23. 
However, there is a low observation number, which makes the results more uncertain, and 
also uncertainty when it comes to actual opportunity cost of time of the farmer, as we have 
used monthly family consume when finding the value of a working hour (same as when 
calculating cost for the forest protection contract). 
 
It should also be noted that for the transaction costs (the application costs), also participants 
entering the program between 1998 and 2002 are included, for which the circumstances were 
somewhat different. All contracts made until 2002 were in the case study area group 
contracts; the application costs were thus spread over all participants in the contract, and there 
were therefore less costs for each of them. 15 of the total contracts included in my 
calculations were signed before 2002. 
 
A point to mention is that there is not the same number of observations for establishment 
costs and maintenance cost. This is because I did not receive all information from all the 
farmers, so for some farmers I only obtained establishment costs, and other only maintenance 
costs. So when calculating both together, some of the observations had to be removed since 
they would not have been representative with lack of information. 
 
 
 
 
 
As to H.10, we may conclude that for the reforestation contract, the costs exceed 30%. For the 
protection contract this is less certain, but there are reasons to believe that the costs also for 
this contract type generally exceed 30%. 
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Table	  6.19	  Establishment	  cost	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  first	  payment	  of	  reforestation	  contract	  
This hypothesis is related to the issue that the establishment costs for plantations associated 
with the reforestation contract are claimed to be too high for many farmers relative to the 
initial payment they receive, which is supposed to cover these costs. Since for the 
reforestation contract, 50% of the total payments are given the first year of the contract in 
order to help cover the expenses for the establishment of the plantation(s), it is interesting to 
look at how much these costs represent of the first payment of the contract. As there is not 
given any payments in advance, many farmers have expressed that they would need a larger 
payment in advance in order to be able to establish a plantation. As the plantation will not 
generate incomes until it is harvested at least 15 years ahead, many farmers find this difficult, 
as there may not be any income sources in the meantime (between the contract and the time of 
harvesting). This indicates that payments given for this contract, to many farmers may be too 
little to overcome their opportunity costs, while farmers with more resources and area 
available can afford the investment (supported by results for reforestation contract from 
regressions in table 6.4).  
 
From table 6.19 we have two interpretations of the amount of establishment costs related to 
the first payment of a reforestation contract. The first interpretation in which all observations 
are included show that based on my results, the total establishment costs represent a 
percentage of 62% of the first PSA payment of the reforestation contract (50% of the total). If 
we remove the 3 extreme values (see section 5.2.3), we get the second percentage, 
interpretation 2 of 37%. Neither of these numbers exceeds the first payment amount, but fixed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Removed	  obs.	  109,	  125	  and	  149	  due	  to	  unlikely	  high	  establishment	  costs.	  
 
 
 
 
 
H. 11: The plantation establishment costs are less than the first payment in the contract for 
reforestation (50% of the total). 
 
	  
The	  establishment	  costs	  as	  a	  
percentage	  of	  the	  first	  payment	  	  
Percentage	  	   St.dev	   Min	   Max	   Number	  of	  
obs	  
Interpretation	  1	   62%	   63,88	   4,1	   249	   23	  
	  
	  
Interpretation	  224	  
37%	   36,47	   4,1	   167	   20	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material costs for expenses such as plants, transport, equipment etc. are not included. The 
percentage may therefore also here be substantially higher. The level of establishment costs 
also depends a lot from place to place, accesses to the farm etc., so it may be substantially 
higher costs for farmers living in more remote areas. However, with the numbers obtained in 
the study, though the observation number is quite low, the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
  
H. 12: The transaction- and compliance costs related to the reforestation contract are higher 
than those costs related to the forest protection contract, (relative to the PES-payment 
received). 
 
From table 6.14 (the last row where all costs are included) and table 6.18, we see that the 
percentages related to the reforestation contract (relative to the payment amount the farmers 
receive) are substantially higher than for protection contract participants. There are, as 
mentioned, uncertainties to the numbers, but to both contract types the same type of costs are 
not included. The numbers should therefore be comparable. We see that the transaction 
(application) costs seem to be relatively low, hence the large differences result from the 
compliance costs. As mentioned earlier, the payments to reforestation participants are higher 
than for forest protection, since investment costs are higher. Hence, the costs for reforestation 
contracts appear to be substantial in comparison. However, in the case study area there is a 
large timber industry and to many landowners, the reforestation/plantation contract is viewed 
as an investment to be profitable in 15 years when they are permitted to harvest and sell the 
wood. One may therefore assume that the reason that many farmers are interested in the 
reforestation contract is the aspect of future gains of the timber, and that they otherwise might 
probably not been applying for this contract type.  
 
6.2.2 Cost-effectiveness and opportunity cost of land 
When it comes to cost-effectiveness, one aims for low opportunity costs as well as transaction 
costs. By comparing the regressions of opportunity cost factors of land, we may draw some 
conclusions regarding differences between applicants and the receivers of PSA, and it might 
be possible to say something about the targeting by FONAFIFO when distributing the 
payments. When analysing H.13, I will first look at the part related to forest protection 
contract and then the part related to the reforestation contract.  
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H. 13: There are not lower opportunity costs among the contract receivers than the contract 
applicants (there is a lack of targeting when it comes to opportunity cost of land). 
 
As to the forest protection contract and the regressions in table 6.2 (dependent variable is 
ever_applied), comparing the results to table 6.3 (received_contract), the results appear quite 
similar with respect to significant variables. The variable hectares is significant in both 
regression types, but there is one more significant variable in table 6.2 than table 6.3, which is 
access rainy season. Hence, out of these results there does not appear to be much difference 
between applicants and recipients of forest protection contract, but there are few significant 
variables, and one may first and foremost conclude based on the specific variables.  
 
When it comes to the reforestation contract, it seems like from the results that there are greater 
differences between applicants and participants here than for the forest protection applicants 
and participants. The two variables that are significant for the applicants, number of other 
farms and cattle in 2011, are not the same as those that are significant for reforestation 
participants, which turned out to be steep slope.  
 
Out from these results, they appear quite similar for the protection-regressions and different to 
some extent for reforestation, but they do not give sufficient result to conclude that 
opportunity costs among contract receivers are less than for applicants. Hence, there does not 
seem to be targeting when it comes to the recipients of PSA based on the case study data, and 
therefore some lack of cost-effectiveness due to this. As I will come back to, there is however 
in the interest to have high opportunity costs when it comes to additionality. The hypothesis 
can however, not be rejected. 
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6.3 Equity  
In this section, I will go through logit-regressions related to factors that are assumed to affect 
the decision of farmers whether to participate in PSA or not and I will give results on whether 
the level of transaction (application) costs are affected by certain factors assumed to affect 
these. In the end I will present results from questions regarding reasons for not to participate 
and things that according to participate should be improved in the program. 	  
6.3.1 Factors affecting participation  
In this part, I will look at regressions with factors assumed to affect landholders’ decisions in 
whether to apply for/participate in PSA. I will therefore look at the dependent variable 
ever_applied in relation to the hypotheses H.14.-H.19., in order to say something about 
characteristics of the PES participants in the case study area. In these regressions, participants 
refer to both participants in forest protection and reforestation. 
 
Table	  6.20	  Factors	  affecting	  participation	  with	  dependent	  variable	  ever_applied,	  regressions	  1-­‐8	  	  
Participatory	  factors	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  
H.14.	  Number	  of	  hectares	   0,002	  (0,91)	   0,004	  (1,47)*	   0,002	  (1,26)	   0,002	  (1,11)	  
H.14.	  Number	  of	  more	  farms	   0,269	  (1,52)*	   0,256	  (1,42)	   0,305	  (1,73)**	   0,269	  (1,53)*	  
H.16.	  Distance	  to	  MAG	  office	   0,022	  (2,63)****	   	   	   	  
H.16.	  Distance	  to	  FONAFIFO	  
office	  
	   	   	  0,012	  (2,45)***	   	  	  
H.17.	  Education	  level	   -­‐1,151	  (-­‐0,33)	   -­‐0,557	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,23)	   -­‐0,123	  (-­‐0,27)	   -­‐0,477	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,07)	  
H.18.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  
2011	  
-­‐0,003	  (-­‐0,93)	   -­‐0,004	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,08)	   -­‐0,003	  (-­‐0,92)	   -­‐0,003	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐0,82)	  
H.18.	  Second	  occupation	   	   	   	   	  
H.15.	  Participant	  CAF	  or	  
similar	  
0,453	  (1,40)	   0,453	  (1,39)	   	   0,456	  (1,44)*	  
H.19.	  Live	  at	  farm	   	   -­‐0,462	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐1,37)*	   	   	  
Constant	   -­‐1,284	   -­‐0,462	  	   -­‐1,223	   -­‐0,607	  
Wald	  Chi2	   18,18	   14,63	   14,68	   10,76	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,0058	   0,0233	   0,0118	   0,0563	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,0651	   0,0526	   0,0528	   0,0385	  
N	   206	   205	   205	   206	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Participatory	  factors	   Regression	  5	   Regression	  6	   Regression	  7	   Regression	  8	  
H.14.	  Number	  of	  hectares	   0,002	  (1,08)	   0,005	  (1,76)**	   O,002	  (1,06)	   0,002	  (1,18)	  
H.14.	  Number	  of	  more	  
farms	  
0,317	  (1,81)**	   0,324	  (1,84)**	   0,288	  (1,62)*	   0,330	  (1,91**)	  
H.16.	  Distance	  to	  MAG	  
office	  
	   	   	   0,022	  (2,65)****	  
H.16.	  Distance	  to	  
FONAFIFO	  office	  
0,011	  (2,33)***	   	   0,012	  (2,55)***	   	  
H.17.	  Education	  level	   -­‐0,233	  (-­‐0,50)	   -­‐0,550	  (-­‐1,22)	   	   -­‐0,162	  (-­‐0,35)	  
H.18.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  in	  
2011	  
	   	   -­‐0,004	  (-­‐0,95)	   	  
H.18.	  Second	  occupation	   0,038	  (0,12)	   -­‐0,065	  (-­‐0,22)	   	   0,016	  (0,05)	  
H.15.	  Participant	  CAF	  or	  
similar	  
0,403	  (1,25)	   	   	   	  
H.19.	  Live	  at	  farm	   	   -­‐0,377	  (-­‐1,22)	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   -­‐1,475	   -­‐0,608	   -­‐1,326	   -­‐1,382	  	  
Wald	  Chi2	   15,72	   11,90	   15,99	   15,65	  
Prob	  >	  Chi2	   0,0153	   0,0363	   0,0069	   0,0079	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0,0563	   0,0426	   0,0575	   0,0558	  
N	   206	   206	   205	   207	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  z-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  	  	  	  
H. 14: Landowners with larger properties are more likely to participate than smaller. 
 
We expect a positive relationship between the variable hectares and application in PSA. As 
mentioned in section 6.1, it is suggested by Zbinden and Lee (2005) and Miranda et al. (2003) 
that larger landholders (hence assumed to be wealthier), are more likely to participate in PSA. 
We find the variable hectares to be significant at 10% and 15% significance level with 
positive sign, as expected. From the results it thus seems that farmers with larger properties 
are more likely to apply than non-participants, hence the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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H. 15: Landholders that have participated in similar incentive programs (before 1997) are 
more likely to apply/participate in PSA than others 
 
We expect a positive relationship between the variable participant CAF and participation in 
PSA, since participation in previous incentive programmes is assumed to bring about more 
information and knowledge of such programmes, and thus facilitating participation for PSA. 
The variable is significant at 15% level in table 6.20. Hypothesis H.15 can therefore not be 
rejected. 
 
H. 16: Landowners closer to public offices (MAG, FONAFIFO) are more likely to 
apply/participate than landowners farther away from these offices 
 
We would expect a negative relationship between the variables related to distance to (forestry) 
public offices and participation in PSA, due to proximity to these offices probably making the 
application process somewhat easier. This variable expresses the distance from the farm in 
question in minutes to the closest office of the kind as reported by the farmer and according to 
the mean of transport he/she normally uses. In table 6.20, both these variables are significant; 
distance to MAG office at 1% level and distance to FONAFIFO office at 5% significance 
level. However, the variables have positive sign, which is opposite to the expected.  This may 
be related to the existence of the intermediary ‘Centro Agrícola’, spreading information about 
the program and facilitates application, and also visiting farmers to encourage them to apply 
as well. Perhaps the most important issue is that the variable is related to the distance of the 
farm and not necessarily the place in which the farmer lives. In many cases, the farmer lives 
in the centre of the canton, close to public offices, but has the farm out in the district. This 
would mean that farmers who had farms far from the centre were systematically more likely 
to live in the town. It could make sense as if the farm is close to the town, one would live at 
the farm, and if the farm is far from the centre one would live where there is available place in 
the centre. Arriagada et al. (2009) find that many farmers not living on their farms often find 
it costly in terms of opportunity costs to participate since they rarely visit their farms. 
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H. 17: Higher educated landowners are more likely to apply/participate than others 
 
The variable education is expected to be positively related to PSA participation, as more 
education is assumed to facilitate the process for the farmers, perhaps first and foremost 
concerning plantation establishment. Miranda et al. (2003) and Zbinden and Lee (2005) found 
that participants were more likely to have more education than non-participants. However, in 
table 6.20, the variable is not significant in any of the regressions. It might be the case that the 
agricultural centres (‘Centro Agrícola’) are facilitating application and participation for many 
participants and that education level therefore is not that much of importance.  
  
H. 18: Landowners with relatively more off-farm income or landowners with a second 
occupation are more likely to apply/participate than farmers without.  
 
This hypothesis is in reality the same as hypothesis H.5., related to opportunity cost of land. 
Here, the regressions are not separated for conservation farmers and reforestation farmers. We 
expect off-farm income to be positively related to participation. According to Zbinden and 
Lee (2005), off-farm income is among other things often associated with more information 
and wider networks. As mentioned earlier under the discussion of opportunity factors, this 
variable may have two different outcomes, since one may also expect that the farmers without 
off-farm income are to be considered poor and hence are in need of an extra income, and 
therefore are likely to apply for/participate in PSA.  Arriagada et al (2009) mention that most 
of the farmers in their study have off-farm income (work outside the farm), often at other 
farms, and do not have much time for their own farms, which often lead them not to 
participate in PSA. However, I expected a positive relationship here, especially thinking of 
the reforestation contract (since this off-farm income often would be necessary for farmers to 
establish plantations). However, neither the variable off-farm income nor second occupation, 
are significant in any of the regressions in table 6.20. 
 
H.19: Landowners living at the farm in question are less likely to be participants than farmers 
living elsewhere. 
 
We expect the variable live at farm to be negatively related to participation in PSA, since we 
assume that landholders living outside the farms to be more wealthy than farmers living at 
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their farm, who probably depend more on their farm for a living. This variable is significant at 
15% level in table 6.20, with negative sign, which is what we expected. This is also what 
Zbinen and Lee (2005) found. Arriagada et al. (2009), however, as noted under H.16 find that 
many landowners not living at their farms rarely visit their properties and hence do not find it 
worth with respect to opportunity cost of time to participate/enter the program. Hypothesis 
H.19. can however, not be rejected. 	  
Table	  6.21	  Factors	  affecting	  participation,	  summary	  table	  for	  tables	  19a	  and	  19b,	  participatory	  factors	  
Hypotheses	   Ever_applied	   Can	  reject	  
hypothesis?25	  
H.14.	  Number	  of	  hectares	   +	   No	  
H.15.	  Previous	  incentive	  
programs	  	  
+	   No	  
H.16.	  Distance	  MAG	   +	   Yes	  
H.16.	  Distance	  FONAFIFO	   +	   Yes	  
H.17.	  Education	  level	   	   ?	  
H.18.	  Off-­‐farm	  income	   	   ?	  
H.18.	  Second	  occupation	   	   ?	  
H.19.	  Live	  at	  farm	   -­‐	   No	  
	  
From the hypotheses related to participation factors in the summary table above, we see that 
there are some significant variables, and several of the hypotheses cannot be rejected. The 
results hence indicate that there seem to be certain characteristics typical to 
applicants/participants of PSA in the case study area. On the other hand, some variables 
appear with sign opposite of what expected, hence it may suggest that there are circumstances 
in the case study area different from other places, as could be expected since Hojancha differs 
from many other places. The intermediary ‘Centro Agrícola) may be an institution with 
importance for facilitating participation for some farmers.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  For	  those	  variables	  I	  have	  rejected	  hypotheses	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  significant	  variable,	  this	  is	  due	  to	  opposite	  expected	  sign	  of	  the	  variables.	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6.3.2 Transaction costs and factors affecting these and participation 
I have run OLS-regressions (see appendix D) for variables that are assumed to affect the level 
of transaction cost, (the dependent variable of application costs). The independent variables 
were several of those associated with factors affecting participation; property size, 
participation CAF, distance to MAG/FONAFIFO, education level, documents (dummy of 
whether the landowner has ‘escritura’ and ‘plano’ or not), the number of contracts they 
have/had in total. Larger property, previous participantion, higher education, documents and 
having several contracts are all expected to lead to lower transaction costs (per hectare). 
Having the two documents in place is assumed to make costs lower since they would have a 
less troublesome application process. Higher education is assumed to be related to more 
knowledge and hence less need for searching for information. Less distance to 
forest/agricultural offices is expected to lead to lower transaction costs as it longer distances 
can be assumed to cause more costs and make the process more troublesome. 
 
It turned out that only two variables were significant. Documents showed positive sign, and 
distance FONAFIFO gave negative sign, which for both variables is contrary of the expected 
result. When it comes to documents, it should be noted that it is not sufficient to only have the 
two documents in question, but they also need to match (show the same number of hectares 
etc.), hence despite having the documents it may lead to extra costs for the landowners. 
 
There are hence few results from these regressions, indicating no tendencies. The are probably 
weaknesses in the data as well, as there should have been more accurate questions concerning 
the transaction costs in order to include all costs the landholders had.  
 
6.3.3 More on participation 
In this section, I will present results regarding reasons for not participating among 
landholders, in addition to opinions among participants concerning whether they received the 
payments in the time they were supposed to, and what they think should be improved or 
changed in the program of their respective contract modality. The results will be discussed 
under in the discussion section. 
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Table	  6.22	  Reasons	  farmers	  gave	  for	  not	  wanting	  a	  contract	  or	  not	  wanting	  to	  apply	  again	  among	  landholders	  
Reason	  for	  not	  participating/applying	   Percentage	  of	  
respondents	  
Number	  of	  
respondents	  
Little	  payment	   23%	   31	  
Complicated	  process/much	  
restrictions/requirements/costs	  &	  paperwork	  
18%	   24	  
Do	  not	  think	  they	  are	  eligible	  (legal	  issues,	  size	  of	  
area,	  quality	  of	  soil	  for	  reforestation)	  
22%	   29	  
Would	  rather	  like	  to	  sell	  the	  property	  (too	  little	  
payment)	  
9%	   12	  
Lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  program	  or	  knowledge	  
of	  how	  to	  apply	  
18%	   24	  
Need	  the	  forest	  for	  the	  livestock	  &	  access	  to	  the	  
water	  sources	  
4%	   5	  
Do	  not	  want	  any	  
restrictions/obligations/commitments	  of	  the	  
farm	  
4%	   5	  
Would	  rather	  like	  to	  plant	  native	  trees	  (instead	  of	  
Teak)	  
2%	   3	  
Sum	   100%	   133	  
	  
Looking at table 6.22, we see the main reasons for why farmers who have never applied (or 
not interested in applying again in the case of previous participation) were not interested in 
applying for PSA. There were given many different answers for this question, and there are 
therefore made groups out of all the answers and the original alternatives.  	  
The second and third row (“complicated process/much restrictions/requirements, costs and 
paperwork” and “do not think they are eligible”, respectively) are the most obvious 
alternatives when it comes to transaction costs being an obstacle (may imply much costs to 
become eligible). But also the fifth row, “lack of knowledge” can be added to the issue of 
transaction costs. These three groups summed up represent 58% of the respondents. That 
indicates that transaction costs are a primary reason for farmers not being willing to apply. 
For this question, it must be noted that it was not separated between the two PSA contract 
types, for which the compliance costs especially may have larger implications for 
reforestation participants.  
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23% of the farmers express that “little payment” is the main reason for not applying and 9% 
say they would not apply because they would rather like to sell the property. 	  
Table	  6.23	  Percentages	  of	  whether	  the	  protection	  participants	  received	  the	  payments	  in	  time	  agreed	  upon	  
Received	  payment	  
in	  time?	  
Percentage	  of	  
respondents	  
Number	  of	  
respondents	  
Yes	   51%	   17	  
No	   49%	   16	  	  
Table 6.23 and 6.25 show that approximately half of all the participants say they did not 
receive the PSA payments in the time agreed upon from FONAFIFO. This is of importance 
especially regarding the reforestation contract since one needs payments in time in order to be 
able to start the establishment of the plantation. 	  
Table	  6.24	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  farmers	  in	  protection	  contract	  of	  what	  should	  be	  improved	  or	  changed	  in	  the	  
program	  
What	  should	  be	  improved	  in	  PSA	  Protection	   Percentage	  of	  
respondents	  
Number	  of	  
respondents	  
Requirements	  of	  eligibility	  and	  costs	  related	  to	  
application	  process	  
13%	   4	  
Payment	  level	  (or	  that	  intermediaries	  should	  
charge	  less	  for	  administration)	  
47%	   14	  
Level	  and	  punctuality	  of	  payments	   13%	   4	  
Punctuality	  of	  payments	   10%	   3	  
Should	  be	  more	  information,	  capacitation	  etc.	   3%	   1	  
Should	  be	  possible	  to	  extract/take	  out	  dead	  
wood	  
3%	   1	  
No	  need	  for	  improvements	  or	  changes	   10%	   3	  
Sum	   100%	   30	  	  
Table 6.24 and 6.26 show which things the participants think should be changed improved in 
the PSA program, and for protection participants it appears that payment level and punctuality 
of payments are the main issues the landholders are not satisfied with. For reforestation, the 
results show that also here, payment level and punctuality of payments are main things they 
think should be improved, but also information is an important factor there is lack of for these 
landowners. 29% mention information among the most important things. This shows that 
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many farmers would like to have more knowledge on technical matters and issues concerning 
plantations and maintenance probably. This is probably something that prevents many 
landholders from applying as well, since this knowledge is required and seemingly not very 
much available.  	  
Table	  6.25	  Percentages	  of	  whether	  the	  reforestation	  participants	  received	  the	  payments	  in	  time	  agreed	  upon	  
Received	  payment	  
in	  time?	  
Percentage	  of	  
respondents	  
Number	  of	  
respondents	  
Yes	   45%	   13	  
No	   55%	   16	  	  	  
Table	  6.26	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  farmers	  in	  reforestation	  contract	  of	  what	  should	  be	  improved	  or	  changed	  in	  the	  
program	  
What	  should	  be	  improved	  in	  PSA	  Reforestation	   Percentage	  of	  
respondents	  
Number	  of	  
respondents	  
Requirements	  of	  eligibility/complicated	  process	   7%	   2	  
Payment	  level	  (or	  that	  intermediaries	  should	  
charge	  less	  for	  administration)	  
21%	   6	  
Punctuality	  of	  payments,	  should	  be	  given	  in	  
advance	  and/or	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  
7%	   2	  
Punctuality	  and	  punctuality	  of	  payments	   11%	   3	  
More	  counselling,	  information	  on	  plantations	  
(commercialization	  etc.)	  
7%	   2	  
Costs	  of	  application	  and	  more	  information	   4%	   1	  
Requirements,	  payment	  level	  and	  payments	  
should	  be	  given	  in	  advance	  
11%	   3	  
Punctuality	  of	  payments	  and	  more	  information	   7%	   2	  
More	  information	  and	  should	  give	  payment	  in	  
advance	  
11%	   3	  
Does	  not	  know	   14%	   4	  
Sum	   100%	   28	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6.4 Discussion section 
6.4.1 Negative and positive incentives and opportunity cost of land 
According to Pagiola (2005)’s theoretical framework, we have seen that reforestation 
participants seem to be more in need for payments in order for it to become privately 
profitable to undertake the desired land-use change (establish plantations) than for protection 
participants. We may hence assume that for many protection participants, the practices may 
have been adopted anyway, as compared to reforestation. Considering Pannell (2008)’s 
framework, negative incentives such as conservation payments for forest protection are to be 
used only if there is a need to discourage landholders from undertaking certain land-use 
changes. Landholders should hence be likely to adopt the other land-use practice unless they 
are prevented from doing so. There should also be overall benefits from preventing such land-
use changes; hence public net costs should outweigh private net benefits for these incentives 
to become appropriate (Pannell, 2008). The problem with the Costa Rican forest protection 
modality seems to be that the private net benefits in reality are not very high. The opportunity 
cost of land may thus be quite low for these landowners. The previously mentioned Forest 
Law from 1996, prohibiting forest clearing may have an important role here, especially when 
it comes to the larger landowners with large areas of forest. Thus, considering the 
environmental effectiveness and the additionality-question, such incentives may therefore in 
principle not be necessary in order to achieve the desired environmental outcome, such as 
biodiversity. The negative incentives may in fact here have little effect on the landowners’ 
decision of land-use and which to choose. Looking at Pannell (2008)’s figures in section 4.4, 
we would in this case be outside the limit where these incentives are recommended. When it 
comes to the question of alternative land-uses and what landowners would use the land for in 
absence of PES payments, this could be addressed by an impact evaluation with interpretation 
of land cover in a matched control group without PES.  
 
As to the positive incentives, these are according to Pannell (2008) intended to encourage a 
specific land-use change, which in the case of the Costa Rican PSA program relate to the 
reforestation/plantation contract. According to the theory, they should be used when the 
positive net benefit is positive and the private net benefit is negative. There thus appears a 
need to make it privately profitable to the landowners (private net benefits) to undertake the 
change that will provide increased environmental services. As claimed by e.g. Daniels et al. 
(2010) and as results form this study indicate, these positive incentives seem to provide more 
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effect in terms of additionality, as they seem to have higher opportunity costs of land. This 
indicates that the landowners in most cases would not have reforested in the absence of 
payments. On the other hand, there is an issue concerning the value and permanence of the 
environmental services provided, given that the contract lasts for 15 years. After this period, 
the landowners are permitted to harvest the plantations and sell off the timber. As to the value 
of environmental services, the Teak, which is the most common and valuable tree species 
used for plantations in this area is known for being very demanding of e.g. soils and nutrients 
(e.g. Tropical Forestry and Timberland News, 2012). Hence, the environmental service value 
in the long run should probably be considered more, in relation to that the focus after PSA 
was introduced in 1996/97 changed from supporting timber production to a focus on 
environmental/ecosystem services. It seems that to many, it is still works as a support for 
timber production. 
 
6.4.2 Transaction- and compliance costs 
 
From the results of the percentages of transaction- and compliance costs, we found that for 
participants, especially the costs related to the reforestation contract turned out to be high. The 
appliance costs (transaction costs) did not seem to be very large. However, the costs are 
probably, as mentioned under the hypotheses section, higher due to lack of including some 
types of costs. In the Pagiola model from the theory part, we find that one of the inefficiency 
problems relate to the payment being insufficient to make landholders adopt the socially 
desirable land uses. This is also said by Pannell, who included both the typical transaction 
costs for the application process and compliance cost, including up-front costs and the costs 
involved with fulfilling the requirements in the definition of the costs. He claims that these 
costs may make it necessary to increase the payments in order to cover these costs and lead to 
private net benefit, which is necessary in order to choose to enter the program. From the 
results of this study, it seems that to many landholders, the transaction- and compliance costs 
turn out to be a main obstacle to apply/participate. For the landowners participating, it has in 
the literature been suggested that larger and more wealthy and more educated landowners are 
more likely to participate than smaller, less educated landowners etc. It may hence be 
assumed that these farmers are more able to take the costs as they have more information, 
perhaps easier access to credit etc. And if they are larger landholders, they will also probably 
have lower transaction costs per hectare, facilitating access for the larger landholders. 
However, from my regression results there are some indications but few that give evidence 
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on specific characteristics of participants. Concerning transaction costs, they did not give any 
significant variables with expected signs. These “participation results” may indicate that the 
intermediaries (‘Centro Agricola’) play an important role in the case study area, but especially 
the transaction cost data are not very strong, there may hence be uncertainties related to the 
results. 
 
Anyway, by looking at the reasons that non-participants give for not wishing a PSA contract, 
we find that transaction- and compliance costs represent a major reason to not apply, even 
though there are differences between protection participants and reforestation participants 
regarding this. The opinions among already participants may also say something about the 
obstacles for non-participants. Many of the participants stress that the main things that should 
be changed or improved by the program are larger payments and less complicated appliance 
process/less requirements. Punctuality of payments is also an important factor that many 
farmers complain about. Approximately half of the protection participants and less than half 
of the reforestation participants said they received the payment at the time they were supposed 
to. This is especially an issue for landowners wishing to establish plantations and who besides 
often some payment in advance at least would need the payment to arrive in time. Information 
is another issue that is particularly important for potential reforestation participants, as there 
normally is needed counselling and technical assistance, as many do not have experience of 
plantations. The costs hence appear as an important obstacle for many landowners and 
making the program less cost-efficient. 
 
Concerning reforestation again, which as mentioned often is considered an investment for the 
future, the participation constraint is one issue, but there are also uncertainties regarding 
future market prices for timber. The farmers may hence result worse off even though they are 
participating voluntarily (Pagiola, 2008).  
 
6.4.3 Opportunity cost and smallholders 
If we go back to the issue of opportunity cost and additionality, we have the contradictions 
between the interests of low opportunity costs (of land) for cost-effectiveness, but which may 
cause little additionality for the previously mentioned reasons. Some of the literature (e.g. 
Sierra and Russmann, 2006) state that including landholders already involved in agriculture, 
which are often small landholders, may lead to a higher level of additionality (in terms of 
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forest cover). Wünscher et al. (2006, 2008) point to the need for targeting of PSA in order to 
achieve additionality. It hence appears that smaller landholders may play an important role in 
this regard. Here, participation constraints come in since opportunity costs may be higher and 
hence the payment may not be high enough to cover the transaction- and compliance costs of 
the landholder. From table 6.22, there are 4% saying they will not participate because the 
livestock needs access to the forest. This indicates that the payment is not sufficient for these 
farmers to abandon the cattle farming (Sierra and Russmann, 2006 state that PSA lead 
landholders to quit agriculture), or making them want to do so. Sierra and Russmann (2006) 
also suggest that profitability often is too low to make PSA be a real option for many 
landholders. As many have cattle and many say payments is too little, one may assume this 
reason to apply for several landholders. Miranda et al (2003) also mention that the farmers 
cannot reduce the grazing area without being adversely affected as in the protection contract, 
the livestock is not permitted to graze or seek shelter or enter the water in the forest. There is 
also uncertainty related to this contract, as one is not guaranteed a renewal of the contract. An 
automatically renewal of contracts if requirements have been fulfilled, as suggested by 
Miranda et al (2003), would probably cause more certainty for landholders and permanence of 
environmental services as well. The inclusion of many small landholders must however be 
viewed in relation to the increased transaction costs by intermediaries as a result of this. 
 
6.4.4 Change in deforestation trends 
However, although agricultural expansion used to be the main reason for deforestation trends 
in the past decades, it needs to be taken into account that the profitability of this sector has 
fallen. The pressure on forests for conversion to pasture land, especially in the marginal lands 
is thus reduced as well and in general it does no longer appear to be the main reason for land-
use change of forest in many parts of the country, but not at least in the case study area around 
Hojancha (e.g. Morales, 2012). This can be related to the economic development Costa Rica 
has undergone during the last decades, with a substantial increase in the tourist sector and 
thereby and increased interest from foreigners to purchase real estate (Daniels et al, 2010), 
especially in the coastal areas of the country. With legal documents in place, purchase and 
sale of properties in Costa Rica is quite straightforward procedure, except in indigenous 
territories that have their own rules and regulations. In these areas, landholders are often not 
permitted to sell nor participate in PSA without the consent the rest of the community. In the 
case study area, however, many landowners have taken advantage of the foreign interest, but 
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as an effect of the world economic crisis from 2008, Costa Rica has experienced less interest 
from foreigners in buying properties the last years. Even though the variable related to offer to 
sell the farm did not result significant in the regressions, several landholders in Hojancha (and 
surrounding areas) expect the conditions to improve sooner or later, and await an offer until 
then. Foreign interest should therefore be taken into account as an increasingly important 
opportunity cost to landowners facing the option of whether to apply for a PSA contract, 
especially in the most attractive areas. 
 
Sierra and Russmann (2006) mention that the contract modality “natural regeneration” might 
be the most effective in terms of providing more environmental services. Since the Forest 
Law for the most part prevents forest clearing, this contract (which is not yet very widespread 
in the country) should receive more focus. However, once trunks of emerging trees in a 
secondary forest area reach 10cm in diameter, they are protected by the law, so it would 
probably be a need for automatically renewal of contracts in order to provide an extra 
incentive for the landowners who currently are in need of the area to cover the opportunity 
cost.  
  
It should also be noted that there seems to be a widespread environmental consciousness 
among the population in general in Costa Rica. The country is often considered a ‘green 
country’ and known for managing well the natural resources of the country, and have 
therefore obtained a good reputation in this regard. Many landowners express the importance 
of keeping forest for protection of water sources on their farm. It may also be related to 
making the farm more attractive for potential buyers. 	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7 Conclusions 	  
The objective of this study has been to evaluate the challenges of the Costa Rican PSA 
program at three areas; environmental effectiveness in terms of forest cover (additionality), 
cost-effectiveness and equity, through a case study in the canton of Hojancha and surrounding 
areas in Costa Rica, with respect to the two contract modalities forest protection and 
reforestation (plantations). 
 
The environmental effectiveness (additionality) issue was studies by investigating opportunity 
cost factors of land of participants vs. non-participants to see whether participants have less 
opportunity costs, and by comparing opportunity cost of land of protection participants vs. 
reforestation participants. 
• I found little evidence of less opportunity cost of land for participants than non-
participants. There were a few significant variables, for forest protection: property size 
and access to farm, and for reforestation: number of cattle, number of farms, steepness 
at the farm and off-farm income.  
• When it comes to differences between protection and reforestation participants with 
respect to opportunity cost factors, the regressions also here show a few significant 
variables (with expected signs), but confirm important factors; that access to farm is 
better and steepness at the farm is less for reforestation participants. However, data of 
self-reported land use alternatives in case of not participating, support the findings that 
reforestation participants have higher opportunity cost of land than protection 
participants and hence seem to have higher additionality than participants.  
• However, the fact that Costa Rica prohibited forest clearing in 1996 with the Forest 
Law, and the current trends with less pressure on forest for pastures as cattle farming 
is less profitable, have important implications for the threat to forests today. Negative 
incentives such as conservation payments do hence not seem to be very effective. 
Positive incentives such as reforestation incentives show more effect, but the results 
indicate that the payments work as subsidies for timber production. It should be taken 
into account that there may be adverse long-term effects since plantations often are 
quite demanding of soil qualities.  
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As to the cost-effectiveness of the program, the main part was related to the farmers’ 
transaction- and compliance costs and their role in impeding cost-effectiveness. I compared 
the level of transaction- and compliance costs to the payment amount they received for both 
contract types separated. I also looked at reasons for non-participants not to apply for a 
contract and that participants think should be improved. The second part concerned 
opportunity cost factors, in order to see whether recipients of PES had lower opportunity costs 
than applicants, regarding targeting. 
• Based on calculations of transaction- and compliance costs in the case study area, 
these costs do not seem to be very high for protection participants, but the percentage 
appear to be substantially higher for reforestation participants. The level of 
compliance costs especially seems to be the major problem.  
• When it comes to non-participants, transaction- and compliance costs and low 
payment level seem to be a key factor for not applying/participating, and the payment 
level seems to be too low for many farmers to cover their participation costs. 
• Even though the numbers show high variation, there are probably several costs that are 
not included and it seems that transaction- and compliance costs prevent cost-
effectiveness to some extent in the case study area.  
• As to the opportunity costs between applicants and receivers, there did not appear to 
be any targeting from the case study data. 
 
When it comes to the equity perspective, I have studied factors that are assumed to affect 
participation in order to find out whether participants have certain characteristics, as 
suggested by literature, such as mainly larger landholders participating. 
• Number of hectares and participation in previous incentive programs were positively 
related to participation in PSA, as expected. 
• The variable for whether the landholder lives at the farm or not was negatively related 
to participation, also as expected 
• Distance to public offices of agriculture and forestry MAG and FONAFIFO were 
negatively related to participation, which was contrary to the expected, but may be a 
result of many farmers not living at their farm and often close to the centers. 
• Some of the variables hence indicate that there are certain characteristics that are 
typical to participation in the case study area as well. 
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Overall, it seems that some of the results from the case study support the general critics to the 
PSA program in Costa Rica and other PES programs in general. One is reforestation 
providing more additionality than forest protection. High participation costs seem to have 
large implications especially for reforestation participants and lead to less cost-effectiveness. 
Hojancha is particular for being a pioneer in providing reforestation incentives and for 
currently having a high amount of farmers involved in the reforestation contract and timber 
production, and has had a great recovery of the landscape since the introduction of the first 
incentives in the 1980s. The results from the case study can therefore not easily be 
generalized to other places, but may give some implications. 	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8 Recommendations 	  
8.1 Improvements in methodology  	  
• An impact evaluation with interpretation of land cover in a matched control group 
would evaluate additionality and alternative land uses in absence of PSA in a more 
accurate way 
• Opportunity cost of time is an important variable that could be better observed by 
focusing more specifically on the individual landholders. It is important to take into 
account that there are large differences in the opportunity cost of time among 
landowners in order to do such analyses of participation in PES schemes. 
 
8.2 Policy recommendations 
 
• From the results in the thesis it seems that payment levels are not high enough for 
many, probably smaller landholders, especially when it comes to the reforestation 
contract modality. An increase in payment and easier access to credit/payment in 
advance would probably facilitate access for many landholders. 
• As to additionality and the fact that reforestation participants are those contributing 
most to increased forest cover, it should probably be a larger focus on natural 
regeneration and increased payments to encourage landholders to choose this land-use. 
It would, however, most likely be necessary with automatically renewal of contracts 
for this to be attractive to abandon other land-uses in favour of regeneration as farmers 
with opportunity costs related to the farm would need some security for the future.  	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Appendix	  A	  	  Development of the Forestry Law and effects in Hojancha	  
 
• Forestry Law No. 4465 of 1969: creation of the ‘Direccion General Forestal’ and the 
forest incentives and they start the reforestation on national level as one of the main 
strategies for the restoration of degraded lands.  
• Law of creation of the Agricultural Centers (‘Centros Agrícolas Cantonales’) No. 
7932 of 1975: Creation of the Agricultural Center, an organization of 
producers/farmers which are supposed to promote and facilitate the direct participation 
of the population in the development of the canton and thereby creates CACH 
(Agricultural Center in Hojancha).  
• Law of creation of the national office of seeds No. 6289 of 1978: grants to the 
National Office of Seeds the responsibility of control and promotion the use of seeds 
with a higher quality. Also supports and assists techniques to the ‘seed activities’ in 
the canton. 
• Forest Law No. 7032 of 1986: Creation of CAF, and CAFA, which facilitated the 
access of small and medium producers and to organizations. 
• Forest Law No. 7174 of 1990: Creation of CPB, which gave incentives to activities of 
protection. They also widened the option of cultivating, managing and conserving the 
forest.  
• Forest Law No. 7575 of 1996: Creation of the PSA Program. Regulated the 
prohibition of land use change.  	  (Isaza	  et	  al,	  2007)	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Appendix B   Priority areas  
 
 
1. Reforestation projects: 
Priority areas for this contract type are the areas without forest in the sites that have a high 
productive potential for forest plantation development. 
 
a) For the reforestation projects with species found in closure degrees and threatened 
species or in danger of extinction (Decrete No25663-MINAE and decrete No25700-
MINAE), the whole country is considered priority area. 
 
b) For reforestation projects established in protected areas according to the article 22 of 
Forestry Law No7575, the whole country is considered priority area. 
 
c) Sites in where there is a high potential of block plantation giving especial priority to 
the projects utilizing improved genetic material and to the projects that use seeds 
certified by the National bureau of Seeds. 
 
d) One may include areas in which there has been undertaken projects of reforestation 
financed by incentives and that have complied with the approved management plans 
and the period of validity. 
 
e) Reforestation projects with forest industry integration 
 
 
2. Forest protection projects 
The priority areas that are set for all forest protection projects are those established by the 
executive decree according to No35762-MINAET of December 4, 2009, or others that have 
been decided in agreements or special provisions. For implementing these priorities to the 
applications, the following valorisation matrix will determine the punctuation they will reach 
once they are evaluated.   
 
No of 
criteria 
Priorities for the Protection modality Points for 
prioritation 
1 Forests at farms located in the ‘vacios’ of conservation in private lands inside 
the Protected Areas (ASP); forests at farms located in the gaps of conservation 
in private lands inside biological corridors, forests protecting water resources 
(ASADA; AYA, municipality), or FONAFIFO or of MINAET, where it is 
stated the importance of protecting forest; forests of the indigenous territories 
of the country. 
80 
2 Forests at farms located in ‘vacios’ of conservation at private lands outside 
ASP and the biological corridors; forests at private farms inside ASP and 
outside ”gaps of conservation”; forests at private farms located inside the 
Protected Areas and that have not yet been bought or expropriated by the 
state. 
75 
 
3 Forests at private farms inside biological corridors and outside the ‘vacios’ of 
conservation. 
70 
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4 Forests that have contracts in the PSA modality Forest Management and that 
present an application for the forest protection modality, and that complies 
with the other requirements established in the Procedure Manual for Payments 
for Environmental Services and the contract ends the same year in which the 
new application is presented 
65 
5 Forests outside any of the mentioned priorities over 60 
 
I Forests for forest protection at estates complying with the requirements 
mentioned previously, where there has been signed payments for 
environmental service contracts previously, as long as they comply with the 
other requirements established in the Procedure Manual for PSA and the new 
contract begins the day after the expiration of the previous contract.  
5 additional 
points 
II Forests at farms located in distriticts with IDS less than 40% according what 
determined by MIDEPLAN (2007). 
5 additional 
points 
III Forests in whichever of the previous priorities, with an application for PSA 
for areas less than 50 hectares 
10 additional 
points 
IV For applications not approved the previous year, that apply again, and 
complying with the requirements 
5 additional 
points 
 
In case that the number of points between to or more applications result equal, these should be 
processed by giving priority according to the order of presentation/application. Those 
applications that after the matrix above has been used, obtain a number of points equal or 
more than 100, these should be sent immediately to approval, those with less points will wait 
for the qualification of the total amount of applications received and they will be processed 
until the budget is used of the agreed number of points obtained.   
 
(MINAET, 2011) 	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Appendix	  C	  	  	  Correlation	  matrixes	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    hectares     0.1092   0.0463   0.3728  -0.0259   0.0656  -0.0514  -0.0050   0.1782   1.0000
  offer_sell     0.0347   0.0717   0.0267  -0.1335  -0.1036  -0.0011   0.0749   1.0000
  second_occ    -0.0347   0.0099  -0.0869  -0.0271  -0.0761   0.4032   1.0000
 offarm_2011    -0.2237  -0.0633  -0.1960   0.0646  -0.0138   1.0000
 steep_slope    -0.0490  -0.1299  -0.0452   0.2919   1.0000
  poor_soils    -0.0576  -0.0329   0.0287   1.0000
 cattle_2011     0.2098   0.0138   1.0000
acc_rainys~2    -0.0473   1.0000
  more_farms     1.0000
                                                                                               
               more_f~s acc_ra~2 cat~2011 poor_s~s steep_~e off~2011 second~c offer_~l hectares
  second_occ     0.0070  -0.0964  -0.1300   0.0428   0.1829   0.3713   1.0000
 offarm_2011    -0.0535  -0.0239  -0.0091  -0.0453   0.1594   1.0000
  education2    -0.0045  -0.2612  -0.2746   0.0543   1.0000
participan~F     0.1970   0.0274   0.0760   1.0000
distance_F~O     0.0362   0.7933   1.0000
distance_MAG     0.0916   1.0000
    hectares     1.0000
                                                                             
               hectares distan~G distan~O partic~F educat~2 off~2011 second~c
(obs=205)
. corr hectares distance_MAG distance_FONAFIFO participantCAF education2 offarm_2011 second_occ
   contracts    -0.2402  -0.3283  -0.2418  -0.0116  -0.4529   0.2569   0.4260   1.0000
distance_F~O    -0.3638  -0.1605  -0.3876  -0.0478  -0.4953   0.8256   1.0000
distance_MAG    -0.3369  -0.0287  -0.3792  -0.0873  -0.3895   1.0000
received_i~e     0.0234   0.1768   0.0085   0.0256   1.0000
participan~F     0.3958  -0.2297   0.3304   1.0000
  education2     0.8483   0.0479   1.0000
  documents2    -0.0142   1.0000
fam_consume2     1.0000
                                                                                      
               fam_co~2 docume~2 educat~2 partic~F receiv~e distan~G distan~O contra~s
(obs=31)
> racts
. corr fam_consume2 documents2 education2 participantCAF received_intime distance_MAG distance_FONAFIFO cont
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Appendix	  D	  OLS	  regressions	  	  	  
OLS-­‐regressions	  of	  factors	  of	  participation	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  level	  of	  transaction	  costs.	  
Transaction	  costs	   Regression	  1	   Regression	  2	   Regression	  3	   Regression	  4	  Documents	  of	  farm	   22,488	  (1,97)**	   17,559	  (1,02)	   11,571	  (0,80)	   26,859	  (2,44)***	  Distance	  to	  MAG	  office	   -­‐0,573(-­‐1,04)	   	   -­‐0,289	  (-­‐0,67)	   	  Distance	  to	  FONAFIFO	  office	   	   	   	   -­‐0,591	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐2,31)***	  Education	  level	   	   	   68,574	  (0,95)	   	  Number	  of	  contracts	   0,797	  (0,06)	   -­‐3,288	  (-­‐0,22)	   	   	  Hectares	  	   	   0,041	  (0,46)	   	   -­‐0,009	  (-­‐0,16)	  Participant	  CAF	   	   -­‐9,147	  (-­‐0,42)	   -­‐25,785	  (-­‐1,27)	   	  	   	   	   	   	  Constant	   62,415	   53,822	   77,698	   87,28	  F-­‐value	   1,64	   1,61	   2,05	   2,93	  Prob	  >	  F	   0,1927	   0,1903	   0,0115	   0,0428	  R-­‐squared	   0,0320	   0,0129	   0,0669	   0,0737	  R-­‐squared	  adjusted	   	   	   	   	  N	   48	   48	   53	   53	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  parentheses	  are	  the	  t-­‐values.	  *	  =	  significant	  at	  15%	  level	  **	  =	  significant	  at	  10%	  level,	  ***	  =	  significant	  at	  5%	  level,	  and	  ****	  =	  significant	  at	  1%	  level.	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Appendix	  E	  	  The	  questionnaire	  for	  the	  survey	  
	  
	  
	  
Questionnaire	  about	  effectiveness	  and	  participation	  costs	  in	  PSA	  	  
	  Survey	  number:	  ____________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  GPS	  coordinates:	  	  ______________________________________________________	  ______________________________________________________________________	  (most	  important	  farm)	  Register	  number	  of	  the	  farm:_____________________________________	  Interviewer:	  	  	  ______________________________	  	  	  	  Date:	  	  	  _______________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Time	  of	  initiation:___________	  Time	  of	  finalization:___________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Duration:	  _____	  min	  	  Buenos	  días/tardes.	  I	  am	  a	  student	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  University	  of	  Life	  Sciences	  (UMB).	  I	  am	  carrying	  out	  a	  survey	  in	  Hojancha	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  study	  which	  will	  be	  part	  of	  my	  final	  thesis	  	  of	  a	  M.Sc.	  degree	  in	  Economics.	  This	  investigation	  is	  done	  in	  colaboration	  with	  CATIE	  (Tropical	  Agricultural	  Research	  and	  Higher	  Education	  Center)	  in	  Turrialba,	  Cartago.	  	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  survey	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  factors	  that	  affect	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  modalities	  forest	  protection	  and	  reforestation	  and	  participation	  costs	  in	  the	  PSA	  (Pagos	  Por	  Servicios	  Ambientales)	  in	  the	  area	  of	  Hojancha.	  To	  do	  this,	  are	  we	  going	  to	  interview	  approximately	  200	  landowners	  –	  participants	  and	  non-­‐participants	  of	  the	  program	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  the	  mentioned	  issues.	  	  Participation	  in	  the	  survey	  is	  voluntary	  and	  you	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  withdraw	  whenever	  you	  like	  without	  further	  explanation.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  withdrawal,	  all	  information	  provided	  will	  be	  anonymized.	  The	  desired	  information	  for	  this	  study	  will	  be	  treated	  confidentially	  and	  will	  not	  be	  utilized	  for	  other	  purposes.	  The	  information	  will	  be	  analized	  in	  group	  from,	  hence,	  we	  will	  not	  refer	  to	  individual	  answers	  from	  a	  specific	  landowner.	  All	  information	  will	  be	  anonymized	  when	  the	  project	  is	  finalized.	  	  The	  duration	  of	  the	  survey	  is	  30-­‐45	  minutos.	  All	  questions	  of	  the	  survey	  refer	  to	  year	  2010	  or	  1998.	  In	  the	  survey	  there	  will	  be	  used	  the	  word	  “finca”	  (farm)	  for	  all	  type	  of	  property	  (terrain,	  property	  etc.)	  	  In	  case	  of	  any	  question,	  you	  may	  call	  me	  at	  the	  number	  xxxx-­‐xxxx	  or	  send	  an	  e-­‐mail	  to	  signe.rugtveit@student.umb.no.	  You	  may	  also	  contact	  my	  contact	  person	  in	  CATIE,	  Muhammad	  Ibrahim	  at	  number	  xxxx-­‐xxxx.	  I	  confirm	  to	  have	  understood	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  survey	  and	  give	  my	  permission	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  survey:	  	  Signature:	  …………………………………………………………………	  	  Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  your	  colaboration.	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Questionnaire	  with	  average	  answers	  –	  some	  remarks:	  
	  
For	  the	  continuous	  variables,	  the	  average	  of	  the	  given	  numbers	  is	  put	  after	  the	  question.	  
For	  questions	  with	  alternatives,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  answers	  for	  the	  respective	  alternative	  
is	  given.	  In	  the	  open	  questions,	  I	  have	  noted	  som	  of	  the	  answers.	  Note	  that	  in	  many	  cases	  
the	  respodents	  gave	  other	  alternatives	  than	  those	  listed,	  in	  those	  cases	  I	  have	  mentioned	  
some	  of	  them.	  There	  are	  also	  in	  several	  cases	  made	  new	  variables	  from	  these	  questions	  
which	  are	  not	  given	  here.	  In	  addition,	  a	  couple	  of	  questions	  are	  removed	  from	  the	  original	  
survey	  due	  to	  turning	  out	  not	  being	  relevant	  for	  the	  study.	  It	  resulted	  however,	  that	  there	  
were	  more	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  would	  not	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  analysis,	  that	  are	  kept	  in	  
the	  survey.	  
	  
	  	  
1 	  	  
a. Are	  you	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  farm?	  
  Yes:	  194	  	  	  →	  Are	  you	  the	  only	  owner	  of	  the	  farm	  or	  are	  there	  more	  owners?	  
  	  Only	  owner:	  72	  
  	  More	  owners	  (co-­‐owners):	  98	  →	  how	  many?	  Average:_4________	  
  No:	  13	  	  	  	  b. Are	  you	  the	  person	  who	  principally	  manages	  and	  takes	  decisions	  afecting	  the	  
farm?	  	  
  Yes:	  207	  	  →	  Which	  relation	  do	  you	  have	  with	  the	  owner(s)?	  __________________________________	  	  (only	  if	  he/she	  is	  not	  the	  owner)	  
→	  Who	  else	  takes	  decisions?	  __________________________________	  
  No:	  0	  	  →	  which	  relation	  do	  you	  have	  to	  the	  farm?	  	  _________________________________	  
	  
c. 	  From	  which	  year	  are	  you	  the	  owner?	  Average:	  _1989_____	  (year)	  
	  
d. Do	  you	  currently	  live	  at	  the	  farm?	  	  
  Yes:	  73	  For	  how	  many	  years	  have	  you	  lived	  at	  the	  farm?	  Average:	  _30_____	  years	  
  No:	  133	  Where	  do	  you	  live?	  Note	  province,	  canton,	  district	  and	  locality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___________________________________	  	  
e. 	  	  How	  did	  you	  obtain	  this	  farm?	  
  Inherited	  it:	  75	  
  Bought	  it:	  106	  
  Received	  it	  as	  a	  gift:	  3	  
  Other	  (specify):	  ____20______________	  	  	  	  	  	  (Has	  been	  part	  of	  an	  association/enterprise	  
or	  partly	  an	  association	  or	  part	  of	  the	  farm	  has	  been	  an	  association;	  partly	  bought	  
and	  partly	  inherited;	  wife’s	  inheritance)	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A. Information	  about	  the	  farm	  
	  
2 Location	  of	  the	  main	  farm:	  	  Province:	  __Guanacaste________________	  Canton:	  __Hojancha,	  Nandayure,	  Nicoya_______________	  District:	  __________________	  Town/place:	  	  __________________	  
	  
	  
3 How	  many	  hectares	  does	  the	  (main)	  farm	  consist	  of	  in	  total?	  __58________ha	  
	  
	  
4 How	  many	  hectares	  are	  there	  of:	  	  a. Natural/primary	  forest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _12______	  ha	  b. Regeneration/secondary	  forest	  (<20	  años)?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __13_____	  ha	  c. Forest	  plantations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _8______	  ha	  Which	  is	  the	  most	  valuable	  species?	  	  	  	  	  	  _Teak,	  Melina,	  Gallinazo,	  Pochote________________	  d. Agricultural	  crops	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __1_____	  ha	  Which	  is	  the	  crop	  of	  highest	  value?	  	  ___Oranges,	  coffee_______________	  e. Pastures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __23_____	  ha	  f. Fodder	  banks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___0,2____	  ha	  
Natura/primary	  forest	  means:	  intact	  forst	  which	  has	  never	  been	  exploited,	  fragmented	  nor	  
deliberately	  influenced/touched/influenced	  by	  human	  beings.	  
	  
5 	  How	  many	  more	  farms	  do	  you	  possess/manage/have	  access	  to?	  __0,7_______	  
	  
	  
Interviewer:	  The	  following	  questions	  refer	  to	  the	  main	  farm/parcel	  or	  the	  one	  with	  mayor	  
economic	  importance.	  
	  
	  
6 Are	  your	  farm	  accessible	  all	  year	  round	  or	  only	  in	  dry	  season?	  
	  
  All	  year	  	  →	  Accessible	  with:	  
o Car:	  139	  
o Motorcycle:	  5	  
o Horse:	  55	  
o Foot:	  8	  	  
  Only	  in	  dry	  season	  	  →	  Accessible	  with:	  
o Car:	  177	  
o Motorcycle:	  8	  
o Horse:	  21	  
o Foot:	  1	  
	  
7 Do	  there	  exist	  natural	  water	  sources	  (nacientes,	  streams,	  rivers,	  lakes	  or	  charco)	  at	  
the	  farm?	  	  	  
  No:	  5	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  Yes	  →	  :	  197	  
  Nascent	  water	  (‘naciente’):	  92	  
  Stream	  or	  river:	  24	  
  Lake	  or	  pool:	  0	  
  Both	  nascent	  water	  and	  stream	  or	  river:	  86	  
→ 	  Are	  the	  watersources	  protected	  by	  forest?	  
  Yes:	  194	  
  No:	  2	  
  Partly:	  6	  
	  
8 Is	  the	  forest	  fenced?	  
  Yes:	  51	  
  No:	  129	  
  Partly:	  20	  
	  
	  
9 If	  you	  do	  not	  have	  natural/primary	  forest,	  go	  to	  question	  10	  
Considering	  only	  the	  natural	  forest	  at	  your	  farm,	  do	  you	  think	  thank	  there	  at	  any	  
moment	  has	  been	  harvested	  wood	  from	  this	  area,	  by	  yourself	  or	  previous	  owners,	  the	  
last	  50	  years	  approximately?	  
	  
  Yes:	  106	  
  No:	  	  49	  
“Wood”	  refers	  to	  wood	  of	  high	  quality	  for	  construction	  or	  industrial	  forestry	  products,	  not	  for	  
fire	  wood	  or	  other	  uses.	  	  
	  
10 Which	  documents	  do	  you	  possess	  of	  your	  farm	  (mark	  all	  alternatives	  that	  apply)	  
  ‘Escritural	  notarial’:	  9	  
  ‘Escritural	  notarial’	  and	  ‘plano’:	  195	  
  ‘Resolución	  del	  IDA’:	  1	  
  Possesion:	  1	  
  ‘Carta	  de	  venta	  privada’:	  0	  
  Right	  to	  using	  the	  farm:	  0	  
  Other:	  9	  	  
11 	  At	  what	  distance	  from	  the	  farm	  are	  the	  following	  offices	  located	  in	  travel	  time	  and	  
which	  is	  the	  transport	  used?	  	  
Interviewer:	  We	  are	  looking	  for	  the	  distance	  by	  the	  road	  and	  the	  farm	  with	  PSA	  if	  it	  is	  a	  
participant	  
	  
	  a. The	  closest	  agricultural	  office	  (MAG)	  	  Office	  name:_______________	  	  	  	  	  	  distance:__30_____	  hours	  travel	  time	  	  	  	  	  Means	  of	  transport:	  ________________	  	  	  	  b. The	  closest	  forestry	  office	  (MINAE)	  Office	  name:________________	  	  	  	  	  distance:___33____	  	  hours	  travel	  time	  Means	  of	  transport:	  ________________	  	  	  	   c. The	  closest	  FONAFIFO	  office	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Office	  name:__Nicoya______________	  	  	  	  	  distance:__59_____	  	  hours	  travel	  time	  Means	  of	  transport:	  ________________	  	  	  	  
12 If	  the	  farmer	  does	  not	  have	  cattle,	  go	  to	  question	  14	  
a. How	  many	  adult	  cattle	  (>1	  year)	  do	  you	  currently	  have	  at	  the	  farm?	  __25_______	  
b. How	  many	  adult	  cattle	  (>1	  año)	  did	  you	  have	  in	  1998?	  __36_______	  
Interviewer:	  If	  the	  farmer	  does	  not	  remember	  for	  exactly	  this	  year,	  ask	  for	  thirteen	  years	  
ago	  or	  ten	  years	  if	  it	  appears	  easier.	  Note	  how	  many	  years	  back	  in	  that	  case.	  	  
	  
c. Do	  you	  sell	  the	  cattle	  or	  derived	  products	  (milk,	  cheese,	  cream	  etc)	  that	  you	  
produce?	  
  Does	  not	  sell	  (go	  to	  question	  14):	  16	  
  Sells:	  155	  	  	  	  
	  
d. In	  which	  place	  do	  you	  sell	  and	  how	  far	  from	  the	  farm	  by	  road	  is	  this	  place?	  	  
  Cattle:	  138	  	  	  	  	  Place:	  ______________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________km/travel	  time	  
  Milk:	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Place:	  _______________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________km/travel	  time	  
  Subproducts:	  0	  	  	  Place:	  _____________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________km/travel	  time	  
  Other	  or	  combination	  of	  previous	  alternatives:	  21	  
	  
14 If	  by	  poor	  soils	  one	  understands	  soils	  that	  yields	  less	  than	  the	  average	  of	  the	  areas	  
nearby,	  which	  percentage	  of	  your	  farm	  contains	  poor	  soils?	  	  __11_____%	  	  
	  
15 If	  “steep	  slope”	  refers	  to	  soils/areas	  with	  too	  much	  steepness	  too	  work	  with	  crops,	  
which	  percentage	  of	  your	  farm	  has	  steep	  slope?	  __34_______%	  
	  
16 Have	  you	  participated	  in	  the	  program	  Certificados	  de	  Abono	  Forestal	  (CAF)	  or	  some	  
other	  forest	  incentive	  program	  (before	  1997)?	  
  No:	  142	  
  Yes:	  	  65	  	  	  When?	  From:	  __1989_______(year)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  until:__1993_______(year)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
B. Pagos	  por	  Servicios	  Ambientales	  (PSA)	  
	  
17 	  
a. Have	  you	  heard	  about	  the	  program	  “Pagos	  por	  Servicios	  Ambientales”	  (Payments	  
for	  environmental	  services)?	  
  Yes:	  203	  
  No:	  4	  	  →	  Would	  you	  be	  interested	  in	  participating	  in	  PSA	  in	  the	  future?	  	  
   Yes	  	  (go	  to	  section	  F,	  question	  41):	  3	  
   No	  (go	  to	  section	  F,	  question	  41):	  0	  	  b. When	  did	  you	  hear	  about	  the	  PSA	  program	  for	  the	  first	  time?	  __1997______	  (year)	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c. 	  How	  did	  you	  hear	  about	  PSA	  the	  first	  time?	  __Through	  Centro	  Agrícola,	  media,	  
neighbours/friends/people	  in	  town__________________________________	  	  
18 Have	  you	  ever	  applied	  for	  a	  PSA	  forest	  protection	  or	  reforestation?	  
  Yes:	  85	  	  →	  Did	  you	  receive	  contract?	  
  Yes:	  68	  
  No:	  13	  (go	  to	  question	  27,	  section	  F)	  
  Other:	  4	  
  No:	  122	  (go	  to	  question	  37,	  section	  G)	  
	  
	  
19 When	  did	  you	  apply	  for	  PSA	  protection	  or	  reforestation	  the	  first	  time?	  
Interviewer:	  Note	  that	  we	  want	  to	  know	  the	  year	  en	  which	  the	  respondent	  applied	  included	  if	  
the	  application	  was	  rejected.	  We	  are	  asking	  related	  to	  PSA	  protection	  or	  reforestation,	  not	  
forest	  management	  or	  agroforestry.	  
	  Protection___2002______	  (year)	  Reforestation___2002_____(year)	  	  
20 Have	  you	  had	  a	  PSA	  protection	  or	  reforestation	  contract	  after	  1998	  or	  do	  you	  
currently	  have	  one?	  	  
	  
  Yes:	  68	  
→ 	  Have	  you	  had	  a	  protection/reforestation	  contract	  before	  2006?	  
  Yes:	  	  53	  →What	  kind	  of	  contract?	  	  
  Protection	  	  (Ir	  a	  sección	  A,	  pregunta	  22)	  
  Reforestation	  (Ir	  a	  sección	  B,	  pregunta	  23)	  
  No:	  13	  
	  
  No:	  6	  	  
	  
	  
Go	  to	  section	  F	  (question	  27)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
C. PSA	  Participants	  protection	  contract	  
	  
21 For	  this	  question	  we	  want	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  the	  landowners’	  PSA	  protection	  
contract(s).	  	  	  	  
a. How	  many	  hectares	  do	  you	  have/did	  you	  have	  under	  forest	  protection	  contract	  
and	  how	  many	  do/did	  you	  have	  at	  other	  farms?	  	  
b. From	  which	  year(s)	  was/were	  the	  contract(s)?	  	  	  	  
c. How	  much	  did/do	  you	  receive	  per	  year/per	  ha?	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d. Which	  type	  of	  forest	  do	  you	  have	  under	  protection	  contract	  (primary	  or	  
secondary)	  
	  	  	   Forest	  protection	  
(a)	  	   Forest	  protection,	  other	  farms	  	  
(a)	  	  
Ha	  (a)	   Year	  
(b)	  	  	  	  	   ¢/year/ha	  (c)	   Type	  of	  forest	  (d)	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	   2003	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Primary:12,	  Secondary:	  14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Both:	  	  	  	  	  10	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	   2007	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  Primary:	  8,	  Secondary:	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Both:	  	  3	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   54	   2010	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Primary:	  1,	  Secondary:	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Both:	  	  1	  
	  
	  
e. If	  you	  were	  not	  in	  the	  PSA	  program	  and	  there	  were	  no	  laws	  restricting	  the	  use	  of	  
forest/land,	  what	  do	  you	  think	  you	  would	  have	  used	  the	  forest	  under	  protection	  
contract	  for	  instead	  (how	  many	  hectares	  for	  which	  land-­‐use)?	  	  
	  1) Would	  have	  kept	  the	  forest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___32____	  	  	  ha	  2) Sustainable	  management	  of	  foreset	  for	  wood	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __2_____	  	  	  ha	  3) Would	  have	  converted	  the	  forest	  to	  pastures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __3_____	  	  	  ha	  4) Would	  have	  converted	  the	  area	  to	  forest	  plantation(s)	  _____0,2__	  	  	  ha	  5) Would	  have	  converted	  the	  forest	  to	  crops	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___0,5____	  	  	  ha	  6) Other,	  specify:	  _Would have sold it___________         __1,5_____	  	  ha	  	   	  	   f. What	  is	  the	  main	  use(s)	  of	  the	  payment	  you	  recieve	  for	  the	  PSA	  protection	  
contract?	  
Interviewer:	  One	  may	  have	  máximum	  two	  answers	  	  
  Savings:	  0	  
  Investments	  at	  the	  farm:	  	  12	  
  Investment	  in	  other	  economic	  activities	  outside	  the	  farm:	  	  
  Education:	  0	  
  Subsistence	  (travels,	  health,	  food,	  clothing	  etc.):	  5	  
  Other,	  specify:	  _(combinations	  of	  the	  other	  alternatives):	  12	  	  
g. How	  satisfied	  are	  you	  with	  the	  PSA	  program	  forest	  protection?	  	  
  Satisfied:	  29	  
  	  Insatisfied:	  2	  
  No	  opinion:	  3	  	   	  h. Did	  you	  receive	  the	  FONAFIFO	  payment	  in	  the	  time	  agreed	  upon?	  	  
  Yes:	  17	  
  No:	  16	  →	  How	  many	  days	  after	  the	  agreed	  time?	  	  
o First	  payment:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___89____days	  
o Second	  payment:	  __142_____days	  
o Third	  payment:	  	  	  	  	  __95_____days	  
o Forth	  payment:	  __89_____days	  
o Fifth	  payment:	  __159_____days	  
	  
i. What	  do	  you	  think	  should	  be	  changed	  or	  improved	  in	  the	  PSA	  protection	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program?	  
Interviewer:	  Do	  not	  read	  the	  alternatives,	  if	  the	  respondent	  gives	  various	  answers,	  ask	  for	  
the	  two	  most	  important.	  	  	  For	  example:	  	  
  Requirements	  of	  eligibility:	  1	  
  Application	  costs:	  1	  
  Payment	  level:	  11	  
  Payment	  punctuality:	  3	  
  The	  way	  in	  which	  compliance	  of	  the	  contract	  is	  monitored:	  0	  
  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  disputes	  are	  resolved:	  0	  
  Others:_Combinations	  of	  alternatives	  above:	  14	  __________________________________	  	  j. Are	  you	  planning	  to	  apply	  for	  PSA	  protectionn	  o	  reforestacion	  in	  the	  future?	  
Interviewer:	  the	  respondents	  may	  choose	  more	  than	  one	  alternative.	  	  
  No:	  13	  
  Yes,	  renew	  contract:	  22	  	     Yes,	  new	  area:	  23	    Do	  not	  know:	  8
(answers	  here	  are	  added	  for	  both	  the	  protection	  and	  reforestation	  contract)	  
	  
Go	  to	  question	  23	  (section	  E)	  
	  
	  
D. PSA	  Participants	  reforestation	  	  	  
	  
22 	  
a. Which	  species	  of	  forest	  plantation	  do	  you	  have/did	  you	  have	  (e.g.	  Teak)?	  
b. In	  which	  year	  were	  the	  plantations	  planted?	  
c. How	  many	  hectares	  were	  planted?	  
d. With	  which	  density	  or	  trees	  per	  hectar	  was	  it	  planted?	  
e. How	  much	  (how	  many	  trees	  or	  percentage)	  have	  been	  thinned?	  
f. What	  will	  be	  or	  was	  the	  final	  cut	  (in	  “pulgadas”)?	  
g. How	  much	  do/did	  they	  pay	  you	  per	  ha/year?	  
Species	  (a)	  	   ha	  (c)	   	  Year	  of	  
planting	  (b)	  
Density	  o	  no	  of	  
trees	  (3x3,4x4)	  
per	  ha	  (d)	  
Thinning	  
(e)	  	  
Final	  cut	  in	  
‘pulgadas’	  
‘(PMT)	  (f)	  	  
Teak,	  Melina,	  Gallinazo,	  
Pochote	  
12	   2003	   	   	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	   2006	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   14	   2005	   	  	   	  	   	   	  
	   	  
h. If	  you	  were	  not	  in	  the	  PSA	  program	  and	  there	  were	  no	  laws	  restricting	  the	  use	  of	  
forest/land,	  what	  do	  you	  think	  you	  would	  have	  used	  the	  land	  under	  
reforestation	  contract	  for	  instead	  (how	  many	  hectares	  for	  which	  land-­‐use)?	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Forest	  plantation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___5____	  	  	  ha	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Agricultural	  crops	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___1____	  	  ha	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Pastures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___7____	  	  ha	  Would	  not	  have	  used	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __0,4_____	  	  ha	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Other,	  speciy:	  __Natural	  regeneration_________________       _____5__	  	  ha	   	  
	   k. What	  is	  the	  main	  use(s)	  of	  the	  payment	  you	  recieve	  for	  the	  PSA	  protection	  
contract?	  
	  	  	  Interviewer:	  One	  may	  have	  máximum	  two	  answers	  	  
  Savings:	  1	  
  Investments	  at	  the	  farm:	  24	  
  Investment	  in	  other	  economic	  activities	  outside	  the	  farm:	  1	  
  Education:	  0	  
  Subsistence	  (travels,	  health,	  food,	  clothing	  etc.):1	  
  Other,	  specify:	  __Combinations	  of	  other	  alternatives_____:	  3	  
	  
l. How	  satisfied	  are	  you	  with	  the	  PSA	  program	  forest	  protection?	  	  
  Satisfied:	  24	  
  	  Insatisfied:	  4	  
  No	  opinion:	  2	  	   	  m. Did	  you	  receive	  the	  FONAFIFO	  payment	  in	  the	  time	  agreed	  upon?	  	  
  Yes:	  13	  
  No:	  16	  →	  How	  many	  days	  after	  the	  agreed	  time?	  	  
o First	  payment:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __175_____days	  
o Second	  payment:	  __148_____days	  
o Third	  payment:	  	  	  	  	  __109_____days	  
o Forth	  payment:	  __113_____days	  
o Fifth	  payment:	  __123_____days	  
	  
	  
	  
n. What	  do	  you	  think	  should	  be	  changed	  or	  improved	  in	  the	  PSA	  protection	  
program?	  
Interviewer:	  Do	  not	  read	  the	  alternatives,	  if	  the	  respondent	  gives	  various	  answers,	  
ask	  for	  the	  two	  most	  important.	  	  	  For	  example:	  	  
  Requirements	  of	  eligibility:	  1	  	  
  Application	  costs:	  0	  
  Payment	  level:	  6	  
  Payment	  punctuality:	  1	  
  The	  way	  in	  which	  compliance	  of	  the	  contract	  is	  monitored:	  0	  
  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  disputes	  are	  resolved:	  0	  
  Others:___More	  information,	  more	  councelling,	  payments	  in	  advance,	  more	  flexibility	  
and	  combinations	  of	  alternatives	  above:___20________	  __________________________________	  	  o. Are	  you	  planning	  to	  apply	  for	  PSA	  protection	  or	  reforestacion	  in	  the	  future?	  
Interviewer:	  the	  respondents	  may	  choose	  more	  than	  one	  alternative.	  	  
  No:	  13	     Yes,	  new	  area:	  21	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  Do	  not	  know:	  8	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (answers	  here	  are	  added	  for	  both	  the	  protection	  and	  reforestation	  contract)	  
	  	  
E. Participation	  costs	  
	  
23 FOREST	  PROTECTION	  –If	  not	  a	  participant	  in	  “forest	  protection,	  go	  to	  question	  25	  a. By	  which	  institution	  did	  you	  apply,	  and	  how	  much	  time	  have	  you	  spent	  for	  the	  
application	  (fill	  out	  papers/forms,	  visits	  to	  offices,	  visits	  at	  the	  farms	  by	  
regentes/intermediaries	  etc.)?	  
	  
  Directly	  to	  FONAFIFO/forest	  official:	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __15hrs/3days_____	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Intermediary	  	  
o Agricultural	  Center	  (CACH):	  34	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __3hrs/3days_____	  hours	  or	  days	  
o NGO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
o Other	  organization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Other	  disadvantages(e.g.	  topographer)	  ,	  specify:	  	  	  	  	  	  _e.g.	  lawyer,	  paperwork,	  councelling______	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ______3,5_____	  hours	  	  
	   b. Have	  you	  had	  to	  consult	  an	  attorney	  for	  matters	  concerning	  tenancy	  or	  
“escritura”	  or	  other	  things	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application?	  
  No:	  24	  
  Yes:	  13	  →	  How	  much	  did	  it	  cost	  you?_26US$__	  	  	  	  	  In	  which	  year?	  	  	  2004_______	  
	   	  c. Have	  you	  had	  other	  costs	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application	  (forest	  officials,	  
topographer	  etc.?	  
  No:	  22	  
  Yes:	  15	  	  	  →	  	  Which:	  	  _e.g.	  topographer,	  copies,	  forest	  officials_______________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  How	  much	  were	  the	  costs?	  	  ___329US$__________	  	  In	  which	  year?	  __2003_____	  
	  
24 	  
a. In	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requirements	  for	  PSA	  protection,	  how	  many	  hours	  
have	  you	  spent	  for	  the	  following:	  
	  
Interviewer:	  If	  the	  landowner	  hired	  labour	  for	  the	  preparation/maintenance,	  note	  how	  
many	  days.	  	  
	   i. Forest	  officials/intermediaries	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___5________	  	  	  hours	  ii. Preparations/mantenance:	  
Do/maintain	  patrols	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  hours	  (or	  days)	  
Do/maintain	  fences	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  hours	  (or	  days)	  
Do/maintain	  signs	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  hours	  (or	  days)	  Total:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __166hrs/20days__	  	  hours	  (or	  days)	  	  iii. Other,	  specify:________________________	   	   	  _____________hours	  iv. Do/did	  you	  hired	  labour?	  Which	  percentage	  of	  the	  work	  was	  performed	  by	  hired	  labour?	  _82___%	  
o 	  How	  much	  do/did	  you	  pay	  per	  hour?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____1,8	  USD_________	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b. 	  If	  you	  were	  not	  going	  to	  spend	  this	  time	  in	  any	  of	  the	  activities	  mentioned	  
above,	  which	  would	  have	  been	  the	  alternative	  use	  of	  time?	  	  
Interviewer:	  If	  it	  was	  hired	  labour	  only,	  the	  question	  is	  not	  necessary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __e.g	  the	  same	  as	  with	  PSA,	  cattle	  farming________________________________	   	  
	  
	  
25 REFORESTATION	  –	  if	  not	  participant	  in	  “reforestation”,	  go	  to	  question	  40	  a. By	  which	  institution	  did	  you	  apply,	  and	  how	  much	  time	  have	  you	  spent	  for	  the	  
application	  (fill	  out	  papers/forms,	  visits	  to	  offices,	  visits	  at	  the	  farms	  by	  
regentes/intermediaries	  etc.)?	  
	  
  Directly	  to	  FONAFIFO/forest	  official:	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___11	  days____	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Intermediary	  	  
o Agricultural	  Center	  (CACH):	  24	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __4,5hrs,	  2	  days_____	  hours	  or	  days	  
o NGO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
o Other	  organization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Other	  disadvantages(e.g.	  topographer)	  ,	  specify:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __Forest	  officials	  _______________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____1	  day_____	  hours	  or	  days	  
	   b. Have	  you	  had	  to	  consult	  an	  attorney	  for	  matters	  concerning	  tenancy	  or	  
“escritura”	  or	  other	  things	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application?	  
  No:	  24	  
  Yes:	  5	  →	  How	  much	  did	  it	  cost	  you?	  ___60USD__________¢	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  which	  year?	  _2002_	  
	   	  c. Have	  you	  had	  other	  costs	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application	  (forest	  officials,	  
topographer	  etc.?	  
  No:	  21	  
  Yes:	  	  7	  	  	  →	  	  Which:	  	  _Forest	  officials,	  topographer_______________________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  How	  much	  were	  the	  costs?	  	  _171USD____________¢	  	  In	  which	  year?	  ___2004____	  
	  
	  
26 	  
a. In	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requirements	  for	  PSA	  protection,	  how	  many	  hours	  
have	  you	  spent	  for	  the	  following:	  
	   Interviewer:	  If	  the	  landowner	  hired	  labour	  for	  the	  establishment/maintenance,	  note	  how	  many	  days(/year).	  	  
	   i. Forest	  officials/Intermediaries	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___24hrs________	  	  	  days/year	  ii. Establishment:	  Management	  plan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days	  Preparation	  of	  the	  land	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days	  Purchase	  and	  transport	  of	  plants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days	  Planting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days	  “Rodajea”/”Chapea”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days	  Fertilization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days	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Total	  establishment:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _250hrs/_31days__________	  	  days	  	  iii. Maintenance:	  Quemical	  control/herbicide/pesticide	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days/year	  	  Maintain	  patrols	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  days/year	  	  Vigilance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  days/year	  	  Fences	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  days/year	  	  Make/maintain	  signs	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  ____________	  days/year	  	  Total	  maintenance:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _371hrs/	  25days________	  	  days/year	  	  	  iv. Other,	  specify:_______________	   	   	   	  _____________hours	  v. Did	  you	  hire	  labour?	  If	  yes,	  which	  percentage	  of	  the	  work	  was	  performed	  by	  hired	  labour?	  _70___%	  
o 	  How	  much	  was	  paid	  per	  hour?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____2,1USD_________	  ¢	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
b. If	  you	  were	  not	  going	  to	  spend	  this	  time	  in	  any	  of	  the	  activities	  mentioned	  
above,	  which	  would	  have	  been	  the	  alternative	  use	  of	  time?	  	  Interviewer:	  If	  it	  was	  hired	  labour	  only,	  the	  question	  is	  not	  necessary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___Cattle	  ranching,	  maintenance,	  plant	  with	  own	  resources__________________________	  	   	  
Go	  to	  question	  40	  (section	  H)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
F. Non-­‐	  participants	  (but	  who	  have	  applied	  for	  a	  PSA	  contract)	  
	  
27 Why	  do	  you	  currently	  do	  not	  have	  a	  contract?	  	  
  Do	  not	  know	  the	  PSA	  system:	  0	  
  Was	  rejected:	  10	  
  Is	  at	  waiting	  list:	  8	  
  Contract	  expired	  (go	  to	  question	  43):	  3	  
  Other,	  specify:	  11__e.g.	  problems	  with	  application,	  has	  sold	  the	  farm,	  not	  agreement	  
among	  the	  owners_____________________________	  	  	  	  (go	  to	  question	  43):	  	  
	  
	  
a. If	  “rejected”,	  why	  do	  you	  think	  the	  contract	  was	  rejected?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __Farm	  outside	  priority	  areas,	  legal	  problems,	  problems	  with	  requirements_______________	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28 FOREST	  PROTECTION	  –	  if	  not	  applied	  for	  a	  forest	  protection	  contract,	  go	  to	  
question	  40	  
For	  this	  question,	  we	  wish	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  the	  contract(s)	  that	  the	  landowner	  has	  
applied	  for	  and	  the	  alternative	  use	  of	  the	  farm/land	  	  
a. For	  how	  many	  hectares	  did	  you	  apply,	  for	  this	  farm	  and	  for	  other	  farms?	  	  
b. In	  what	  year	  did	  you	  apply?	  
c. How	  much	  would	  they	  have	  paid	  you	  per	  ha	  per	  year?	  
d. What	  type	  of	  forest	  did	  you	  wish	  to	  include	  in	  PSA	  protection	  (primary	  or	  
secundary)?	  
	  Forest	  protection	  
(a)	  	   Forest	  protection,	  other	  farms	  (a)	  	   Ha	  (a)	   year	  (b)	  	  	  	  	   ¢/año/ha	  (c)	   Type	  of	  forest(d)	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   17,2	   2009	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  Primary:	  2,	  Secondary:6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 	   a. 	  By	  which	  institution	  did	  you	  apply,	  and	  how	  much	  time	  have	  you	  spent	  for	  the	  
application	  (fill	  out	  papers/forms,	  visits	  to	  offices,	  visits	  at	  the	  farms	  by	  
regentes/intermediaries,	  attorneys	  etc.)?	  
	  
  Directly	  to	  FONAFIFO/forest	  official:	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___4hrs_____	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Intermediary	  	  
o Agricultural	  Center	  (CACH):	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __3hrs,	  2	  days___	  hours	  or	  days	  
o NGO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
o Other	  organization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Other	  disadvantages(e.g.	  topographer)	  ,	  specify:	  	  0	  	  	  ________________________________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
	   b. Have	  you	  had	  to	  consult	  an	  attorney	  for	  matters	  concerning	  tenancy	  or	  
“escritura”	  or	  other	  things	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application?	  
  No:	  10	  
  Yes:	  0	  	  →	  How	  much	  did	  it	  cost	  you?	  _____________¢	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  which	  year?	  _______	  
	   	  c. Have	  you	  had	  other	  costs	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application	  (forest	  officials,	  
topographer	  etc.?	  
  No:	  8	  
  Yes:	  2	  	  	  →	  	  Which:	  	  __Paperwork,	  topographer______________________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  How	  much	  were	  the	  costs?	  	  __55USD___________¢	  	  In	  which	  year?	  __2008_____	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32 If	  you	  had	  participated	  in	  PSA,	  how	  much	  time	  do	  you	  think	  you	  would	  have	  spent	  for	  
the	  following	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  PSA	  requirements	  (not	  for	  the	  application):	  	  
Interviewer:	  If	  the	  landowner	  would	  hire	  labour	  for	  preparations/maintenance,	  note	  how	  
many	  days.	  	  
	   i. Forest	  officials/Intermediaries	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days/year	  ii. Preparaciones/mantenimiento	  por	  rondas,	  cercas	  y	  rótulos	  ____________	  	  days/year	  	  	  	  	  Total:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __32__________	  	  days/year	  	  iii. Other,	  specify:________________________	   	   	  	  	  	  	  _____________days/year	  iv. Would	  you	  hire	  labour?	  How	  much	  would	  you	  pay	  per	  hour?	  	  __2,3USD___________	  ¢	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
33 REFORESTATION	  –	  if	  not	  applied	  for	  PSA	  reforestation,	  go	  to	  question	  40	  
a. Which	  species	  of	  forest	  plantation	  did	  you	  apply	  for	  (e.g.	  Teak)?	  
b. In	  which	  year	  did	  you	  apply?	  
c. How	  many	  hectares	  did	  you	  apply	  for/intend	  to	  plant?	  
d. With	  which	  density	  or	  trees	  per	  hectar	  did	  you	  plan	  to	  plant?	  
e. How	  much	  (how	  many	  trees	  or	  percentage)	  have	  been	  thinned?	  
f. What	  would	  have	  been	  the	  final	  cut	  (in	  “pulgadas”)?	  
g. How	  much	  would	  they	  have	  paid	  you	  per	  ha/year?	  
Specie	  (a)	  	   ha	  (c)	   	  Year	  of	  
application	  
(b)	  
Density	  or	  how	  
many	  trees	  
(3x3,4x4)	  per	  ha	  
(d)	  
Final	  cut	  in	  
‘pulgadas’	  
(PMT)	  (e)	  	  
¢/year/ha	  (f)	  
	  	  Teak,	  Melina	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7	   2009	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
34 	  
a. By	  which	  institution	  did	  you	  apply,	  and	  how	  much	  time	  have	  you	  spent	  for	  the	  
application	  (fill	  out	  papers/forms,	  visits	  to	  offices,	  visits	  at	  the	  farms	  by	  
regentes/intermediaries,	  attorneys	  etc.)?	  
	  
  Directly	  to	  FONAFIFO/forest	  official:	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Intermediary	  	  
o Agricultural	  Center	  (CACH):	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __4hrs,	  1,5days_____	  hours	  or	  days	  
o NGO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
o Other	  organization	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
  Other	  disadvantages(e.g.	  topographer)	  ,	  specify:	  	  	  	  	  ________________________________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________	  hours	  or	  days	  
	  
b. Have	  you	  had	  to	  consult	  an	  attorney	  for	  matters	  concerning	  tenancy	  or	  
“escritura”	  or	  other	  things	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application?	  
  No:	  4	  
122	  	  
  Yes:	  0	  	  	  →	  How	  much	  did	  it	  cost	  you?	  _____________¢	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  which	  year?	  _______	  
	   	  
c. Have	  you	  had	  other	  costs	  related	  to	  the	  PSA	  application	  (forest	  officials,	  
topographer	  etc.?	  
  No:	  4	  
  Yes:	  0	  	  	  →	  	  Which:	  	  ________________________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  How	  much	  were	  the	  costs?	  	  _____________¢	  	  In	  which	  year?	  _______	  
	  
	  
35 If	  you	  had	  participated	  in	  PSA,	  how	  much	  time	  do	  you	  think	  you	  would	  have	  spent	  for	  
the	  following	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  PSA	  requirements	  (not	  for	  the	  application):	  	  
Interviewer:	  If	  the	  landowner	  would	  hire	  labour	  for	  preparations/maintenance,	  note	  how	  
many	  days.	  	  
	   i. Forest	  officials/Intermediaries	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___________	  	  	  days/year	  ii. Establishment	  (management	  plan,	  preparation	  of	  the	  land,	  purchase	  and	  transport	  of	  plants,	  planting,	  ‘rodajea’/’chapea’,	  fertilization)	  Winter	  (rainy	  season):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days/year	  Summer	  (dry	  season):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days/year	  Total	  establecimiento:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _400hrs/50days______	  	  days/year	  
	  
iii. Maintenance:	  (quimical	  control,	  maintenance	  patrols,	  fences,	  signs)	  Winter	  (rainy	  season):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days/year	  Summer	  (dry	  season):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________	  	  days/year	  Total	  mantenimiento:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _92hrs/1	  day___________	  	  days/days	  	  iv. Other,	  especify:_______________	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _____________hours	  v. Would	  you	  hire	  labour?	  How	  much	  would	  you	  pay	  per	  hour?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___2USD______	  ¢	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Are	  you	  planning	  to	  apply	  for	  PSA	  protection	  or	  reforestation	  in	  the	  future?	  
  No:	  3	  
  Yes:	  9	  
  Do	  not	  know:	  0	  
	  
Go	  to	  question	  40	  (section	  H)	  
	  
	  
	  
G. Non-­‐participants	  (who	  never	  have	  applied	  for	  any	  PSA	  contract)	  
	  
37 Why	  have	  you	  never	  applied	  for	  a	  PSA	  contract?	  	  
  Do	  not	  know	  the	  program:	  11	  
  Do	  not	  know	  how	  to	  apply:	  1	  
  Too	  complicated	  process:	  9	  
  Does	  not	  trust	  state	  institutions	  or	  the	  intermediaries	  (or	  do	  not	  want	  them	  on	  their	  property):	  0	  
  The	  payment	  is	  less	  than	  what	  they	  may	  gain	  using	  the	  forest/land	  for	  something	  else:	  
14	  
123	  	  
  Do	  not	  have	  enough	  money	  for	  the	  application	  process:	  
  Do	  not	  believe	  themselves	  eligible	  for	  PSA	  
o Not	  sufficient	  forest:	  23	  
o Not	  secure	  property:	  3	  
o Other	  legal	  issue	  
  Other,	  specify:	  72	  ____Cattle	  needs	  access	  to	  water,	  would	  rather	  like	  to	  sell	  the	  property,	  
would	  not	  have	  used	  the	  area	  anyway,	  not	  agreement	  among	  owners,	  and	  combinations	  
of	  alternatives	  above_____________________________	  	  
If	  you	  received	  an	  offer	  for	  a	  PSA	  contract,	  would	  you	  accept	  it?	  
  Yes:	  46	  
  No:	  39	  	  → 	  Why?	  
  Much	  paperwork:	  7	  
  High	  costs:	  2	  
  Little	  profitability:	  5	  
  Other,	  specify:	  25	  	  _Have	  little	  area,	  all	  owners	  need	  to	  agree,	  want	  the	  
area	  for	  cattle	  farming,	  are	  retired,	  do	  not	  want	  any	  obligations,	  or	  
combinations	  of	  alternatives_______________________________	  
	  
38 Thinking	  of	  the	  possible	  change	  of	  contract	  payments	  in	  the	  future;	  what	  would	  be	  
the	  minimum	  payment	  you	  would	  accept	  for	  applying	  for	  a	  contract	  in	  the	  future?	  	  
  Forest	  protection:	  82	  The	  mininum	  payment	  you	  would	  accept?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___107USD______________¢/ha/year	  
  Reforestation:	  13	  	  	  	  The	  mininum	  payment	  you	  would	  accept?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____247USD______________¢/ha/year	  
  Agroforestry:	  1	  	  	  	  The	  mininum	  payment	  you	  would	  accept?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  __________________¢/ha/year	  
  Do	  not	  know:	  9	  	  	  
H. 	  
	  
39 Considering	  only	  natural/primary	  forest,	  and	  the	  case	  that	  one	  of	  your	  neighbours	  
cuts	  trees	  at	  his/her	  farm	  without	  legal	  authorization;	  what	  do	  you	  consider	  would	  
have	  happened?	  	  	  
Interviewer:	  Do	  not	  read	  the	  alternatives.	  The	  respondent	  might	  want	  to	  indicate	  more	  than	  
one	  answer/alternative.	  
	  
  Nothing	  (the	  law	  does	  not	  apply	  in	  the	  area):	  29	  
  Would	  receive	  a	  warning:	  7	  
  Would	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  little	  fee:	  13	  	  
  Would	  have	  to	  pay	  a	  high	  fee:	  35	  
  Would	  have	  to	  go	  to	  prison:	  25	  
(The	  rest	  of	  the	  answers	  (92)	  are	  combinations	  of	  various	  alternatives	  in	  addition	  to	  
“confiscation	  of	  equipment”,	  “do	  society	  service”,	  “must	  plant	  again”.)	  	  
	  
	  
124	  	  
	  
40 Do	  you	  have	  confidence	  in	  programs	  of	  statal	  institutions	  such	  as	  PSA	  of	  FONAFIFO?	  
  Very	  little:	  10	  
  Little:	  21	  
  Middle/normal:	  117	     Much:	  41	    Do	  not	  know:	  18	  
	  
41 Do	  you	  think	  the	  profitability	  of	  your	  property/land	  will	  increase,	  decrease	  or	  stay	  
the	  same	  the	  next	  15	  years?	  	  	  
  Increase	  a	  little:	  35	  
  Increase	  moderately:	  76	  
  Increase	  much:	  38	   	  
  Decrease	  a	  little:	  9	  
  Decrease	  moderately:	  4	  
  Decrease	  much:	  0	  
  Will	  stay	  the	  same:	  39	  	   For	  what	  reason?	  _E.g.	  increased	  value	  of	  the	  timber	  or	  agricultural	  crops,	  because	  of	  
economic	  crisis,	  decresing	  prices	  of	  cattle___________________________	  	  	  	  
	  
I. Socio-­‐economic	  information	  
	  
42 Gender?	  Interviewer:	  only	  note	  this	  question,	  do	  not	  ask	  	  
  Masculine:	  188	  
  Feminine:	  19	  	  
43 What	  is	  your	  age?	  	  _55_____	  year	  
	  
44 What	  is	  your	  marital	  status?	  	  ______________________	  
	  
45 How	  many	  persons	  live	  in	  your	  home	  (included	  yourself)?	  ___2_____	  men	  (more	  than	  15	  years	  old)	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___1,5_____	  mujeres	  (more	  than	  15	  old)	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___0,5_____	  children	  
 Number	  of	  persons	  in	  total:	  _4_____	  	  
	  
46 What	  is	  your	  highest	  completed	  education	  level	  (primary,	  secundary,	  technician,	  
university)?	  	  
  Incomplete	  primary:	  41	  
  Complete	  primary:	  114	  
  Incomplete	  secondary:	  14	  
  Complete	  secondary:	  9	  
  Incomplete	  technician:	  0	  
  Complete	  technician:	  4	  
  Incomplete	  university:	  5	  
  Complete	  university:	  20	  	  
47 Which	  is	  your	  main	  occupation?	  	  _E.g.	  farmer,	  housewife,	  public	  official,	  retired,	  
merchant_________________________________	  
	  
48 Do	  you	  have	  a	  second	  occupation?	  	  
  Yes:	  83	  	  	  	  	  specify:	  _________________	  
  No:	  124	  	  	  
125	  	  
	  
49 	  
a. Are	  there	  incomes	  in	  the	  family	  that	  does	  originate	  from	  the	  farm	  (the	  farm	  with	  
PSA	  contract	  if	  PSA	  participant)?	  Which	  percentage?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ___47________	  	  %	  	  
b. Which	  percentage	  did	  not	  originate	  from	  the	  farm	  in	  question	  in	  1998?	  __42_____%	  
Interviewer:	  If	  the	  respondent	  does	  not	  remember	  for	  this	  year,	  ask	  for	  13	  years	  ago	  or	  10	  
years	  ago	  if	  it	  is	  easier.	  Note	  how	  many	  years.	  
	  
50 Could	  you	  indicate	  on	  the	  following	  list,	  the	  total	  consume*	  per	  month	  in	  your	  home	  
included	  all	  expenses	  of	  all	  persons	  living	  in	  the	  house?	  	  *Consume	  includes	  all	  expenses	  that	  are	  not	  for	  the	  farm,	  for	  example	  food,	  clothing,	  school	  expenses	  (school,	  high	  school,	  university),	  expenses	  for	  the	  car,	  electrodomestics,	  reparations,	  medicins,	  doctor,	  medical	  insurances,	  gifts	  for	  friends	  or	  family,	  energy,	  telephone,	  water	  etc.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Total	  consume	  per	  month	  
  Less	  than	  25	  000	  colones:	  0	  
  25	  001	  	  	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  000	  colones:	  3	  	  	  
  	  50	  001	  	  –	  	  	  	  100	  000	  colones:	  22	  
  100	  001	  –	  	  	  	  200	  000	  colones:	  74	  
  	  200	  001	  –	  	  	  	  300	  000	  colones:	  52	  
  	  300	  001	  –	  	  	  	  400	  000	  colones:	  17	  
  	  400	  001	  –	  	  	  	  500	  000	  colones:	  18	  
  	  500	  001	  –	  	  	  	  750	  000	  colones:	  12	  
  	  750	  001	  –	  	  	  	  1	  000	  000	  colones:	  4	  
  	  More	  than	  	  	  1	  000	  000	  	  colones:	  5	  	  
51 Thinking	  of	  the	  general	  living	  conditions	  of	  your	  family,	  comparing	  to	  1998,	  do	  you	  
think	  they	  are	  better,	  equal	  or	  worse	  now?	  
  Better:	  104	  
  Equal:	  45	  
  Worse	  now:	  58	  
	  
52 Have	  you	  been	  offered	  to	  sell	  your	  farm	  during	  the	  last	  10	  years?	  
  No:	  99	  
  Yes:	  108	  	  →	  Year	  _2007____	  	  Type	  of	  buyer:	  
  Family:	  0	  
  Other	  farmer:	  19	  
  Enterprise:	  7	  
  Turism	  purposes:	  76	  	  	   Offer	  per	  hectar	  (USD):	  _____14405_____________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  	  
	  
	   127	  
	  
